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NAVAL STAFF HISTORY
SECOND WORLD WAR

RAID ON DIEPPE
(NAVAL OPERATIONS)


19th AUGUST 1942

(Battle Summary No. 33)



Revised 1959

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


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
NAVAL STAFF HISTORY

SECOND WORLD WAR

RAID ON DIEPPE (NAVAL OPERATIONS)

19th August 1942

BATTLE SUMMARY No. 33



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HISTORICAL SECTION
ADMIRALTY

Admiralty, S.W.1.
31st December, 1959

H.S. 14/57

B.R. 1736(26)(Restricted), Naval Staff History, Second World War, *Raid on Dieppe (Naval Operations)*, 1959, having been approved by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, is hereby promulgated.

B.R. 1736(26)(Restricted), dated 1946, is hereby superseded and should be destroyed in accordance with the instructions contained in B.R.1.

By Command of Their Lordships,



J. S. Lang

FOREWORD

Battle Summary No. 33, *Raid on Dieppe (Naval Movements)*, was originally written in 1944.

The events of the Raid had been carefully analysed at Combined Operations Headquarters as soon as it was over, and a combined report was issued in October 1942 (B.R. 1887), which, together with the contemporary reports of Force Commanders, etc., was largely used in the compilation of the Battle Summary.

Since then information from returned prisoners of war and other sources, notably the Official History of the Canadian Army by Colonel C. P. Stacey, have become available. The ensuing revision contains additions and amendments in the light of this information.

The real interest of the Raid lies in the lessons drawn from it, which in their application provided the key to the success of the remarkable series of Allied landings carried out from November 1942 onwards, culminating in Normandy in June 1944.

A summary of these lessons is included in the Battle Summary (Appendix F). There is a detailed examination of them in a pamphlet, B.R. 1887 (1), issued by Combined Operations Headquarters in September 1942, which contains much of permanent value.

April, 1959

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Note on Sources

1. B.R.1887, issued by Combined Operations H.Q. and containing the combined report on the raid, with many plans, diagrams and air photographs. This is referred to in the text as "B.R." This report was issued under the signature of the Chief of Combined Operations, 15th October 1942, just two months after the raid had taken place. The part of the report which deals with planning, preparation, etc. may be taken as accurate, but the part which deals with the actual events of the raid, casualties, etc. naturally requires amendment in the light of information not available when it was produced, e.g. reports of returned prisoners of war, German documents captured in 1945, etc. With these reservations, the report should be studied if it is desired to go more deeply into the details of the operation.

2. M.051641/42, Report from Naval Force Commander to C.-in-C., Portsmouth, dated 30th August 1942, referred to throughout as "M." This contains the detailed narrative of the Naval Force Commander (not included in B.R.) and his conclusions and recommendations. It also contains a number of reports from commanding officers of ships and landing craft and from senior officers of groups. Some of the reports are not complete, being extracts only from the original; and, in a number of them, times are not given.

3. Conference on Landing Assaults (two volumes), issued by the United States Assault Training Centre, E.T.O.U.S.A., and here referred to as "L." Volume I contains an address given on 26th May 1943, by Captain Hughes Hallett on the Dieppe Raid, and an address by General Roberts, who was Military Force Commander at Dieppe.

4. N.I.D. 07886/44. Report by the German C.-in-C., West (Field-Marshal von Rundstedt), containing a report from G.O.C., 81st Army Corps, in whose area Dieppe lay, and also from G.O.C. 15th Army. This is referred to as the "German Report". It is an English translation of an Italian version of the German original. The text may have suffered in the double translation.

5. C.B.4051 (49). Interrogation of survivors of German Armed Trawler U.J.1404.

6. The Royal Marines Report (R.M. 10410/42).

7. M.3146/45. Report of Lt. P. Ross, R.N.V.R., Beachmaster, White beach.

8. H. and A. 809/45. Award to Lt. D. T. Bibby, R.N.V.R., Beachmaster, Red beach.

9. H. and A. 1235/45. Report of Commander G. T. Lambert, R.N.

10. *The Canadian Army, 1939-45*, by Colonel C. P. Stacey, Chapters 4 and 5.

11. *Six Years of War* (Official History of the Canadian Army), by Colonel C. P. Stacey, Vol. I, Chapters X, XI, XII.

12. *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G.* (Collins, 1958).

13. Notes by Vice-Admiral J. Hughes Hallett, February 1958.

14. Notes by Vice-Admiral T. Baillie-Grohman, June 1957.

Abbreviations

A.A.	Anti-aircraft	L.C.T.	landing craft, tank
B.R.	See Note on Sources	L.S.I.	landing ship, infantry
C.C.O.	Chief of Combined Operations	M.	See Note on Sources
C.-in-C.	Commander-in-Chief	M.F.C.	Military Force Commander
C.O.	Commanding Officer	M.G.B.	motor gunboat
E-boat	German armed motor boat (British term)	M.L.	motor launch
E.T.O.U.S.A.	European Theatre of Operations, U.S. Army	M.T.B.	motor torpedo boat (British)
F.O.O.	Forward Observation Officer	N.F.C.	Naval Force Commander
G.O.C.	General Officer Commanding	R-boat	motor boat used for mine- sweeping (German term)
H.Q.	Headquarters	R.M.	Royal Marines
L.	See Note on Sources	S-boat	German M.T.B. (German term)
L.C.A.	landing craft, assault	S.G.B.	steam gunboat
L.C.F.	landing craft, flak	S.O.	Senior Officer
L.C.M.	landing craft, mechanized	T.O.O.	time of origin (of signals)
L.C.P.	landing craft, personnel	U.J.	anti-submarine trawler (German term)
L.C.S.	landing craft, support	U.S.A.A.C.	United States Army Air Corps

Note.—The letters L, M, S, often found in brackets after landing craft, mean Large, Medium and Small.

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CHAPTER I

Preparations

I. INTRODUCTION

The month of April 1942, when the raid on Dieppe was first considered, marked, in almost every theatre of war, the nadir of Allied fortunes since the capitulation of France in 1940. In the Far East, the Japanese had so far carried all before them; Singapore fell on 15th February, Java surrendered on 9th March; Rangoon had been occupied and the fate of Burma and north-east India was in the balance. Some four thousand miles further east, Japanese landings had taken place in East New Guinea; Australia felt herself gravely menaced. In the Middle East a German advance of some 300 miles in Cyrenaica took place in the first week of February; Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham's Mediterranean Fleet, gravely weakened by recent casualties, was hard put to it to protect the vital convoys to Malta, then undergoing savage air attack. Serious losses had been suffered recently by the British Navy¹ and at the same time a new fleet had to be formed for service in the Far East. True, the enforced entry of the United States in the previous December guaranteed *ultimate* success, but some critical months must yet elapse before the damage inflicted on the American Fleet at Pearl Harbour could be made good. The Battle of the Atlantic had entered its grimmest phase; U-boats sank a higher tonnage of merchant shipping in the quarter ending March 1942 than in any previous period, and this was on the increase. Only in Russia had the Axis received a check, where their armies, having failed to achieve a knock-out blow in the autumn, had been caught unprepared for the rigours of a winter campaign and had suffered heavy punishment at the hands of the Russians. The Spring break-up, however, imposed a lull on the Russian front in March.

The British and American Governments had for some time been much concerned about the best way of relieving the intense strain on the Russians. By this time, industry in both the United Kingdom and the United States was getting geared to war. Munitions and equipment, so desperately lacking in the earlier stages, were being produced in ever-greater quantities; increasing shipments against increasing opposition were being sent to Murmansk. But agitation for a "Second Front" in the west was growing in intensity; and troops stationed in the United Kingdom, notably the Canadians, were becoming more and more doubtful whether "they also serve who only stand and wait". Investigation, however, had proved that a large-scale cross-Channel operation would not be feasible in 1942. The best that could be devised was a series of raids on an increasing scale. These had culminated in the fine exploit at St. Nazaire² on 28th March 1942.

¹ Casualties to capital ships and carriers had been particularly unfortunate. In the Mediterranean, the *Ark Royal* and *Barham* had been sunk in November 1941, and the *Valiant* and the *Queen Elizabeth* severely damaged by limpet mines in December; the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* were sunk that month off Malaya. Seven cruisers had been sunk in the last 6 months, and the *Dorsetshire*, *Cornwall* and carrier *Hermes* were lost early in April.

² See *Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No. 12*.

It was against this background that the raid on Dieppe, first known as Operation "Rutter" and later renamed "Jubilee", was undertaken. This was the largest raid actually carried out, and the only one in which the landing of tanks was attempted and in which more than an hour or two was allowed for military operations on shore; it was also the last, because the available landing craft were soon afterwards required for use in the North African expedition, and subsequently the strategic policy regarding raids underwent a change.

2. DIEPPE: DEFENCES

The town and port of Dieppe contained several military objectives such as stores, docks, shipping, railway yards, a radar station at Caude-Côte and the fighter airfield of St. Aubin on the western outskirts of the town. It was estimated that the defences were comparatively weak and manned by second-rate troops. The port was also well within range of English shore-based fighters. In other respects Dieppe was not altogether an easy target for a surprise landing. It lies in a stretch of chalk cliffs which extend from Cap d'Antifer to the town of Ault, 56 miles to the north-east. In the vicinity of the port they are fairly high and present an almost unbroken front to the sea. The only considerable gap is at Dieppe itself, where the river Arques enters the Channel. Other openings in the neighbourhood are few and confined. The beaches are narrow and rocky, with occasional ledges which render landings almost impracticable at or near low water. Smooth water was essential for any undertaking, and wind in excess of force 3 was said to cause a swell. Under these circumstances, in the opinion of Combined Operations Headquarters, opportunities for landing were limited to "about two days a month on an average during the summer."¹ Dieppe, however, was regarded as the only objective which was a "worth-while" target and yet a practicable one from the point of view of distance, defences and beaches.

So far as was known, the defences of Dieppe consisted of a battery of six 5.9-in. naval guns at Varengueville ("Hess" Battery) and a battery of four 5.9-in. naval guns at Berneval ("Goebbels" Battery). Three field batteries, each of four guns (either 4-in. or 5.9-in.), were thought to be situated on the east headland commanding the harbour, behind the town near Arques-la-Bataille, where divisional H.Q. was believed to be located, and near Appeville, not far from the fortified position "Quatre Vents" Farm. Besides these there were a number of A.A. batteries, both light and heavy, some being dual-purpose guns; and of course included in the defences were machine guns in pill-boxes, and small guns behind concrete defences.²

In estimating the suitability of Dieppe as a target, the question of naval and aerial covering bombardment had also to be considered. Very powerful bomber and fighter forces were within easy flying distance of the French coast and it was possible for cruisers or even battleships to manoeuvre off the town in comparative safety. The possibility of effective support in such cases depends partly on the nature of the terrain. If the coast line is fairly low with more or less open country extending some distance inland, the enemy's defences can be bombarded and his lines of supply and reinforcement disrupted during the critical initial disembarkation. The conditions however were not altogether favourable in this respect. Pill-boxes and light gun positions round the harbour

¹ B.R.1887, *The Dieppe Raid—Combined Report*, 1942, p.1. This will be referred to as "B.R."

² In point of fact the defences were stronger than was thought. There was a coastal battery at Arques-la-Bataille and two field batteries on each side of the town. In addition there were eight 75-mm guns in the town, emplaced so as to sweep the beaches (Canadian History, p.67).

entrance, enfilading the coast line to the westward, could be engaged by direct fire, but the built-up area near the main landing beaches constituted a serious obstacle to naval or aerial bombardment during an actual landing. The shell bursts from heavy naval guns would probably have endangered the landing parties, whilst the distance between the sea and the houses was much too narrow for aerial bombardment. There was of course the alternative of heavy protracted bombing to flatten the houses along the sea-front prior to the raid, but it was considered that such action would probably warn the enemy of the impending assault and kill a large number of Frenchmen.

3. ORIGINS OF THE PLAN

The possibilities of an attack were first investigated by the Target Committee of Combined Operations Headquarters early in April 1942,¹ and about the middle of that month the Planning Staff of that Headquarters—under the general direction of Captain J. Hughes Hallett, R.N.—began to prepare an outline plan.

A frontal assault was not contemplated, landings on each flank being proposed—at Quiberville, some six miles to the west of Dieppe, and at Oriel-sur-Mer, about double the distance to the east. These flank landings were to be of roughly brigade strength, and a third brigade was to be held as a floating reserve prepared to reinforce either of the flank landings or to synchronise a frontal attack on Dieppe with the approach of the other brigades to the city.

On 30th March 1942, the Chiefs of Staff had made their approval for the military part of the plans for large raids contingent upon their being agreed by a senior officer nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces.² In this instance Lieutenant-General B. L. Montgomery was chosen. He was, at the time, C.-in-C. South Eastern Command, in which the 2nd Canadian Division was stationed. He at once criticised the military plan on the ground that the distances to be covered by the troops landed on the flanks were such that the city could not possibly be captured within the period dictated by Naval and Air considerations. He therefore proposed that a dawn frontal assault should be made instead, synchronised with two smaller landings either side to seize the cliffs which overlooked Dieppe.

Under this decision of the Chiefs of Staff, H.Q. Home Forces became closely associated with the preparation of the outline plan, and on 14th April their representatives joined the planning syndicate, General Montgomery being kept in broad touch with progress.

In the course of the discussions that took place during April, certain disadvantages which might derive from the C.O.H.Q. proposals for converging attacks on Dieppe were examined. Chief of these was held to be the possible loss of surprise which could occur before the main assaults on the city had time to develop from the flank landings, six and twelve miles away. In this connection, some of the intervening country—particularly to the west—was enclosed and lent itself to delaying action. Further, if time was to be lost in bringing our

¹ This date is taken from B.R., p.2. It is probable that verbal discussions of which no record was kept had taken place at C.O.H.Q. during March.

² The policy at this time was to stage a series of raids on an increasing scale (see p.1). Dieppe was the largest raid so far contemplated, and the first in which a considerable military force—not under C.C.O.'s control, as were the Commandos—was to be put ashore. It was these changed circumstances that led the Chiefs of Staff to make their approval of the military part of outline plans for large-scale raids contingent on their being agreed by a senior officer of Home Forces from which the troops taking part were to be drawn.

strength to bear against Dieppe itself, it would not only make re-embarkation within the time limit dictated by Naval and Air considerations very difficult, but would also increase the risk of German reserves being enabled to intervene in the battle.

These considerations, among others, led to the preparation of two schemes (see Plan 1). One (Scheme A) envisaged a frontal assault preceded by flank attacks at Puits and Pourville whilst parachute and glider-borne troops were simultaneously to capture the batteries at Berneval and Varengeville-sur-Mer. The second (Scheme B), which was in principle a modified version of the original C.O.H.Q. plan, was to dispense with an initial frontal assault and to land two battalions at Puits and two at Pourville, with two more as a floating reserve, whilst a seventh battalion and a battalion of tanks landed at Quiberville.

When these two plans of attack had been prepared they were considered at a conference held on 18th April, at which the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, was represented by his Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Brigadier, General Staff (Plans). In the course of the discussion which then took place, it became apparent that the weight of Army opinion favoured Scheme A. The Naval view was that though a frontal assault was hazardous it was feasible from the naval aspect, subject to a short interval being accepted between the main frontal attack and the subsidiary flank landings, in order to give the L.S.I. sufficient sea room; it was immaterial whether the main attack preceded or followed the flank attacks. All were agreed that the landings should take place in darkness, that they should follow as closely as possible after a heavy air bombardment of Dieppe, and that low-flying attacks against targets ashore should take place as soon as there was sufficient light.

Thus it was that an outline plan on the lines of Scheme A was prepared for the approval of the Chiefs of Staff.

4. ADOPTION OF PLAN "RUTTER"

On 25th April the first formal meeting to consider the plans for the operation (to which the code-name "Rutter" had been given) was held, Vice-Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations, being in the chair. The question of a frontal assault on Dieppe was discussed.

The Army representatives explained the reasons which led them to favour this form of attack. In the first place, to land any force as far west as Quiberville would make a surprise attack on Dieppe more difficult to achieve. In the second place, tanks landed on that beach would have to cross two streams which might prove to be considerable obstacles. The bridges over them would have to be seized at a very early stage in order to make sure they were not demolished by the enemy. Lastly, all available intelligence at that time showed that Dieppe was lightly held by a single low-category battalion, and that the troops in the town, numbering not more than 1,400 all told, could not be heavily reinforced for some time and not by more than 2,500 men within four hours. As the operation was a raid, the time on shore was limited by the anticipated rate of reinforcement of the enemy and governed by the distance of the landing from the objective. The Naval Planners still expressed doubts as to the expediency of the frontal assault, basing the opinion on general and not on naval grounds.¹ It was again emphasised that the landing would be preceded by a bombing attack on the town just before the craft carrying the assaulting troops touched down. This air bombardment would be of maximum intensity, and it was

¹ B.R., p.2.

thought that the defence would be too confused by it and by subsequent attacks by low-flying aircraft to offer stout or prolonged resistance. The bombing was to be carried out from both high and low level, the high-altitude attack being against the town generally, the low-level attack against the sea front and beach defences. The question of fighter cover and air support for the land forces was debated at some length, for it was realised that support from the air would be of paramount importance. It was agreed that the system of Command should be a Joint Command exercised by Naval, Military and R.A.F. Force Commanders.

5. OBJECTIVES

The Outline Plan, including the principle of a frontal assault preceded by bombing, was then adopted and on 9th May was submitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee.¹

The objectives² were defined as:—

- (1) Invasion craft consisting of converted barges and tank landing craft
- (2) German Headquarters located in various hotels
- (3) Gambetta Barracks, and also barracks and coastguard station on the cliff at Puits
- (4) The Casino, used as an ammunition dump
- (5) Railways, marshalling yards, and tunnels
- (6) Gasworks and power station
- (7) Pharmaceutical factory; the destruction of this was desirable in view of the shortage of these products in Germany
- (8) Petrol tanks or dumps
- (9) Bridges and locks
- (10) Food stores at Bassin de Paris, used for the German Army
- (11) St. Aubin fighter airfield
- (12) Town Hall
- (13) Radar station at Caude-Côte
- (14) Post Office, in which was located the main telephone exchange
- (15) E- and R-Boats and Siebel Ferries
- (16) Area of town occupied by Germans.

But the main purpose of the raid was not these minor objectives. A large-scale amphibious invasion of France would eventually be necessary and before serious planning for this operation could be undertaken, it was essential to mount a raid on a divisional scale so as to decide whether a direct attack on a defended port was a reasonable operation of war,³ or whether invading forces should be landed on open beaches at a distance from the objective. It was also necessary to test the different types of landing craft under fire and to obtain experience of an opposed landing of tanks. Though the raid was to all appearances a complete and costly failure, the lessons learnt were invaluable and were the basis of planning for all subsequent landing operations.

¹ B.R., pp.2, 3. The Canadian History gives the date as 11th May.

² B.R., p.1.

³ Admiral-of-the-Fleet Lord Mountbatten has explained that an important object of the raid was to test the possibility of capturing a fully equipped enemy-occupied port in a condition sufficiently *intact and undamaged* to land and maintain the follow-up formations. This aspect of the operation may have had its influence on the decision to abandon the high-level bombing of Dieppe as originally planned (see Section 7) and on the scale of naval gunfire provided.

6. CONFIRMATION OF THE ORIGINAL PLAN

On 13th May the Chiefs of Staff Committee approved the Preliminary Plan as the basis for detailed planning by the Force Commanders. It approved also the employment of Canadian troops and appointed as Military and Air Force Commanders, respectively, Major-General J. H. Roberts and Air Vice-Marshal T. Leigh-Mallory. The Naval Force Commander (Rear-Admiral H. T. Baillie-Grohman) was not appointed till 1st June, as he was then serving in the Middle East, but his place on the planning committee was taken by Commodore T. H. Back. It had also been decided on a previous occasion that the naval Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth (Admiral Sir William James), would be responsible for certain aspects of the raid. He was to settle all administrative questions, decide the time of sailing, make arrangements for the passage to and fro and provide the necessary naval cover. Operations between the time of landing and re-embarkation were, however, outside his sphere of control. The meeting also agreed to seek from the Cabinet approval for the bombing of the town should the Force Commanders deem that this was desirable. A minute was accordingly sent to the Prime Minister on 19th May pointing out that, under the then Cabinet ruling, targets in France could only be bombed when weather conditions permitted of accurate attacks, a restriction which had proved a handicap at St. Nazaire. On that occasion aircraft of Bomber Command arriving over the town stirred up the defences, but the diversionary attack which was an important part of the plan was rendered abortive by cloud conditions hiding the dock area which was their objective.

It was hoped that this ruling might be relaxed in cases of Combined Operations. This permission was obtained. On 1st June the Chiefs of Staff were informed that, though the Prime Minister was still against indiscriminate bombing of French towns at night, an exception would be made in the case of coastal raids.

The plan now provided for a frontal assault by two infantry battalions and up to 30 Army tanks with support from sea and air. The main assault was to be preceded by high-level bombing and by flank attacks delivered half an hour previously, by comparatively small forces. One battalion was to capture the A.A. coast defence and mobile batteries in the area east of Dieppe, and then aid in taking the town. Two other battalions were to perform a similar rôle to the west and also capture the airfield of St. Aubin. Simultaneously, parachute troops were to attack coastal and A.A. batteries and the divisional headquarters 4 miles south-east of Dieppe. The whole operation was to be carried out on two tides, the rear parties being withdrawn under cover of darkness.

It was at this stage that Rear-Admiral Baillie-Grohman arrived in England to take over the detailed naval planning and training for the operation, with his Headquarters in the Isle of Wight (H.M.S. *Vectis*). He was handed the plan by Lord Louis Mountbatten, and a day or so later attended a meeting under the chairmanship of the Chief of Combined Operations, at which were present, amongst others, General Sir Bernard Paget (C.-in-C., Home Forces), Lieut.-General B. L. Montgomery (South Eastern Command) and the Force Commanders. Admiral Baillie-Grohman was concerned at the weakness of the naval supporting fire¹ as proposed (4 "Hunt" Class destroyers mounting 4-in. guns), but the Army officers considered that the air attack as planned could take the place of naval gunfire.

¹ Admiral Baillie-Grohman would have liked a battleship to have been made available, but it was explained to him that one of the purposes of the raid was to provide a success—or what could be represented as a success—to hearten public opinion after the shocks it had endured in the last six months. Whatever happened, the operation could not have been represented as a success had a battleship been lost by mine or otherwise in the confined waters off Dieppe.

7. MODIFICATION OF PLAN

On 5th June a modification to the plan was introduced. It was decided, at a meeting between the executive of Combined Operations, the Force Commanders and General Montgomery, to abandon the high-level bombing of Dieppe on air and military grounds. The Air Force Commander was of the opinion that the bombing of the port itself during the night prior to the assault would not be the most profitable way to use bombers and might only result in putting the enemy on the alert. The Military Commander took the view that the destruction of large numbers of houses and the setting of a considerable portion of the town on fire would probably prevent the tanks from operating in streets choked with debris.¹ As an alternative to high-level bombing the Air Force Commander proposed that diversionary bombing attacks should be made on Boulogne and the airfields at Abbeville-Drucat and Cr  cy. In view of the above opinions, high-level bombing was abandoned in favour of diversionary air attacks which, it was considered, would occupy the attention of the German radar organization and might put out of action for some hours two airfields which the enemy would certainly wish to use during the operation. It was also agreed that cannon-fighters should attack the beach defences and the high ground on either side of Dieppe and that the German Divisional Headquarters at Arques-la-Bataille should be bombed.² These decisions represented an important modification of the original plan. The bombardment was now to be limited to the 4-in. guns of six destroyers and the 250-lb bombs of the Hurricanes.³ A force of M.G.Bs. was to operate off Boulogne in the early stages of the raid to give the impression that the assault would take place there instead of at Dieppe.

A period of intensive training followed, with the idea of carrying out the operation at the first favourable date after 24th June. The period when astronomical and tidal conditions were favourable was limited to some 5 or 6 days twice a month⁴; and it had been accepted that settled fair weather for a period of at least 48 hours was necessary for the operation. Unfortunately the weather proved uniformly unfavourable for the airborne troops, though not consistently so for the beach landings, and on 5th July the operation was further postponed and the plan again altered. Owing to the changed states of the tides, troops would now have to be re-embarked three hours later than originally arranged. This necessitated three hours longer air cover and, in the opinion of the Military Commander, might give the enemy the opportunity to organize infantry and artillery opposition on a scale which might prejudice the re-embarkation. The Force Commanders therefore informed the Chief of Combined Operations that in their view the operation had a diminishing chance of success as each day passed and should not be carried out in its original form on the date proposed (7th July). They were accordingly instructed to consider a modified plan whereby the operation would take place on one tide only. The

¹ B.R., p.6. At this meeting Lieut.-General (later Field-Marshal) Montgomery, who was then G.O.C., South-Eastern Command, took the chair.

² B.R., p.6.

³ The B.R. does not state whether the question of using more powerful warships was considered. C-in-C., Portsmouth (Admiral Sir William James), in his letter to the Admiralty dated 6th September 1942, stated that in his opinion "a ship with heavy guns and up-to-date control for bombardment might have made a very material difference to the course of the operation after the first landing." Naval Force Commander stated (Narrative, para. 30): "A capital ship could have been operated during the first hours of daylight without undue risk and would probably have turned the tide of battle in our favour." The report of Rear-Admiral McGrigor's committee (in M.051641/42) stated that a battleship could have been usefully employed immediately before the landing, but the committee was doubtful whether a capital ship would have been of much use after the troops had landed.

⁴ 21st-26th June, 4th-9th July, 20th-25th July, 3rd-8th August.

landing was now to be made as near low water as possible and to be completed or nearly completed by the next high water. Though on the one hand this "one tide" plan had the advantage of increasing the intensity of air support by shortening the time during which cover would have to be given, on the other hand, it tended to complicate the task of removing the German barges in Dieppe harbour, which was one of the objects of the raid.

8. ABANDONMENT OF "RUTTER"

These modifications were accepted, but the weather continued unfavourable and as the prospects of improvement were poor, the operation was cancelled on 7th July. Early that morning the project had received a setback. Four German fighter bombers, probably F.W. 190s, dropped four 500-kg bombs on two L.S.I. (H.M.S. *Princess Astrid* and H.M.S. *Princess Josephine Charlotte*) then lying in Yarmouth Roads, Isle of Wight, with troops embarked ready for the operation. Both ships were hit, the *Josephine Charlotte* being severely damaged. Large adjustments in the operation orders were rapidly made by the Naval and Military Force Commanders' staffs, and despatched the same day to all ships concerned; and the expedition could have sailed at any time had the weather permitted, albeit the operation would have been somewhat handicapped.¹ This episode probably influenced the decision to cancel the expedition and disperse the forces.

9. OPERATION "JUBILEE"

Subsequently it was decided to remount the operation under the name "Jubilee" as a "one tide" plan. General Montgomery strongly deprecated the revival of the operation, on the grounds that once the fully briefed forces had been dispersed, all hope of secrecy would be lost and he recommended that the raid on Dieppe should be cancelled "for all time". The Chiefs of Staff, however, after careful consideration, approved the operation, and in the event it actually achieved surprise.²

In essentials the actual plan of attack was the same as for "Rutter", but there were some modifications, the most important of which was the substitution of Commandos for airborne troops for the attacks on the extreme flanks to capture the batteries at Berneval and Varengeville, since the use of paratroops demanded ideal weather conditions,³ and also a considerable time would be required for briefing. It had originally been intended to use ten drifters to create a smoke-walled "sanctuary", in which the landing and other craft would lie while the troops were ashore; in the final plan these were dispensed with, as it was considered that the same result could be produced by smoke screens laid

¹ Information supplied by Admiral Baillie-Grohman.

² Captain Hughes Hallett pointed out that, with the troops already trained as they were, the raid could be mounted in such a way as to make it very difficult of detection in advance, for there was no need to concentrate the force beforehand. The various units could move direct from their stations to their ports of embarkation, and embark there on the same evening on which they were to sail. Further dispersion before sailing was obtained by sending certain troops direct from England in their landing craft, instead of in L.S.I. for transhipment off the French coast, as previously planned.

³ Weather conditions permitting the landing of troops, tanks etc., from the naval point of view were not necessarily suitable for paratroop operations. In point of fact, on the day of the operation the weather, though satisfactory from the naval point of view, would have made the employment of airborne troops impossible.

by destroyers, landing craft and from the air. Smoke-carrying aircraft, too, were to mask the defences on the east cliff at the moment the main landing touched down.

Before Operation "Jubilee" could take place there were changes in the Command. In the Army chain of command, in view of the preponderant part to be taken by the Canadians, Lieut.-General H. G. D. Crerar, G.O.C. 1st Canadian Corps, took the place of Lieut.-General Montgomery,¹ who thereafter took no part in the operation.² On the naval side, Rear-Admiral Baillie-Grohman, and his Chief of Staff, Commodore Back, were no longer available, and at the suggestion of Lord Louis Mountbatten two members of the naval staff of Combined Operations Headquarters—Captain J. Hughes Hallett and Commander (acting Captain) J. D. Luce—were appointed as Naval Force Commander and Chief of Staff on 17th July.

By early August the plan had assumed its final shape. There were to be four flank attacks launched at nautical twilight, followed half an hour later by the assault on Dieppe. The landing places (see Plan 1) were to be:—

East of Dieppe

Beach at Berneval	Yellow 1
Beach at Belleville-sur-Mer	Yellow 2
Beach at Puits	Blue

Dieppe

East	Red
West	White

West of Dieppe

Beach at Pourville	Green
Beach near Varengeville	Orange 1
Beach $\frac{1}{4}$ mile east of River Saane	Orange 2

¹ Constitutional questions were involved, the Canadian General Officers being responsible through Lieut.-General McNaughten, G.O.C.-in-C., 1st Canadian Army, to the Canadian Government. The matter is dealt with at length in the Canadian Official History, *Six Years of War*, Vol. I, Chapter X.

² As events turned out, General Montgomery left the United Kingdom for the Middle East on 10th August, about a week before the raid on Dieppe took place. In his *Memoirs* published in 1958, Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery, after alluding to his objection to the remounting of the operation on security grounds, criticises the revised plan for "Jubilee" on two counts, to which he states that he himself would not have agreed:

- (a) The elimination of paratroops and replacement by Commandos. "Commando units, if thought necessary, should have been an addition to, and not a replacement of, the paratroops."
- (b) The elimination of any preliminary bombing of the defences from the air. "The demoralisation of the enemy defence by preliminary bombing was essential (as was done in Normandy in 1944) just before the troops touched down on the beaches."

As regards (a), the reason for the elimination of paratroops has been given in the foregoing. It is pertinent to remark that in the event the Commando on the western flank was completely successful in capturing the battery at Varengeville; and on the eastern flank, but for a fortuitous meeting with a German convoy when approaching the coast which resulted in a failure to land most of the troops, there is no reason to suppose that they would not have been equally successful. As it was, the 20 troops who got ashore considerably embarrassed the battery with rifle fire during the main landing. As regards (b), the decision to eliminate heavy air bombardment had been taken at a meeting as early as 5th June, at which General Montgomery presided (B.R., p.6; *Six Years of War*, p.336), for reasons which no doubt seemed adequate at the time.

The Field-Marshal also remarks that there were too many authorities with a hand in it; "there was no one single operation Commander who was solely responsible for the operation from start to finish". With the C.C.O.—responsible, but without an entirely free hand—C.-in-C., Home Forces, C.-in-C., 1st Canadian Army and their delegates, C.-in-C., Portsmouth, all, to a greater or less degree involved, besides the R.A.F. Commands, the set-up was certainly complicated. But it must not be forgotten that this was the first large-scale combined operation of the kind, and to a large extent experimental.

The naval force¹ consisted of 237 vessels, viz:—

Destroyers	8	Chasseurs	7
Gunboat	1	Landing Craft, Tank	24
Sloop	1	Landing Craft, Flak (large)	6
Landing Ship, Infantry	9	Landing Craft, Support	8
Steam Gunboats	4	Landing Craft, Mechanized	7
Motor Gunboats	12	Landing Craft, Personnel	74
Motor Launches	16	Landing Craft, Assault	60

They carried 6,088 troops:

Canadian Army	305 officers; 4,658	other ranks=4,963
Commandos Nos. 3, 4, 6 and R.M.	65 „ 992	„ =1,057
Inter-Allied Commando		18
U.S. 1st Ranger		50

Total: 6,088

Air force consisted of:—

Fighters	60 squadrons
Fighter-bombers	2 „
Bombers	5 „

Total: 67 squadrons

The attack from Yellow beaches aimed at the capture of the “Goebbels” battery near Berneval, and that from Orange beaches at the corresponding one—“Hess”—near Varengeville. Of the inner flank attacks, that from Blue beach was designed to take another battery—“Rommel”—and attack in the rear the east headland above Dieppe. From Green beach, troops were to capture the fortified position at “Quatre Vents” Farm and take the western headland overlooking the town in the rear. Other troops were to move up the Scie Valley against the airfield of St. Aubin and the German divisional headquarters, which was believed to be at Arques-la-Bataille.² Supported by tanks, the troops landed on the main (Red and White) beaches were to take and hold the town. The east and west headlands were to be heavily bombed by Bostons, as were also the battery on the east cliff and the two batteries behind the town; and immediately after aircraft were to throw smoke screens over the two headlands. Fighters armed with cannon were to co-operate with the attacks on the Berneval and Varengeville batteries, and were also to shoot up the defences along the front at Dieppe.

Destroyers would provide covering bombardment from seaward, while L.C.F. and L.C.S. would give close support during the landings. Once the defences were mastered and our troops were established in the town, the gunboat *Locust* and the “Chasseurs” carrying the Royal Marine Commando were to enter Dieppe harbour, cut out the landing barges, trawlers and any other naval vessels and demolish naval installations and harbour works.

Unfavourable weather and tides caused some delay, but on 17th August the forecast for the next two days, though not very good, was better than that expected later, and at 1000³ the necessary preliminary order was issued for the expedition to sail on the night of 18/19th August. The flank landings were

¹ Details of forces are given in Appendices A and B.

² In point of fact the headquarters had been removed to Envermeu, six miles further east (Canadian History, p.352).

³ Zone minus 1 Time (B.S.T.) is used throughout.

timed for 0450, the main assault for 0520.¹ At a final conference between C.C.O. and the Force Commanders, "the question of air bombardment by heavy bombers was again discussed, but the decision not to use them was confirmed, the Military Force Commander remaining of the opinion that the destruction wrought by such bombardments would make the passage of tanks through Dieppe very difficult if not impossible."² All was set for what the Naval Commander, in a signal made before sailing, termed "an unusually complex and hazardous operation".³

¹ Nautical twilight (sun 12 deg below horizon) commenced 0431: Civil twilight (Sun 6 deg below horizon) 0515. Sunrise was at 0550.

² B.R., p.10.

³ Before sailing, the Naval Force Commander, after consulting C.C.O., placed on record the circumstances in which he intended to abandon the expedition, viz., if a considerable number of ships carrying the troops were sunk on passage (B.R., p.10; and M, enclosure 2, par. 23), and went on to state that "if a number of heavy bombers could have been provided to make low flying attacks on enemy batteries, his conclusion as to the losses he would accept would have been profoundly modified".

CHAPTER II

The Passage

10. THE EMBARKATION; MINESWEEPING (*Plan 2*)

The preliminary order for operation "Jubilee" was issued at 1000 on 17th August and the executive order by Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth's signal, 1002A/18th August, 1942. Embarkation of the tanks sailing from Portsmouth began on the night of 17th, though a smoke screen at Gosport delayed the completion of the loading there until 0330, 18th. The loading hards at Newhaven had been found unsuitable, so the tanks sailing from that port had been embarked at Gosport and sent round there during the previous ten days.¹ Troops were taken on board during the afternoon and evening of 18th August, everything going according to plan.

As a large area off Dieppe was believed to have been mined by the enemy, proceedings were opened by our minesweepers. During the afternoon of 18th, the 9th and 13th Minesweeping Flotilla sailed separately from Portsmouth for the vicinity of Beachy Head, so as to give the impression that one flotilla was carrying out a clearance sweep in the area and the other proceeding on passage up Channel. At 2130, as arranged, they were joined at NN² by the four M.L.s which were to act as their mark boats and rescue craft. In their preliminary manoeuvres here a difficulty arose, as L.C.P. of Group 5 had reached the scene before schedule, having been granted permission to sail 15 minutes early because of the southerly wind. But no delay resulted, and from this point the 9th and 13th Flotillas set course for DD and LL² respectively, to sweep channels through the enemy minefield to FF and QQ². The 9th Flotilla, which consisted of the *Sidmouth*, *Bangor*, *Blackpool*, *Bridlington*, *Bridport*, *Bude*, *Rhyl* and *Tenby*, commenced sweeping at 0003 and at 0105 turned to port and got in sweeps; the 13th Flotilla, which comprised the *Blyth*, *Clacton*, *Eastbourne*, *Felixstowe*, *Ilfracombe*, *Polruan*, *Stornaway* and *Rothersey*, began eight minutes earlier and passed QQ at 0051. Everything went without a hitch; the channels were about four cables wide, clearly marked on each side and at the ends; only one mine was seen.³ The flotillas then manoeuvred to keep clear of the approaching expedition, and soon after 0500 turned for home, setting flag dan buoys to mark the channels in daylight on the way back. They returned in company to Portsmouth, having carried out their work "with efficiency and precision".

¹ The problem arose of how to assemble the flotilla at Newhaven without arousing German suspicions. This was done by sending a flotilla not participating in the raid to Newhaven 10 days in advance of the operation, embarking the tanks in pairs of tank landing craft for several nights before the operation, and subsequently exchanging loaded tank landing craft for empty ones.

² See Plan 2.

³ A number, however, were observed by our forces during their return.

11. THE PASSAGE (*Plan 2*)

The passage was to be made in darkness. The moon (in its first quarter) set at 2316.¹

The size of the expedition, the necessity for dispersal and the existence of the enemy minefield necessitated an elaborate time-table for its passage. With one or two minor exceptions this was faithfully adhered to up to its closing stages.

The force was organised in 13 groups.² Groups 1 and 3 consisted of the L.S.I.s bound for Orange, Green and Blue beaches respectively, and Group 4 of those for Red and White beaches.

Groups 5 and 6, bound for Yellow and Green beaches, and Group 7 carrying the floating reserve, were composed of L.C.P. flotillas.

Groups 8 to 12 consisted of the tank landing craft and Group 13 the Chasseurs carrying the R.M. Commandos and the *Alresford*. Each group included its Coastal forces and close support craft, M.G.B.s, L.C.F., etc.

Groups 1, 2, 3, 4, 12, 13 and part of 10 sailed from Portsmouth and Southampton, the rest from Newhaven and Shoreham. Those from Southampton had to leave before dark; in order to baffle the routine German evening photographic air reconnaissance, they were elaborately disguised to resemble a coastal convoy.

At 2125, 18th August, the *Queen Emma* (Landing Ship, Infantry) passed the East Solent Gate leading Groups 3, 2, 1 and 4 followed by destroyers, all in single line ahead with the escorting S.G.B.s and M.G.B.s disposed on either beam.³ The speed of the *Queen Emma* being slightly in excess of that intended, the Naval Commander in H.M.S. *Calpe* made a signal to her at 0016, 19th August, to reduce speed to 18 knots. The *Calpe* led the destroyers to take station ahead of her, and at 0045 and again at 0106 altered course to enter the western passage through the minefield, which she did at 0110. The *Queen Emma* should have followed, but failed to observe the destroyers' alterations of course and, with the L.S.I. of Groups 1, 2 and 3, entered the eastern passage instead. Here at 0140 they overtook the *Fernie*, which had joined Groups 5 and 8 off Newhaven and was leading them down the far channel according to plan. The minefield had been crossed by 0155 and the L.S.I. had disappeared from sight to starboard. On reaching QQ⁴, the *Calpe* hauled out to the eastward and stopped. At 0145 she sighted the L.S.I. of Groups 1, 2 and 3 and signalled her position by flashing lamp. Twenty-five minutes later the *Glengyle*,⁴ leading Group 4, emerged from the western channel exactly according to schedule and the *Calpe* proceeded to accompany them to their "lowering position"⁴ (RR), 10 miles from Dieppe. Group 4 was escorted by the *Slazak* and *Brocklesby*. The *Locust* failed to keep up with the rest of Group 4 and, with M.L.291, crossed the minefield by an unswept route and was at QQ⁴ by 0245. The first swarms of small craft were then emerging from the eastern channel, with Groups 5 and 8 leading.

¹ 18th August, moonset 2316. 19th August, nautical twilight 0431.

² For details of Groups, see Appendix A.II.

³ The Portsmouth Naval Staff had grave doubts as to whether it would be possible to pass the whole of the force through the gate of the boom within the forty minute period that the timing of the operation required. As much as 4 or 5 hours was suggested, but actually it went according to schedule. Captain Hughes Hallett considered that this was among the most important lessons learned.

⁴ See Plan 2. The passage through the swept channels depended on the use of "G" equipment (navigational aid) in each ship leading a group. The equipment was lent by Bomber Command and worked by R.A.F. personnel. There were doubts about the efficacy of the equipment at the time, and the approach to a narrow channel accurately and without delay had been rehearsed night after night for 14 days before the operation; but in the event it was so successful that under the name "QH" it was subsequently fitted in practically every warship operating in coastal waters.

12. THE APPROACH (*Plan 2*)

As soon as they had cleared the minefield, the leading forces formed up for the opening attack. In the van with their escorting craft were the *Prince Albert*¹ of Group 1 carrying No. 4 Commando, the *Princess Beatrix*¹ and *Invicta*¹ of Group 2 carrying the South Saskatchewan Regiment, the *Queen Emma*¹, *Princess Astrid*¹ of Group 3 with the Royal Regiment of Canada, and Group 5 with No. 3 Commando. These were intended to carry out the flank landings at 0450 at Orange, Green, Blue and Yellow beaches respectively. They were followed by the *Glengyle*,¹ *Prince Charles*¹ and *Prince Leopold*¹ of Group 4 with the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry and the Essex Scottish, who were to make the initial assault on the beaches of Dieppe itself at 0520, and the *Duke of Wellington*¹ with reinforcements for Blue beach. Next came the *Calpe* (the headquarters ship), *Fernie* (the stand-by headquarters ship) with the *Locust* and Group 8. Behind were Group 6 with the Camerons of Canada who were to land on Green beach at 0520, and Group 7 with the Fusiliers Mont Royal who constituted the floating reserve: then followed Group 9, with Groups 10 and 11 far astern, all three carrying tanks for Red and White beaches. The destroyers acted as screening forces, the second division (*Garth*, *Berkeley*, *Albrighton* and *Bleasdale*) being to starboard, and the third division (*Slazak* and *Brocklesby*) to port. The L.S.I. now made for their respective lowering positions (SS, GG, BB and RR² for Groups 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively), and all craft were safely in the water within three minutes of schedule—0300 for Groups 1, 2 and 3, 0320 for Group 4. The distance from the lowering positions to the beaches was about ten miles. This long run-in was accepted because it was desired to keep the landing ships outside the range of the enemy radar. The L.S.I. turned somewhat unwillingly for home, the monotony of their return passage being broken only by a minor collision between the *Princess Beatrix* and *Invicta*. The landing craft formed up. The *Princess Astrid*'s flotilla lost precious minutes through some of their number forming up on an M.G.B. which, having got out of station, had appeared near the spot where M.G.B. 316 was expected.

13. SITUATION 0340, 19th AUGUST

By 0340 it was possible to view the progress made with considerable satisfaction. There had been some inevitable deviations from programme, but they had been neither numerous nor important. The L.S.I. were steaming homeward after accomplishing their task successfully and the first waves of landing craft had formed up and were being led in to their respective beaches as follows:—

Orange Beach (Varengeville)	M.G.B.312, the <i>Prince Albert</i> 's flotilla, S.G.B.9
Green Beach (Pourville)	M.G.B.317, the <i>Princess Beatrix</i> ' and <i>Invicta</i> 's flotillas, S.G.B.6
White Beach (Dieppe, West)	M.G.B.326, the <i>Glengyle</i> 's flotilla
Red Beach (Dieppe, East)	M.L.291, the <i>Prince Charles</i> 's and <i>Prince Leopold</i> 's flotillas
Blue Beach (Puits)	M.G.B.316, the <i>Queen Emma</i> 's and <i>Princess Astrid</i> 's flotilla, S.G.B.8
Yellow Beach (Berneval)	Group 5 (S.G.B.5, 23 L.C.P., M.L.346, L.C.F.(L)1)

¹ Landing Ships, Infantry² See Plan 2.

In the rear was the *Duke of Wellington's* flotilla, bound for Blue beach. On either wing the six destroyers were carrying out protective patrols and beyond them lay outer screens of coastal craft. To the northward, spread over several miles, stretched the remaining groups. First, Groups 8 and 6 with the *Fernie* ahead and the *Calpe* astern of the former, then Groups 7, 9, 10 and 11. In the rear, due to clear the minefield by 0355, were the *Alresford* and her Chasseurs, whilst well on the far side of the passages was Group 12 and its spare L.C.T., not due on the scene for some hours.

Meanwhile from 0330 to 0450 M.G.B.s 6, 7 and 9 were making the small-scale diversion off Boulogne according to plan. Depth charges and smoke floats were dropped, but the enemy seemed unimpressed. No hostile ships were sighted, nor was there any sign of activity ashore.

It had been thought possible that the convoy might be attacked by enemy E-boats, but none were sighted. They were otherwise engaged. The fifth German S-boat (M.T.B.) flotilla was laying mines during the night in Lyme Bay; the fourth S-boat flotilla was at Boulogne, and after the attack commenced the German Naval Command decided that it was useless to employ E-boats against a force protected by destroyers.¹

Just when all was going so smoothly there occurred an unfortunate mischance.

14. ACTION WITH ENEMY FORCES (*Plan 4*)

During the passage Group 5 had become somewhat disorganized, a slight delay outside the harbour necessitating a rather greater speed than the L.C.P. could comfortably maintain. Group 5 consisted of 23 L.C.P.(L) carrying No. 3 Commando which was to land on Yellow beaches to the eastward. The group was escorted by S.G.B.5., M.L.346 and L.C.F.(L) 1, the whole under the command of Commander D. B. Wyburd, R.N., while the troops were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. F. Durnford-Slater.

At 0340 the *Slazak* and *Brocklesby* crossed the bows of Group 5 from starboard to port.² Then came a critical interlude. At 0347 Group 5 suddenly encountered an enemy convoy consisting of five small motor coasters escorted by three escort vessels. Three patrol vessels off Dieppe apparently supported this convoy later.³ About 7 miles from the shore S.G.B.5 sighted a ship on her port bow and immediately the group was lit up by enemy star-shell. It was at first thought that the *Slazak* and *Brocklesby* had mistaken Group 5 for the enemy, but it was soon seen that this was not the case; in fact, the destroyers at this time were about 4 miles to the N.N.E.⁴

¹ German Report, para. 1a.

² M, Appendix 7, page 47. Extract of Report by Commander Wyburd. Commander Wyburd estimated that he was half a mile to the east of the approach course and six to seven miles from the coast.

³ Estimates of the strength of the enemy vary; the above figure is taken from the German Report (Appendix G, para. 1a). Actually the version of the report used, which is translated from the Italian, says that the convoy was escorted by three submarines. It is possible that the original German was "V. boote" = "Vorpostenboote," and that the Italians who readily confuse the letters U and V read "U. boote" = submarines. Alternatively the Germans may have called them U.J. boote (submarine-chasers). The survivors from U.J. 1404 who were rescued by the *Brocklesby* said the convoy consisted of eight small ships escorted by four escort vessels. (C.B.4051/49)

⁴ The *Brocklesby* says (M, Appendix 27, p.101) "at 0348 sighted gunfire bearing 200 deg, 6 to 8 miles," but see Plan 4. N.F.C. says "weather, at 0348, wind force 3 from 160 deg, sea slight, visibility clear but very dark."

The enemy opened a heavy fire on our ships, mainly with light A.A. guns but also with guns of up to 3-in. or 4-in. calibre.¹ Commander Wyburd had "decided beforehand that, should the enemy be encountered, he would continue his course and speed, and endeavour to fight his way through". He had issued orders to this effect, being convinced that any general alteration of course and speed would so disorganize the formation of Group 5 as to render an organized landing impossible.² S.G.B.5 accordingly continued on her course at 9½ knots for about 10 minutes. She was the enemy's main target and was hit many times. Five hits were scored on her boiler, all her guns were put out of action, her wireless was disabled and 40 per cent of those on board became casualties, though, surprisingly enough, only one man was killed.

Owing to lack of illuminant our ships were not able to see the enemy and could only fire at the points from which tracer seemed to come. Commander Wyburd remained on the bridge under heavy fire and showed great gallantry and determination, but at 0407 S.G.B.5 was silenced and partially disabled and it became evident that the plan to fight a way through had failed. By this time the L.C.P. had scattered and S.G.B.5 turned away at 6 knots.

M.L.346, leading Group 5, had been hit several times. At 0412, having lost contact with the group, she set course for Yellow beaches. She called up S.G.B.5 continually so as to report the position but "all waves appeared to be jammed, no messages could be sent."³

L.C.F.(L)1, armed with two twin 4-in. guns, continued the action and although her fire control was soon disabled she fought with great energy and determination and succeeded in setting one of the enemy on fire and claimed to have sunk another.⁴

15. THE DESTROYERS

The *Slazak* and *Brocklesby* took no part in the action, as the captain of the *Slazak*, who was senior officer of 3rd Destroyer Division, thought that the firing was from the shore. As the special function of the destroyers was to protect the convoy it is unfortunate that the situation was not realised. At 0530 the *Brocklesby* parted company with the *Slazak* to investigate a burning ship 4 miles 340° from Berneval. This was UJ.1404, abandoned by her crew who were in the water. Survivors to the number of 25 were rescued, but the commanding officer had been killed early in the action. The *Brocklesby* shelled the enemy craft, which finally blew up at about 0645.

The *Garth* (senior officer of 2nd Destroyer Division) had sighted star-shell at 0351 followed by tracer fire, and thought that the 3rd Division was firing at enemy shipping. Increasing speed, he steered towards the firing, but, before reaching the scene of the action, decided that it was necessary to alter course to the southward to get into station astern of the landing craft at the proper time, so as to cover the main assault with their bombarding fire. By this time

¹ UJ.1404 was armed with one 88-mm gun and smaller weapons.

² B.R., p.12, para. 66.

³ Report of C.O. of M.L. 346 in M., App. 8, p. 55. This probably means that there was such traffic congestion on all waves that no messages could be sent.

⁴ Commander Wyburd in his narrative (M., App. 7, p.50) says one enemy trawler was sunk for certain and probably two more. The German report mentions no losses among ships of convoy, but says the convoy was dispersed north of Dieppe and that at 0745 a small part of it was off St. Valéry-en-Caux. The report also says that three harbour look-out vessels were off Dieppe when the action began. These retired into harbour, where one sank, probably from a hit received during the battle. It must be remembered, however, that this is essentially a military report.

only five L.C.P. were in sight from S.G.B.5. Some time was spent in trying to repair the S.G.B.'s wireless so as to report the situation to the Naval Force Commander, but this proved impossible, and soon afterwards the S.G.B.'s engines broke down completely

Commander Wyburd and Colonel Durnford-Slater then decided that the landing of the troops on Yellow beach could not be effected according to plan, and at 0455 they transferred to an L.C.P. with the intention of finding a ship in another group to pass a signal to Naval Force Commander, failing which they intended to report in person on board the *Calpe*. The other four L.C.P. were ordered to tow and escort the S.G.B. back to Newhaven; three of these, however, misunderstood their orders and followed Commander Wyburd's L.C.P. at a distance. Commander Wyburd proceeded towards Dieppe, boarding an M.L. on the way to try to pass a signal, but owing to traffic congestion he was unable to do so in spite of using the priority "Most Immediate."

Of the 23 L.C.P. in Group 5, four had broken down before the action and eventually returned to Newhaven, four were damaged in the action but succeeded in making their way home,¹ one accompanied S.G.B.5, four proceeded with Commander Wyburd to look for the *Calpe*, three closed L.C.F.(L) 1, and the other seven, accompanied by M.L. 346, went in and landed their troops on Yellow beaches.

L.C.F.(L) 1 continued the action until 0450, by which time many of her crew, including all her officers, were killed or wounded. As it was then zero hour she broke off the action and, considering it was useless to land the troops at Yellow beaches, proceeded towards Dieppe in company with three L.C.P.². On the way this party met four L.C.P. with Commander Wyburd and all proceeded in company towards the H.Q. ship.

16. RADAR WARNINGS (*Plans 4 and 5*)

The presence of these enemy craft does not appear to have been detected by radar³ by any vessel of the expedition. The enemy was, however, located by shore radar stations, and was plotted by Portsmouth at 0040, 0100 and 0226 (see Plan 5). A warning signal was made by Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, at 0127A: "Small craft apparently patrolling approximately 350° Tréport 15 miles at 0100". There was so far nothing to show that these craft were likely to enter the operational area, but fresh reports showed that this was very possible, so at 0244A a further message was sent to the Naval Force Commander: "Two craft 302° Tréport 10 miles, course 190° 13 knots at 0226".

Thus a full hour before the encounter, warning had been given of the presence of unidentified craft, which were then but 4 miles from the projected track of Group 5 and were almost bound to intercept it, if course and speed were maintained. At 0300 the enemy was apparently not more than 2 miles from the line of advance of Group 5.

¹ One of these arrived at Newhaven commanded by a sergeant of the Hampshires, all the Naval crew being casualties. He navigated the craft with an army prismatic compass.

² There are discrepancies in the different accounts of the movements of L.C.P. after the action. S.G.B.5 returned to Newhaven with three L.C.P.; it must be assumed that two of these came from another group, or else that they were two of the damaged craft. As report of C.O. of S.G.B.5 is not included in the Appendix to M, it is impossible to be definite about this point. The report of C.O. of L.C.F.(L) 1 is also not included in M.

³ H.M.S. *Garth* had obtained a contact at 0328 of some vessel some 24 miles to the westward.

Judging from information given in M¹, the only ship that realised the association between the enemy ships reported by Portsmouth and the subsequent encounter was the *Fernie*, the stand-by H.Q. ship. In her Captain's report it is stated: "0350 engagement between surface ships 100° 5 to 6 miles. Thought at time to have been *Brocklesby* and *Slazak* engaging enemy convoy previously reported by Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth. Two medium-sized vessels were observed silhouetted against star-shell at a long range."²

The *Locust*, between entries of 0212 and 0245, notes: "Signals were received during passage indicating the movements of certain small craft on the French coast."³ The only mention by the *Calpe* is: "0348 observed engagement between surface craft."⁴ The destroyers most concerned were the *Slazak* and *Brocklesby*, who were acting as screening force to the eastward. It is clear that to both of them the encounter came as a complete surprise, and to judge from the information available neither had any idea that unidentified craft were in the vicinity. Even after the action had started the importance of immediate support was not realised. Nor apparently had it been possible to discern the proximity of a force whose approach had been indicated in the signals from Portsmouth. The Naval Force Commander says: "At about 0350 gunfire was observed to E.S.E. which it was realised must be in the immediate vicinity of Group 5. At the time I considered that this might be caused by an E-boat attack, but with the knowledge that the *Slazak* and *Brocklesby* were within about 4 miles of Group 5 and that *Calpe* was the only ship in the immediate vicinity of the *Glengyle* and Group 4, it was decided to keep Group 4 in sight."⁵

The unexpectedness of the encounter is confirmed by the fact that the destroyers continued to patrol on a pre-determined course⁶ incompatible with any intention of intercepting the force reported by Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth. To prevent enemy contact with Group 5 the destroyers would have had to make a large alteration of course. This they did not do. They maintained their original patrol and, when the enemy opened fire, were about 4 miles astern of Group 5.⁷

Nor did the action taken by Group 5 conform with the Operation orders. According to Operation order No. 1⁸, senior officers of Groups were to take drastic avoiding action if enemy forces were encountered during passage. These orders were complied with by Commanding Officer of Group 1, who successfully evaded an enemy force shortly before the landing.⁹ C.C.O. says: "Commander Wyburd had decided beforehand that should the enemy be met with at sea, he would continue his course and endeavour to fight a way through."

¹ In the list of "important signals" (enclosure 5 of M) the two signals from C.-in-C., Portsmouth, are not mentioned, and it is not clear whether, or by what ships, the second signal was received. *Calpe's* signal log has not been seen.

² M, App. 22., p 91.

³ M, App. 20, p.83.

⁴ M, App. 21, p.89.

⁵ M, Enclosure No. 1, Naval Force Commander's Narrative, p.1.

⁶ Orders to destroyers, JNO (Jubilee Naval Orders) 3 in B.R., p.66.

⁷ Captain Hughes Hallett subsequently expressed the opinion that the Polish Commander Tyminiski of the *Slazak* failed to comprehend the operation orders; he himself would have preferred Lieut.-Commander Pumphrey of the *Brocklesby* as Senior Officer of the destroyers. It was not until after the operation was over that Captain Hughes Hallett found that a secret order permitting a British officer to be placed in charge, regardless of seniority, in such circumstances, was actually in existence. This order was, however, issued to Commanders-in-Chief only—a good example of the dangers of excessive security.

⁸ B.R., p.52, para. 393.

⁹ M, App. 4, p.33.

He had issued orders to this effect before the operation began.¹ The Naval Force Commander does not comment on this point beyond stating that he considers that Commander Wyburd should have made more use of the speed and smoke-laying capabilities of his S.G.B.² Commander Wyburd in his report³ does not mention either of these points. It is clear, however, that no support was received from the destroyers and though there is considerable conflict of evidence as to their precise position relative to Group 5 when the action opened, the distance between them was evidently not more than 4 miles (see Plan 4) at 0347.

17. RESULTS OF THE ACTION

The effect of this action must not, however, be overestimated. The German report shows that the enemy Naval H.Q.s at first regarded the gunfire out at sea as being merely another of the numerous night actions between coastal forces⁴ and not as the precursor of an immediate landing attack. By 0500, however, an alarm had been given to the coastal sector concerned, though the immunity which attended some of the first landings and the fact that Pointe D'Ailly lighthouse continued to flash, indicates that it was not very quickly acted upon.⁵ It appears that the effect of the naval action was to alert the German coast defence system, that is to say the "Goebbels" and "Hess" batteries and the radar stations, whose rôle was to engage hostile shipping rather than to repel a landing. The other defences and the infantry were not alerted until our troops landed at Pourville. It can thus be said that the naval encounter did not compromise the effect of surprise.

The result of the action was to cripple our eastern flank attack, for the small number of troops which eventually landed on Yellow beaches could entertain no hope of capturing the 5.9-inch battery which was their objective.

On the other hand, even if the Berneval battery had been captured it does not necessarily follow that the main landings would have been successful. In fact the sniping and harassing fire maintained on the battery by the very small party of troops which succeeded in landing on Yellow 2 beach effectively kept down the battery's fire until they re-embarked at 0810. Even then its fire had no effect on the main landing, probably because the whole inshore area was shrouded by a dense pall of smoke. The German report implies that the battery was firing shortly after 0900,⁶ but the first time it was observed by the British to open fire was when the force was 3 or 4 miles from the coast during the withdrawal.

¹ B.R., para. 66. The assault force for "Orange" beaches also sighted enemy vessels, but successfully avoided them. See Section 20.

² M, Enclosure 1, p.1.

³ M, App. 7, pp.47-51.

⁴ German Report, App. G, para. 2.

⁵ Lt.-Cdr. Goulding in M.G.B.316, making for Blue beach about 0500, found the Dieppe Harbour lights on (M, Enclosure No. 3, Detailed Narrative, para. 28). Pointe D'Ailly Light was "burning at 0350" (Lt.-Cdr. Mulleneux, *idem*, para. 9). Pointe D'Ailly was "an extremely conspicuous and useful mark" (N.C.F. in M, Enclosure No. 9).

⁶ German Report, para. 10.

CHAPTER III

The Assault

18. GENERAL REMARKS (*Plan 1*)

The assault¹ and actions ashore will be described beach by beach, first the outer flank landings (on Yellow 1 and Yellow 2 beaches to the east, and Orange 1 and Orange 2 beaches to the west), then the inner flank landings (on Blue beach to the east, and Green beach to the west), and finally the main assault at Red and White beaches; but it must be remembered that these various operations were taking place almost simultaneously.

In the event, things went much better on the western flank than on the eastern, complete success being achieved on both Orange beaches, and partial success on Green beach. But to the east, though there was a measure of success at Yellow 2, the landing party was wiped out at Yellow 1; and the assault at Blue beach, on the success of which the frontal assault hinged, was a costly failure. In consequence of this the batteries and machine gun posts of the east cliff were able to dominate the approaches to Dieppe and to bring a heavy fire on the Red and White beaches, where the main assault, despite great gallantry and tragic losses, likewise came to grief.

For the sake of convenience the air battle will be described separately; but it must be understood that it was taking place at the same time as the naval and military action, and that the air cover provided endured from dawn to dusk.

19. THE EASTERN OUTER FLANK (YELLOW BEACHES) (*Plan 1*)

This attack was to be made from the beaches at Berneval and Belleville-sur-Mer, with the "Goebbels" battery of four 5.9-in. guns as the principal objective. The troops—of No. 3 Commando—were transported in landing craft of Group 5, and we have already seen how, as a result of the clash with the enemy escort, only a small proportion of them were put ashore.

The landing at Yellow 1 (Berneval) was a complete failure, and of those who got ashore, none either reached their objective or returned.

At Yellow 2 (Belleville), only one landing craft reached the shore, but the twenty officers and men whom she landed succeeded in exercising an effect quite disproportionate to their numbers, and after remaining on shore for over three hours, re-embarked with only one casualty.

Yellow 1 Beach (Berneval)

At 0425 M.L.346 sighted four L.C.P., which were soon joined by another. They knew nothing of what had happened to the rest of Group 5, but were prepared to go in on their own under the flotilla officer. They touched down at about 0510, some 20 minutes behind schedule. Save for some slight opposition

¹ High water 0405, rise 27 feet. Nautical twilight commenced 0431, sunrise 0550.

from a pill-box during the approach¹ the enemy seems to have held the weight of his fire until our craft had beached. During the final approach enemy movements had been observed on the top of the cliff and our troops ashore were heavily attacked with grenades and small-arms fire as they attempted to leave the beach.

Whilst the landing was in progress an armed trawler approached, fired at our aircraft in the vicinity and laid a smoke screen off Yellow 1 beach. She was attacked by M.L.346 and disappeared into the smoke. At 0535 another ship, later found to be the armed tanker *Franz*, of 200 tons, approached from the southwest. M.L.346 at once engaged her with gunfire and prepared to use depth charges, but before this could be done the enemy abandoned the ship, which drifted towards the rocks on fire and in a sinking condition. At 0545 L.C.P.(L) 85 arrived on the scene and touched down at 0600, putting her troops ashore amid heavy fire.

By that time enemy opposition was considerable; the "Goebbels" battery had opened up on the beach and the L.C.P. lying off shore. Lt.-Cdr. Corke, the flutilla officer in L.C.P.(L) 42, had been mortally wounded, most of his crew were casualties and his craft and L.C.P.(L) 81 had both to be abandoned in a sinking condition. At considerable risk M.L.346 gave all possible supporting fire, which here, as elsewhere, proved quite inadequate for the task. None of the troops succeeded in reaching their objective and the entire force was killed or captured.

At 0615 a Very's light was fired from the beach, and L.C.P.(L) 1, 85, 157 and 41 went in to endeavour to carry out evacuation, while M.L.346 approached to within half a mile to give covering fire. The first three beached; no troops could be seen, but the naval beachmaster and his party were embarked under very heavy fire in L.C.P.(L) 157; the beach party had seen nothing of the troops after the landing. The L.C.P. then endeavoured to withdraw, but L.C.P.(L) 157 was hard on the rocks and in attempting to assist her L.C.P.(L) 1 also went aground. The crew and the beach party from L.C.P.(L) 157 were taken off by L.C.P.(L) 85 and L.C.P.(L) 1 eventually got clear. By this time M.L.230 had arrived from Dieppe and the three surviving craft accompanied her to the "Boat Pool" at about 0730, by which time it was clear that there was no hope of bringing off the troops. These totally unarmoured L.C.P., which held on to the last under heavy fire, performed a remarkable feat.

In a final attempt to evacuate Yellow 1 beach some L.C.P. (L) from the "Boat Pool" were sent in at about 0950. They appear, however, to have gone by error to Blue beach instead, for under heavy fire they picked up from a cap-sized boat nine soldiers, who turned out to be Canadians and not Commandos.

Yellow 2 Beach (Belleville) (Plan 1)

Here L.C.P.(L) 15, commanded by Lt. H. T. Buckee, R.N.V.R., enjoyed the distinction of making a solitary landing. She carried three officers and 17 other ranks, the headquarters party of No. 6 Troop, under Major P. Young, Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment, and put them ashore quietly and unopposed at 0445, five minutes before zero. The reports do not mention any immediate opposition. Despite inadequate equipment, the party succeeded in getting through the wire and by 0530 had reached the top of the cliff, just as our aircraft attacked the battery. Our men succeeded in getting to within 200 yards of their target and then settled down to intensive sniping. They were highly successful and drove the Germans to pay them the compliment of turning

¹ M, App. 8, p.52. It is not clear whether this was directed at the escort or at the landing craft. Commander Wyburd's report speaks of touching "down without encountering any opposition." (App. 7, p.49)

one of the heavy guns against them, after rifle fire had proved ineffective. Fortunately it could not be depressed enough, and the black and yellow fumes accompanying its discharge provided a tempting target, which was exploited to the full. After carrying out these tactics for about an hour and a half, our men made an orderly withdrawal at 0800 to L.C.P.(L) 15 which had meanwhile been lying off the beaches under spasmodic fire, and now in spite of intense opposition came into the beach and, covered by M.L.346, withdrew the troops, whose only casualty was one wounded. M.L.346 escorted L.C.P.(L) 15 back to Newhaven, where they arrived at 1231. On the way back they were attacked by a Junker 88, but all the bombs missed.

While Major Young's small force could of course entertain no hope of capturing the battery, the sniping tactics employed greatly interfered with its handling and materially kept down its rate of fire during the period of the main landing. In fact it was not until 0900 that the battery was again firing.¹

The Germans assumed that a Commando of about 250 men had landed at Yellow beaches,² and as they must have known the total number at Yellow 1, it follows that they conceived a greatly exaggerated idea of the forces landed at Yellow 2, which is much to the credit of Major Young and his party.

20. THE WESTERN OUTER FLANK (ORANGE BEACHES) (*Plan 1*)

The force to be landed here consisted of 250 officers and men from No. 4 Commando, under Lt.-Colonel the Lord Lovat, M.C., and was brought in by the landing craft of the *Prince Albert* under the command of Lt.-Cdr. H. H. H. Mulleneux, R.N., who was in M.G.B.312 supported by an L.C.S. and S.G.B.9. Their chief objective was the capture of the "Hess" battery of six 5.9-in. guns behind the village of Varengeville. On the way in—at about 0350—three darkened vessels, eastward bound, were sighted on the port bow. As the Pointe d'Ailly light was showing, it was assumed that this was an enemy convoy and contact was successfully avoided by a sharp alteration of course to starboard. The enemy headed towards the tracer now splashing the sky round Group 5³. At 0430 the flotilla divided according to plan. The landing was made almost exactly to schedule at 0450, and encountered no opposition; the troops achieved complete success and afterwards withdrew according to plan.

Orange 1 Beach (Vasterival)

Attention from the landing here had been at first diverted by the well-timed attack on the battery by British cannon fighters, but, when the aircraft had passed and the troops were ashore, a heavy though inaccurate fire was directed on the withdrawing landing craft. Our troops were under the command of Major D. Mills Roberts, Irish Guards, and got ashore without much opposition, considerate bilingual notices drawing their attention to land minefields. Houses in Varengeville were searched and the mortar party closed the battery through a thick wood. At 0550 brisk small-arms fire was opened on the battery. The 2-in. mortar was set up and with its third shot scored a hit on the ready-use ammunition, stacked alongside the guns. There was a blinding flash, and a heavy explosion silenced the guns, while "the screams and cries of the wounded Germans could plainly be heard." The battery did not fire again, though it had already got off a few salvos which fell near the force moving up towards the main beaches.

¹ German Report, para. 10.

² German Report, para. 60.

³ These vessels were probably the Dieppe patrol vessels mentioned in Section 14.

Enemy attempts to fight the flames were heavily sniped and Bren gunners fired bursts into the flames at frequent intervals; the enemy machine gun positions were silenced and the battery shelled by our mortar up to the moment when Lord Lovat's party made their assault, after which Major Mills Roberts's party returned to the beach.

Orange 2 Beach (Mouth of the Saane) (Plan 1)

Lord Lovat's party, helped by Spitfires which caused a diversion, landed successfully on Orange 2 beach—which, with few casualties, they crossed—and made their way inland to approach the battery from the rear. Meanwhile, the L.C.S. and S.G.B. 9 had engaged enemy coastal defences. As they pushed forward Lord Lovat's men heard the roar of the explosion at the battery, and one troop, coming on about 35 German assault troops forming up behind a farmhouse, evidently to counter-attack Major Mills Roberts's party, wiped them out by Tommy-gun fire. At 0625, with the aid of a low-level air attack, an assault was made on the battery. Despite heavy opposition, this was completely successful. The battery, with two strong points enfilading it, was captured at the point of the bayonet.

Lord Lovat claimed that the guns in the battery were demolished and the crews wiped out, except for four who were captured.¹ The German report, however, says that their casualties were 30 killed, 21 wounded and 10 missing out of a total of 112 and that the battery had been reoccupied and was firing again with two guns at 0903². Our troops then withdrew to Orange 1 beach under desultory sniping fire. Meanwhile the landing craft had withdrawn seawards, but, coming under fairly heavy fire, again approached the beach and lay close inshore, where the enemy's fire could not reach them and where they were unmolested except for occasional sniping.

The re-embarkation started at 0730, three extra L.C.A. having been sent from the Boat Pool to assist, and was carried out from Orange 1 beach, which was free of enemy fire, though shells were falling on Orange 2 beach. The withdrawal of the troops was not easy; owing to the flatness of the beach and the ebbing tide, troops had to wade out up to their necks in water; but all, including the wounded, were brought off, and the operation was completed by 0815. The wounded were transferred to the *Fernie* and the flotilla returned to Newhaven, arriving at 1745. The casualties sustained by No. 4 Commando were two officers and nine men killed, three officers and 19 men wounded, and 13 men missing believed killed. The C.C.O. remarks³ "This hazardous assault on "Hess" battery was carried out strictly according to plan and may well become a model for future operations of this kind".

21. THE EASTERN INNER FLANK (BLUE BEACH—PUITS) (*Plan 1*)

Great importance was attached to the landing at Puits; unfortunately it was doomed to failure. "It had always been realised that unless the east headland which overlooks the town and port of Dieppe was captured, the frontal assault on the town, on which the whole operation chiefly depended, would probably fail".⁴ Near this eastern headland there were numerous objectives, notably the "Rommel" four-gun battery, barracks, gasworks and various gun sites. They were to be attacked by troops of the Royal Regiment of Canada, trans-

¹ B.R., p.16.

² German Report, paras. 30 and 10. The author of the Canadian History doubts the accuracy of this report and quotes the German 81st Corps' report of material losses sustained. This indicates the destruction of six 5.9-inch guns, but it does not follow that all of them belonged to "Hess" battery; two may have been destroyed in bombing attacks on the other batteries.

³ B.R., p.17.

⁴ Conference on Landing Assaults: Captain Hughes Hallett's address, Vol. I, p.24.

ported in the landing craft of the *Queen Emma*, *Princess Astrid* and *Duke of Wellington*, supported by M.G.B.316 and S.G.B.8, with Lt.-Cdr. H. W. Goulding, D.S.O., R.N.R., as the Senior Landing Officer. No covering bombardment was planned. "Surprise is the element upon which reliance is placed for the success of the landing on Green and Blue beaches and they will not be supported by gunfire from destroyers".¹

By making his landfall on the harbour entrance, Lt.-Cdr. Goulding succeeded in picking out this "narrow and difficult beach", but this dog-legged course further delayed his force which, it will be remembered, had been delayed in forming up², and it only touched down at 0506³, 16 minutes late, when it was already getting light. The landing did not meet with very severe opposition, which indicates that a fair measure of surprise was achieved. The effect of this delay must not, therefore, be over-estimated. At the less important Green beach, where the landing was made almost exactly to schedule, the troops encountered very heavy opposition as soon as they got ashore. In the opinion of the Naval Force Commander, "the main difficulty seems to have been that the troops under-estimated the height of the sea wall [10 to 12 feet], and were consequently insufficiently prepared for surmounting it. The ensuing delay gave the enemy time to recover from his first surprise and to bring down heavy and accurate fire."

Be this as it may, there can be no doubt that the Blue beach assault never came within measurable distance of success. The landing craft, which advanced under cover of smoke laid by aircraft, were not fired on until they were about 100 yards off the beach, but the troops lost heavily as they left the landing craft and still more heavily when they reached the lofty sea wall which ran along the beach some 50 yards from the water's edge: here they were pinned down by enfilading fire from well-concealed positions on the flanks. L.C.S. 25 and L.C.S. 8 maintained spirited supporting fire from almost point-blank range and continued in action until most of their guns were silenced, but "were almost completely ineffective against strengthened houses and pill-boxes",⁴ and could not even be sure of their targets.⁵ A second wave of landing craft which had been unable to keep up with the others touched down at 0525, but the troops they landed suffered just as heavily, their mortar detachment being quickly wiped out. At 0545 some L.C.A. from the *Duke of Wellington* which constituted the third wave, though heavily shelled, succeeded in putting their troops ashore. L.C.M. 99 was heavily hit and suffered a number of casualties. The beachmaster and his staff, who were on board her, were transferred to L.C.A. 208 and an attempt was made to land them, but the enemy's fire had increased so much that the L.C.A. could not make the beach.

Unfortunately the troops could effect little in the face of such intense opposition on so difficult a beach. A small party led by Lt.-Colonel D. E. Catto, Commanding Officer of the Battalion, succeeded in cutting a path through the wire, and, reaching the top of the cliff, cleared the houses there, but their retreat was cut off; they were unable to join up with Essex Scottish from Red beach and ultimately, at 1620, were forced to surrender. Apart from a solitary corporal, they were probably the only men to get beyond the beach. The rest were pinned down by accurate and increasingly vicious fire, including hand grenades hurled from the cliff top and 3-in. mortar fire. The "Rommel" battery, despite several bombing and machine-gunning attacks by the R.A.F., only checked its

¹ B.R., p.84; provision, however, was made for such support if either landing got held up and a call for fire was received from the F.O.O. concerned.

² See Section 12.

³ Some accounts say at 0507.

⁴ M, App. 3B, p. 24.

⁵ M, App. 18, p. 75.

fire for a few minutes. In such a situation there could be but one result: "The troops never succeeded in getting beyond the sea wall, where they were pinned down by steadily increasing fire, until all but a few men who escaped by swimming were either killed or captured."¹ The casualties were crushing—24 officers and 459 other ranks killed, wounded and missing, out of an embarkation strength of 27 officers and 516 other ranks.²

The dismal results expected from failure in this sector were fully realised. The batteries and machine-gun posts of the east cliff were able to dominate the approaches to Dieppe and bring a heavy fire to bear on Red and White beaches.

22. NAVAL ATTEMPTS TO EVACUATE BLUE BEACH (*Plan 1*)

While the troops had been facing this ordeal ashore, the landing craft had been withdrawn and were lying about 8 cables off shore; those which were badly damaged or had severe casualties were ordered to join the Boat Pool to the westward off Red and White beaches.

Shortly before 0600 an L.C.A. endeavoured to approach the beach, but was hit and sunk. Soon after 0700 a message sent by someone unknown³ was received in the *Calpe* by Naval Force Commander asking for all Landing Craft to return to the beach to evacuate the beach party. Only two craft picked it up—L.C.S. 8 and L.C.A. 209, which were patrolling off the beach.

L.C.A. 209 went in and was half-swamped by the rush of soldiers; she left the beach, but, when 50 yards out, was hit by a heavy shell and sank; only two of the crew and one soldier survived. Soon after 0700 the rest of the landing craft proceeded to join the Boat Pool, while Lt.-Cdr. Goulding, having been unable to get his signal through to the Naval Force Commander, went on board *Calpe* to report at about 0745.

At about 1005 some L.C.P.(L) which were trying to evacuate Yellow 1 beach closed Blue beach by error and in spite of heavy fire rescued nine soldiers from an upturned boat.

The *Garth* was bombarding batteries on the east cliff and though in touch with the Forward Observation Officer was not able to effect much as she was frequently straddled by the enemy and had to turn away. While Lt.-Cdr. Goulding was still on board the *Calpe*, a signal was received from the *Garth* saying that Blue beach was asking for help and evacuation.⁴ The Naval Force Commander ordered Lt.-Cdr. Goulding to take an M.L. for support and to attempt an evacuation. Lt.-Cdr. Goulding accordingly boarded M.L. 291 at 1100, and as none of his own landing craft were in the vicinity he collected some L.C.A. and one L.C.S. and proceeded towards the beach. Lt.-Cdr. McMullen was sent to assist him. Very heavy fire was opened as the craft approached and they were forced to retire; no one was seen on the beach, and Lt.-Cdr. Goulding made a signal to the *Calpe* reporting failure to evacuate. Another attempt to evacuate the beach was made shortly afterwards by some of the *Princess Astrid's* craft. They saw no one on the beach and retired under heavy fire, losing one craft. After this all craft were required for the main evacuation.

¹ L, Vol. I, p. 21.

² Apparently over 50 of the troops never landed.

³ B.R. p. 18, says "it may well have been the enemy." It had been decided prior to the raid that as the troops would only be ashore for a short time, plain language could be used for operational signals after the attack had started. There is evidence that the Germans noticed this early and made use of it.

⁴ M, p. 45, App. 6 to Encl. No. 13; the time of receipt of the signal is not given. The captain of *Garth* in his report (M, p. 95, App. 23 to Encl. No. 13) does not mention it. The N.F.C. in his detailed narrative does not mention *Garth's* signal and simply says that Lt.-Cdr. Goulding proceeded at 1100. *Garth* was not in touch with F.O.O. after 0747.

23. THE WESTERN INNER FLANK (GREEN BEACH—POURVILLE) (*Plan 1*)

Here the combined flotillas of the *Princess Beatrix* and *Invicta* were to land officers and men of the South Saskatchewan Regiment. They were to take Pourville with the German defence headquarters there, the radar station nearby and other targets and also to aid the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry against the Quatre Vents Farm, the capture of which was regarded as essential if the withdrawal was to be accomplished without severe casualties. They were also to cover the western flank of the outer perimeter of Dieppe. The Queen's Own Camerons of Canada were to land half an hour later and pass through to attack the airfield of St. Aubin, and link up with the tanks to take the Divisional Headquarters at Arques-la-Bataille and a heavy gun position not far away.

The South Saskatchewan Regiment touched down unopposed at 0452, but as the troops went ashore they came under concentrated fire from machine-guns and A.A. guns.¹ This, however, was overcome. "A" Company scaled the sea wall, silenced two pill-boxes and moved against the radar station, which their strenuous efforts failed to take, through lack of adequate artillery and mortar support. "C" Company meanwhile established themselves in Pourville and captured the German headquarters there. "B" and "D" Companies, under Lt.-Colonel C. C. I. Merritt, made a most determined attack on "Quatre Vents." Strong opposition was encountered in this area and during the morning a reserve enemy battalion appeared on the west side of the River Scie, while the Saskatchewan were later reinforced by part of the Cameron battalion. The river was crossed, but heavy and accurate fire, to which our men could make no sufficient reply, prevented them from capturing the place before the order to withdraw was received.

The landing was covered by L.C.S.9 and L.C.S.31. The enemy opened fire soon after the troops were ashore and L.C.S.9, in attempting to land Lt.-Cdr. Prior, senior officer, Green beach landings, was heavily hit and later sank. Lt.-Cdr. Prior was eventually landed by L.C.S.31. L.C.A.170 also came under heavy fire when attempting to land the beach party and had to withdraw, suffering several casualties including the beachmaster, who was severely wounded. The landing craft then withdrew under cover of smoke and joined the Boat Pool.

The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders in L.C.P. of Group 6 under Commander H. V. P. McClintock, owing partly to the anxiety of the Senior Military Officer not to be landed ahead of time and partly to navigational difficulties occasioned by smoke during the final approach, landed at 0550, half an hour late.² The enemy fire encountered by the landing craft was not very heavy and, having put their troops ashore, they withdrew to the Boat Pool. Despite this delay, the troops crossed the beach with few casualties, though the Commanding Officer, Lt.-Colonel A. C. Gostling, was killed as he set foot on shore: our craft found that there was still enemy opposition commanding the beach, though it was only moderate and mostly mortar fire. After a hurried conference at the South Saskatchewan head-quarters, it was decided that, as the area to the east was still untaken, the Highlanders should advance against the airfield along the west bank of the Scie. But they were unable to take a vital bridge and soon after 0845, as the tanks which should have joined them at about 0630 had not appeared, the withdrawal was begun. Thus, it had not been possible to maintain their initial success.

¹ The Canadian History (p. 73) states that an error was made in landing the troops, nearly all of whom were put ashore to the west of the River Scie instead of being landed each side of the river mouth, and attributes the failure to capture the high ground east of Pourville to the resultant delay. No naval report mentions that the troops were not landed in the right place.

² M, p. 2; App. 16, p. 71 Some were even later; B.R., p. 20, has "ten minutes late at 0530."

24. THE MAIN ASSAULT (RED AND WHITE BEACHES—DIEPPE) (*Plans 1 and 6*)

The main assault was to be delivered against the sea front of Dieppe itself: this was some 1,700 yards long backed by a sea wall,¹ boulevards and gardens. The western end (White beach) was to be attacked by the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, the eastern (Red beach) by the Essex Scottish Regiment, supported by the 14th Canadian Tank Battalion (the Calgary Regiment) and some small subsidiary units. Immediate success in this sector was a cardinal feature of the plan. The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry were to attack gun positions, notably the "Goering" heavy battery, assist the South Saskatchewan Regiment in the attack on Quatre Vents and join the Essex Scottish Regiment in controlling Dieppe. The latter was to concentrate on the dock area and eastern side of the town, attack various gun sites, capture two emergency landing grounds and join up with the Royal Regiment of Canada. The landings were to be supported by tanks landed at White beach: detachments of the Royal Canadian Engineers were to land with the first wave, and demolish portions of the sea wall to enable the tanks to get on to the esplanade and thence to enter the town and co-operate with the Highlanders from Green beach against St. Aubin and Arques-la-Bataille. Men of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry were transported in the *Glengyle*, the Essex Scottish Regiment in the *Prince Charles* and *Prince Leopold*. The 2nd Destroyer Division (*Berkeley*, *Bleasdale*, *Garth*, *Albrighton*) and the *Locust* were to support the initial landing by bombarding the sea-front and then the flanks, whilst the R.A.F. delivered a cannon fire attack and laid a smoke screen over the eastern headland.

At 0502 the 2nd Destroyer Division spread to take up bombarding positions astern of the landing craft and ten minutes later opened fire. Three buildings on the front were set on fire and others damaged. The R.A.F. attacked defences according to plan. The assault craft, under Lt.-Cdr. C. W. McMullen, S.O. Landings for White beach, and with Commander G. T. Lambert in general command, were led in by M.G.B. 326 and M.L. 291. They were given close support by the L.C.S. and L.C.F. and were screened by smoke laid by the L.C.M.

The enemy's fire was not heavy and the landing craft beached at 0523, only three minutes late in spite of delay in forming up. The troops landed with little loss, but their troubles then developed rapidly, because instead of advancing quickly while the enemy was still taking cover from the bombardment, they remained under the shelter of the sea wall, thus losing precious moments. When they started to advance the Germans had recovered and opened a heavy fire. The landing craft withdrew under fire and joined the Boat Pool off the main beaches; a few were hit, but none was lost. The Support Craft remained close inshore.

The preliminary naval and air attacks over, the enemy opened an intense and well-directed fire which caused heavy casualties on both Red and White beaches. Very much greater than had been anticipated was the murderous enfilade fire from guns concealed in the east cliff face. These guns were "impossible to detect even at close range until they fired and . . . could not easily be silenced by our own fire. This enfilade fire made the capture and retention of the beaches almost impossible and was therefore the main cause of the failure to press on through Dieppe and attain objectives laid down in the plan."² The situation was made much worse by barbed wire defences which proved more formidable than had been expected, and by the ill success which attended our tanks.

¹ The sea wall, from which numerous groynes ran out towards the sea, was about 10 feet high, but the shingle had been washed up against it, and for most of its length the height above the beach varied from 2 to 4 feet. At five places there were steps leading to the beach.

² B.R., p. 22. Lt.-Cdr. McMullen's report is given in App. to M.

25. LANDING THE TANKS

The tanks were to have been landed in four waves, on Red and White beaches. The first flight, consisting of the L.C.T. of Group 8 guided by H.M.S. *Fernie*, with Lt.-Cdr. Lord Beatty, the senior officer of Groups 8 and 9 of L.C.T., in M.L. 343, arrived about ten minutes late (at 0535) owing to navigational difficulties.¹ The infantry was thus deprived of the valuable covering fire which the tanks might have given in the first crucial minutes. The L.C.T. met with tremendous fire as soon as they cleared the smoke. L.C.T. 145 beached successfully and landed her three tanks, "but on withdrawing she was heavily hit, disabled and had to be sunk." L.C.T. 127 sustained very heavy damage and most of her crew were killed or wounded, but she got her tanks ashore and withdrew from the beach. L.C.T. 159 was hit approaching the shore and she came in with the ramp half-down; she was disabled and could not get off the beach. L.C.T. 126 was also heavily hit and set on fire, but she landed her tanks and subsequently sank in deep water off the shore. L.C.T. 121 beached and probably landed her tanks, but was disabled and remained on the beach. L.C.T. 163 "was hit in the engine room when close in shore: a fire was started and before it could be extinguished, the fumes overcame the helmsman so that the L.C.T. swung to port and failed to make a landing. Another rating took the wheel and brought the craft in again; when 70 yards from the beach the helmsman was killed by a direct hit and the steering damaged with the result that the ship swung once more to port. A third attempt was made with the same result, the helmsman again being killed, but at the fourth attempt L.C.T. 163 crept in, using as cover L.C.T. 145 which was then 60 yards from the beach and sinking. This time the landing was successful".² But the heavy fire encountered, and to some extent the original delay, had most unfortunate effects, as the assault demolition parties of engineers, who were to break the sea wall to enable the tanks to penetrate through the crust of the enemy's defences, were unable to carry out their task owing to heavy casualties. Many of their stores were set on fire before landing. This resulted in all prospects of successful penetration being foredoomed to failure.³

The four L.C.T. of Group 9 made up the second flight. They were L.C.T. 124, 125, 165, 166, and arrived at 0605. The enemy fire was intense. L.C.T. 124 landed her tanks and withdrew, but was sunk later. L.C.T. 125 landed one tank and was then ordered to withdraw by the beachmaster—for what reason does not appear.⁴ About 45 minutes later she beached again; but all her officers and crew were killed or wounded; a second tank left the craft. The L.C.T. was heavily damaged, but her wounded First Lieutenant managed to get her away from the beach and she was taken in tow by the *Alresford*. L.C.T. 165 landed her tanks; her steering gear was hit, she was out of control and received considerable damage, but got away from the beach and repaired her steering gear. L.C.T. 166 landed her tanks without difficulty and withdrew.

There are discrepancies in the total number of tanks disembarked, but the probable number is 28 out of 30, a result highly creditable to the L.C.T. The number "drowned" seems to have been one or two. Unfortunately, once ashore, the tanks were unable to accomplish much. Apart from the obstacle presented by the sea wall the tanks had trouble in moving across the shingle and came up against unexpected opposition from unmapped anti-tank guns, as

¹ Lord Beatty's orders were that the first three L.C.T. were to beach as soon as possible after, but on no account before, the L.C.A. This would have been at 0525. The next three L.C.T. were to beach at 0535 and were on time.

² B.R., p. 23.

³ The Naval Planning Staff had repeatedly pressed for the preparation of special explosive tanks for this task.

⁴ M, App. 11, p. 63.

well as the fire from the eastern headland. In consequence of these difficulties, the tanks could give little aid. Of the 28 disembarked, 13—probably 15—crossed the sea wall and reached the promenade, but all the exits were blocked and most of the tanks eventually returned to the beach.¹ The ten L.C.T. of Groups 10 and 11 were to have formed the third and fourth waves, but in view of the rapid deterioration in the situation it was decided that no useful purpose could be served by sending them in, so they were finally sent home.

26. NAVAL SUPPORT (*Plans 1 and 6*)

All this time covering fire was being vigorously given by support craft. L.C.F.(L) 2 fought with great gallantry. Closing to point-blank range, she gave close support until she was disabled, her captain killed, her guns put out of action one by one and she finally sank. The *Locust* also attempted to give aid. She was to have taken part in the initial bombardment, but had been unable to keep up with the main forces and in the darkness had formed up on the wrong group. However, she arrived off Red and White beaches about 0530. "Owing to the obscure situation on shore she was unable to provide much useful or effective bombardment."² She approached the harbour entrance and at 0607 opened fire with her 4-in. gun on the cliff to east of the harbour, but came under accurate fire from the heavy batteries on the cliff and also from a new battery near the east side of the harbour. At 0611 she received a direct hit on the bridge superstructure starboard side, causing casualties; she withdrew and was instructed not to enter till the situation to the east of the harbour had improved.

The destroyers also were heavily engaged, but their guns were too light to have much effect on the strong and well-concealed enemy gun positions. It had been intended to control the destroyers' fire by means of F.O.O.s, who were to land with the troops, but most of them became casualties or could not establish communication. Nevertheless they achieved some success. The *Albrighton* silenced an A.A. battery above Pourville and heavily shelled the tobacco factory near the main beaches with partial success.

The *Bleasdale* engaged a battery about 100 yards along the cliffs to the east of Dieppe, but was unable to silence it. The *Garth* also bombarded positions on the east cliff. The C.C.O. in his report says,³ "At no time was the support which the ships were able to give sufficient for the purpose and this is one of the main reasons why the landing at Blue, Red and White beaches was unsuccessful." The Germans were surprised at the weakness of our supporting gunfire during the landings.⁴ Our ships were frequently subjected to air attack in spite of the very efficient protection given by our fighters. Naval A.A. guns were claimed to have shot down 24 enemy aircraft,⁵ the *Slazak* claiming four of them, and, unfortunately, also five of our own, which contrary to orders were flying low towards our ships.

S.G.B.8 and 9 made a sweep for enemy surface craft at 0600, but sighted nothing. They were attacked by a formation of Focke-Wulf 190, one of which was shot down. S.G.B.9 was disabled, but carried out repairs, and both boats returned towards Dieppe at 0830. While they were away, owing to a false report at 0750 of E-boats approaching from Boulogne,⁶ the *Slazak*, *Brocklesby* and *Bleasdale* were sent to the north-east to intercept. The destroyers had to leave the

¹ Canadian History, p. 76.

² M, p. 11.

³ B.R., p. 27.

⁴ German Report, paras. 47 and 72.

⁵ It seems probable that this claim was exaggerated. The total number of enemy aircraft destroyed during the operation was only 48. (See Section 36)

⁶ Captain Hughes Hallett subsequently remarked that it was "remarkable that at no time during the entire operation was there any organised opposition from German naval forces".

fighter screen to carry out their mission and were subjected to numerous air attacks, the *Slazak* receiving some damage from near-misses. The landing craft by that time were mostly in the Boat Pool, screened from the enemy's fire by a most efficient smoke screen.

"Throughout the period which followed", wrote Captain Hughes Hallett,¹ "enemy fire from the shore steadily increased, and the destroyers were forced constantly to shift their positions in order to avoid damage and keep under cover of smoke. . . . H.M.S. *Calpe*'s appearance during most of this period must have resembled that of a Fleet Flagship on regatta day, as there were seldom less than from six to ten craft alongside. They came to transfer wounded, bring reports, or seek instructions, and their presence was rather an embarrassment to the Commanding Officer, when he wished to manoeuvre to avoid gunfire. . . . My general impression during this phase. . . . was a feeling of inability to give the troops effective support. The military situation was completely obscure, and the large quantities of smoke drifting inshore made it impossible to see what was happening. . . ."

27. THE FLOATING RESERVE AND R.M. COMMANDO (Plan 6)

Meanwhile the enemy opposition had proved much too intense to be overcome by our military forces, who were able to attain only an insignificant part of their objectives. Seldom has great gallantry been so ill rewarded. "In fact the main beach was never properly secured, and the main force never succeeded in getting clear of it. . . . A steadily increasing volume of fire was brought to bear on the foreshore in the main landing area, which had the effect of pinning down the troops throughout the whole operation."² Some of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, aided by the Royal Canadian Engineers, eventually succeeded in attacking the Casino—the prominent building at the western end of the beach—and at 0712 reported its capture, and some small parties infiltrated into the town but were not powerful enough to effect much. A small body which made an attack on the west headland was killed to a man. The Essex Scottish Regiment was soon under very severe fire from field artillery and heavy mortars and sustained serious losses. A small party crossed the esplanade and occupied two buildings near by, from which the enemy was engaged with success, but the vast majority of the forces were pinned down to the beach area by sheets of enemy fire, and, as already related, the tanks were quite unable to afford any effective support.

In an attempt to secure the vital eastern headland, the Military Force Commander, who apparently did not know fully of the critical position ashore, decided to send in his floating reserve—the Fusiliers Mont Royal—to Red beach. With the aid of smoke, and in the face of very heavy firing, some of them were successfully put ashore at 0704 under the direction of Lt.-Cdr. J. H. Dathan, R.N., Senior Officer of Group 7, in M.L.214. He took in 26 L.C.P., losing two when beached and a third during the withdrawal. So intense was the enemy's fire that the Fusiliers achieved little or no success and suffered serious losses as soon as they landed. Two small parties succeeded in penetrating into the town and dock area, but few returned. Meanwhile, owing to failure to allow for the then strong westerly set of the tide and the superabundance of smoke, some 300 officers and men of the Fusiliers had to be landed, not according to plan, but on the very constricted beach below the western headland. No frontal advance was practicable and attempts to move out on either flank proved unsuccessful. About noon 288 of them, of whom some 100 were wounded, surrendered.

¹ B.R., p. 139.

² L, Vol. I, p. 22.

Meanwhile at a conference in the *Calpe* it had been decided that, as the harbour was still in enemy hands, it would be necessary to abandon the idea of an attack on shipping there by a naval cutting-out party from the Royal Marine Commando, and the latter was put at the disposal of the Military Force Commander. Knowledge of events ashore was far from complete, but it seemed to General Roberts that if White beach was promptly reinforced, there was a fair chance that the infantry would be able to capture the western headland and still break into the town and that it would be possible to carry out many of the demolition tasks before the hour of withdrawal. He therefore decided to use the Royal Marine Commando, consisting of 18 officers and 352 other ranks under Lt.-Colonel J. P. Phillipps, R.M., to reinforce White beach. Commander Ryder was instructed to tranship the Commando from the *Locust* and six Chasseurs into seven L.C.A. and L.C.M. from the Boat Pool.

The Chasseurs (French patrol craft) constituted the body of Group 13 which had been led across by the *Alresford*. One fell out during the passage through mechanical trouble; the rest were approaching Dieppe by 0600 after an eventful crossing, and with the *Locust* had been lying off the beaches.

The landing craft moved in, with three Chasseurs on each flank to screen them from the fire of the shore batteries and to provide smoke. At 0830 the group went in to land and the gravity of the situation became only too apparent. "It was not long before I realised that this landing was to be a sea parallel of the Charge of the Light Brigade," wrote the senior officer, Chasseurs.¹ Shell-fire was opened on the craft almost immediately at about 4,000 yards, increasing in intensity as the range shortened. The fire was mostly coming from the eastern cliff and the end and base of the mole, and, as the range decreased, rifle and machine gun fire opened, the Chasseurs being no longer able to support the force owing to the shallow water.² As the leading craft emerged from the smoke they came under a most devastating fire and Colonel Phillipps' craft went aground. It was obvious that no useful purpose could be served by attempting to continue, and at the cost of his life Colonel Phillipps at once signalled to those behind him to retire. "Putting on a pair of white gloves so that his hands could be more easily seen, he jumped on to the forward deck of his landing craft and signalled to the remainder to put about and head for the shelter of the smoke screen. He had scarcely sent this signal when he fell mortally wounded, but by his action he undoubtedly saved some 200 of his men from landing on a beach swept by murderous and concentrated fire."³ Despite severe damage and casualties, most craft succeeded in obeying this instruction, though by the time the action was over Royal Marine Commando casualties killed and missing amounted to six officers and 60 other ranks.⁴ In view of these events at White beach, the senior officer, Chasseurs, made a situation report to the Naval Force Commander in the *Calpe* saying that the position on Red and White beaches was out of control; this was passed shortly after 0915. It was clear that nothing more could be done and soon afterwards arrangements were in progress for the final withdrawal.

¹ M, App. 19, p. 80.

² R.M. 10410/42. Capt. J. C. Manners' Report. M. App. 19, p. 80.

³ B.R., p. 26. S.O. of Chasseurs, however, says (M. App. 19, p. 80): "Five of the landing craft had reached the beach and had been shot to pieces. The remaining two had been in and had been ordered back by Colonel Phillipps." The S.O.'s. craft had been hit and temporarily disabled shortly before and his report may have been from hearsay, but he was sufficiently well informed of the situation to make a signal to N.F.C. The casualties however, suffered by the Marines do not seem to correspond with the destruction of five craft.

⁴ R.M. 10410/42. The final count of the Royal Marines' total casualties is 7 officers, 93 other ranks, of whom 4 officers and 27 other ranks lost their lives. This includes the Royal Marines serving in L.C.F.

CHAPTER IV

The Withdrawal

28. SITUATION AT 0900 (*Plan 1*)

As has already been related, the troops who landed in the west on Orange beaches had successfully completed their task and were on their way home. The small party which landed in the east on Yellow 2 beach had also been safely withdrawn and was on its way back to England. The troops who had landed on Yellow 1 beach had been killed or captured and the naval beach party had been withdrawn.

At Blue beach all hope of evacuating any survivors from the Royal Regiment of Canada had been abandoned. At Green beach the South Saskatchewan Regiment held Pourville and was still trying to capture "Quatre Vents" Farm, while the Camerons of Canada were about to assault the bridge of the Scie prior to advancing on the airfield at St. Aubin. It now became evident to the Commanding Officers of the two battalions that they would not be able to accomplish their task as the enemy was stronger than was expected and the tanks which should have pushed through from Dieppe to support them had not appeared. A fighting retirement was accordingly commenced at 0930 and by about 1000 was successfully accomplished under heavy fire. Up to this time the casualties suffered by the two battalions amounted to about 20 per cent of their strength, but later their losses were far heavier. It was known that the troops would have to wait for three-quarters of an hour until the arrival of the landing craft, and so positions were taken up to defend the beach.

On Red and White beaches the Essex Scottish and Royal Hamilton Light Infantry were barely able to maintain themselves, but were holding the Casino, and a few men had penetrated into the town of Dieppe. The tanks had mostly been disabled. The reserve battalion, the Fusiliers Mont Royal, had suffered too heavily on landing to have any influence on the situation, while of the Marines, constituting the last reserve, those who landed had been almost completely wiped out.

The landing craft, after putting their troops ashore, had joined the Boat Pool which had been established off Red and White beaches and was protected by an almost continuous smoke screen. The Boat Pool was under the orders of Commander H. V. P. McClintock. The destroyers and support craft were giving the troops ashore what support they could, but the enemy fire was increasing.

At 0900 the Military Force Commander came to the conclusion that the troops were unlikely to capture the headlands east and west of Dieppe and that the main assault had failed. He therefore decided not to land the remaining tanks, and Groups 10 and 11 were ordered to return to England escorted by the *Garth*, which was running short of ammunition, and the *Abresford*, which was towing a damaged L.C.T. Operation orders had laid down 1100 as the hour for commencing the withdrawal. The Force Commanders would have liked to advance this to 1030, but the R.A.F. adviser pointed out that this alteration would upset the R.A.F. time-table and might make it impossible to lay the smoke curtain which had been arranged. Furthermore, General Roberts doubted whether there would be time to contact the Camerons. Accordingly no change in the

time was made and Naval Force Commander ordered Commander McClintock to send all L.C.A. and L.C.M. to the same beaches on which they had landed their troops, but decided that fire was too heavy to send in L.C.P. and L.C.T. Landing craft were to ferry troops out to the L.C.T., which were to remain one mile out to sea, returning to beaches to load again. The evacuation was to be confined to personnel, it being clearly impossible to remove the tanks. Destroyers and L.C.F.(L) were to give fire support, while the R.A.F. was to bomb the two headlands.

29. EVACUATION OF GREEN BEACH (POURVILLE) (*Plan 1*)

At 0930, L.C.A. 521 went into Green beach, but was unable to make contact with anyone on shore and was forced by heavy fire to withdraw. At 1000 L.C.A. 315 arrived inshore. Nothing could be seen but the beach party taking cover under a wall, where they were held trapped by heavy fire from the western headland. One man tried to cross the beach to reach the craft but was instantly killed. The L.C.A. then retired.

At 1045, L.C.A. 198, 185, 186, 187, 188, 176, 197, from the *Prince Leopold's* flotilla, supported by L.C.S.(M) 21, proceeded inshore to carry out the withdrawal. They should have gone into Red beach at Dieppe, but owing to the smoke arrived instead at Pourville; L.C.A. 186, realising her error, left at once for Red beach after picking up some men who were in the water. The *Albrighton* and *Bleasdale* covered this movement by bombarding the flanks and firing smoke shell. Soon after, L.C.A. 170 and 215 arrived at Green beach.

Enemy fire was very heavy, especially from the hill to the east of Pourville. Lt.-Cdr. Prior (senior officer, Green beach) tried to communicate with M.G.B. 317 to arrange for a bombardment of the hill, but was unsuccessful, mainly because the beach signal party had not been landed. Troops moving down the beach towards the landing craft lost heavily from enemy fire and many swam or waded out to the approaching craft. This caused delay as the men had to be picked up one by one. Arriving further in there was a rush to board the craft and many casualties occurred during the re-embarkation; the ramps became jammed with dead and wounded and some of the craft were overloaded and shipped a lot of water.

L.C.A. 215 was sunk during the withdrawal. The landing craft withdrew and transferred the troops to destroyers. Of the craft not disabled some returned to Green beach and embarked more troops while others endeavoured to go to Red beach according to the original plan, but it does not appear that any of the latter craft succeeded in beaching. At 1100, L.C.A. 262, 317, 251 and 214 from the *Invicta's* flotilla proceeded in to Green beach. The enemy's fire had increased in intensity. L.C.A. 317 was badly hit and was abandoned on the beach. L.C.A. 251 was overloaded and sank under fire 200 yards out. L.C.A. 214 too left the beach greatly overloaded; she was towed by an L.C.M. to a destroyer (probably *Albrighton*) and sank alongside. L.C.A. 262 also sank alongside the *Bleasdale* after transferring her troops.

At 1115, L.C.A. 250 and 315, having picked up some Marines who were swimming off Red beach, proceeded to Green beach and took off survivors from the beach and from wrecked landing craft. Soon after 1130 the *Brocklesby's* bombardment¹ of positions overlooking Green beach gave some relief from enemy fire, and L.C.A. 250 and 315 were able to make two more trips into it. The *Locust* assisted by bombarding enemy positions round Green beach at this

¹ See Section 31.

time, and S.G.B. 9 also bombarded later. According to the *Locust*, there was no enemy fire out to sea to the west of Dieppe.

At about 1130 Lt.-Colonel Merritt, commanding the South Saskatchewan Regiment, formed a rearguard of 100 men and held the perimeter of the beach. Lt.-Cdr. Prior and the assistant beachmaster, who had both been wounded, were tireless in their efforts to evacuate all the troops, and in a last endeavour to rescue the rearguard, Lt.-Cdr. Prior asked Lt.-Colonel Merritt to set fire to the houses on the foreshore so as to withdraw under cover of the smoke; unfortunately, owing to the failure of the incendiary grenades, this could not be done and the gallant rearguard had to be abandoned. The troops held on until their ammunition was exhausted and then surrendered. Lt.-Cdr. Prior was also taken prisoner.

At 1215, L.C.A. 250 and 315 made their final trip in to the beach, where there was no one alive, and withdrew under heavy fire. There seems little doubt that had it been possible effectively to shell the dominating hill to the eastward of the beach the rearguard could have been evacuated, but as the enemy's fire was never silenced,¹ the task could not be performed.

30. EVACUATION OF RED AND WHITE BEACHES (DIEPPE) (*Plans 1 and 6*)

While this was going on at Green beach, similar strenuous efforts against heavy opposition were being made at Red and White beaches.

At 1020 the Naval Force Commander had ordered destroyers to form a line of bearing 070° to 250° from the *Calpe* and follow landing craft in towards the shore, laying a smoke screen. The wind blowing on shore from the west made the smoke screen effective, its efficiency being increased by a curtain of smoke laid by aircraft between the east and west headlands from 1100 to 1200. The smoke prevented the enemy from firing effectively on landing craft until they were close inshore, but it also hid the beaches from the destroyers, interfering seriously with their covering fire and preventing the force commanders from seeing what was happening ashore.

The destroyers, the *Locust* and the L.C.F. remained at from 4 to 6 cables from the shore and gave what support they could. L.C.F.(L) 6 claimed to have shot down two Junkers 88 during two dive bombing attacks before the destroyers closed. Some of the landing craft made several journeys between the beaches and the L.C.T. under heavy fire and often dangerously overloaded. At 1040 the Flotilla officer of the *Prince Charles* went into Red beach with eight L.C.A. Of these six were destroyed including the Flotilla officer's craft, but one, and probably two, embarked troops.

The Flotilla officer of the *Princess Astrid* led four craft in to White beach under very heavy fire. On touching down, the boats were swamped by the weight of numbers trying to embark, and one craft, hit by a heavy shell, capsized, but each of the others took off about 70 men. L.C.A. 314, heavily laden, had been badly holed on the beach so the troops were transferred under fire to an L.C.T., which immediately received several direct hits and sank. L.C.A. 314 was sinking, so her Commanding Officer put her alongside another L.C.T. and abandoned her.

At 1100 the Flotilla Officer of the *Glengyle* proceeded in to White beach with three craft of his flotilla and two or three from the *Prince Charles*. The beach was in enemy hands, with a small pocket of Canadians forming a strong point round a stranded L.C.T. These troops were removed, but many were killed

¹ B.R. p. 21.

after embarkation.¹ The enemy fire was very heavy and they were fired on by some of our own tanks which had been captured. At least three craft were lost after leaving the beach; the troops that survived were put on board the *Calpe*.

From the report of the senior officer of "A" L.C.T., the tank landing craft which was sunk appears to have been L.C.T. 124, which, in spite of orders to remain one mile off shore, had approached to within half a mile. L.C.T. 163 off White beach took troops from L.C.A. which were withdrawing, and L.C.T. 166 remained off Red beach embarking troops who were ferried out. Later the senior officer of the L.C.T. in M.L. 343 proceeded to a point off the harbour entrance and came under very heavy fire. The M.L. put up a smoke screen to cover L.C.T. 166, which eventually withdrew safely in company with the M.L. and L.C.F.(L) 5 and 6. Commander McClintock, the Boat Pool officer, gave his assistant, Lt.-Cdr. Dathan, orders to supervise the withdrawal of landing craft from the eastern part of the beaches, while he himself dealt with the western half. He was off the breakwater in an M.L. leading in the landing craft when enemy aircraft attacked him with bombs and cannon, forcing him to retire seawards followed by some of the landing craft. He then met a landing craft from Blue beach, which the Commanding Officer stated was held by the enemy. He accordingly came to the conclusion that it was impossible to carry out evacuation from Blue, White or Red beaches, and ordered the landing craft with him to form up on a course for home, while he himself proceeded in search of the *Calpe*.² Lt.-Cdr. Dathan meanwhile in M.L.214 led his landing craft in towards the beach and at about 1145, when the last landing craft had gone in, closed the *Calpe*. As there were no special orders for him, he withdrew to 3 miles off shore and collected landing craft as they came off the beaches, eventually sailing in company with them and the *Calpe* in the last group to leave.

Commander Lambert, the Principal Beachmaster, subsequently gave a graphic account³ of these attempts as seen from the shore:—

"... I observed about eight L.C.A. making for White beach and was proceeding along the beach to meet them when they were heavily attacked by bombs from German aircraft while still some way off. In the meanwhile about half-a-dozen other L.C.A. were seen heading for Red beach. These duly made the land through heavy fire and deployed perfectly just below the strong point. Lieutenant Bibby took charge of the loading, but all except one were struck by mortars or shells as they were backing away and the troops had to be brought on shore again through a heavy fire. The only surviving officer of the boats which had been sunk was Lieutenant H. R. Hobday, R.N.V.R., of H.M.S. *Princess Beatrix*. It was subsequently reported to me that it was this officer who led these boats in and it was hard luck that his boat should have been hit on its way off after a fine attempt to rescue troops in almost hopeless circumstances.

"After this incident, which left us busy for some time, it was noticed that the horizon was clear of shipping, and the Brigadier (W. W. Southam) was informed that it was unlikely that any more would be sent. He was rallying his men to further efforts, but they were too exhausted for much exertion. Casualties were getting heavy, and although we kept up small-arms fire as individuals, we could not reduce the increasing fire directed at us from the cliff tops. I then set out to return to Beach H.Q. about a furlong to the eastward to talk things over with the P.M.L.O., but a heavy barrage was put down and it was necessary to lie very flat until it ceased. When it suddenly stopped Germans could be seen approaching the promenade and our troops had begun to surrender. I returned to the strong point, being met by Lieutenant Bibby who told me that the soldiers had had enough and had run out of ammunition. We decided to try to escape by swimming out to a sunken L.C.T. with its

¹ "With the help of the beach party these were quickly loaded and had just shoved off when there was a rush of military personnel towards the departing craft. In order to stop this I plunged into the sea and made for the nearest craft. I reached this and gave orders to go full speed astern in order to get clear, but the few extra men who had managed to scramble aboard, together with timely enemy fire, upset the trim of the craft and she sank. One of the remaining craft received a direct hit and sank."—(Extract from report of Lieutenant P. Ross, R.N.V.R., White beachmaster).

² M., App. 16, p. 72.

³ H. and A. 1235/45.

bows afloat and lie up in it until dark. The Germans had no compunction about firing at us all the way out, but we got on board. However, the rising tide engulfed the bows and, as we were too exhausted to swim, the current took us close in to the breakwater where we were picked up by the enemy."

Meanwhile some of the landing craft from the *Prince Leopold's* flotilla, which had taken troops off Green beach, went in towards Red and White beaches. Some of these were ordered to withdraw by destroyers before they reached shore, others picked up men swimming in the water, but more of them appear to have touched down.

L.C.A.186 made a final attempt. On arriving off White beach she found that all was quiet. At Red beach she found two L.C.T. on fire and three disabled L.C.A. The beach was clear of smoke and under heavy fire; it was covered with dead. Only two live men were seen, but the craft could not, owing to heavy fire, approach sufficiently to take them off, though she picked up 30 men swimming in the sea including the Flotilla officer of the *Prince Charles* whose craft, as already recounted, had been sunk. L.C.A.186 was the last craft to leave Red beach.

31. DECISION TO ABANDON OPERATION

By about 1130 the Naval Force Commander realized that the position ashore was deteriorating and that enemy fire was continually increasing. At that time the *Brocklesby* was ordered to close the shore and give supporting fire. She advanced to within 500 yards of the beaches, firing at gun positions on the cliffs and at houses on the front. Her action gave some relief to Green beach (see Section 29), but does not appear to have had much effect on the enemy guns, which were firing on the main beaches. The *Brocklesby* came under very heavy fire, and was repeatedly hit by shells of 3-in. calibre and below and even by small-arms fire; both engines were put out of action and the ship grounded by the stern. Repairs, however, were completed in three minutes and, still firing at the enemy, the *Brocklesby* got clear and sought protection behind the smoke.

At 1215, according to the *Brocklesby's* report, the enemy were firing with small-arms from the Casino and large houses to the east of the Casino. Three L.C.T. were high and dry and our troops were sheltering behind these, whilst others lying on the beach were still firing. The number of troops was estimated at between 100 and 150 and one man signalled asking for boats to be sent.

At 1233, the *Fernie* attempted to give Red beach extra smoke cover, but was hit and her director put out of action. Her Captain then received a request for assistance from Chasseur 13, hit and stopped off Red beach, but did not consider himself justified in approaching further. He endeavoured to pass on the request, but without success. The Chasseur, however, succeeded in extricating herself and reached home.

Meanwhile Commander McClintock, unable to find the *Calpe*, had made a signal at 1220 saying that no further evacuation was possible. The Military Force Commander, however, asked for further efforts to be made to bring off troops, so the Naval Force Commander replied, "If no further evacuation possible, withdraw." The signal was reported to Commander McClintock without the word "if" and he accordingly withdrew with all landing craft in sight at about 1230 without apparently having been into the beach at all.

By this time over 400 men had been evacuated from Red and White beaches under conditions of the greatest difficulty, the crews of the landing craft showing complete contempt for danger. At 1240 the Naval Force Commander in the *Calpe* closed the beaches for a final personal inspection. Stationing L.C.A. 185 and 188 one on each bow, the *Calpe* steered for the eastern end of Red beach,

opening fire with her 4-in. guns. At nine cables from the shore she came under heavy fire and as no troops could be seen on the beach, retired behind the smoke screen. It appeared impossible to bring off any more troops, but before finally abandoning the attempt Captain Hughes Hallett closed the *Locust*, which was bombarding the eastern cliff, intending to consult Commander Ryder as to whether the shallow-draught *Locust* should go in once more. At this time, however, the Military Force Commander received a signal saying that the remainder of the troops ashore were surrendering, and the operation was brought to an end.

32. LOSS OF H.M.S. "BERKELEY" (Plan 1)

It was shortly after the withdrawal from the French coast started that the Force incurred its only warship loss. When the signal to withdraw was made, the destroyers were ordered to close the *Calpe* and make smoke. A number of enemy aircraft was engaged, but owing to the smoke it was impossible to assess the results of A.A. fire. A general withdrawal began and destroyers were ordered to concentrate 4 miles 330° from Dieppe. Air attack at the time was almost continuous. The *Berkeley* was bombarding houses at the back of White beach when she received the signal to withdraw. On arriving at the rendezvous, her Captain intended to turn round astern of the main body in order to make smoke cover. At this juncture, at 1318 she was attacked by three Dorniers, which were at once engaged by our fighters. One of the enemy, however, came on and dropped four bombs, which some of the accounts—not, however, that of the *Berkeley's* Captain—say were jettisoned. Two bombs hit the ship on the starboard side just forward of the bridge. The ship's back was broken, the main bulkhead at the after end of the forward mess-deck was shattered, and the forepart of the ship was flooded.

S.G.B. 8 immediately went alongside and took off the greater part of the ship's company. Lieutenant Yorke still thought that there was a chance of saving his ship and decided to remain on board with a towing party. As, however, all communications on board had broken down and the ship appeared to be sinking, the Captain reluctantly gave the order to abandon ship, which was carried out at 1321, when the S.G.B. cast off. The *Albrighton* was ordered to sink the *Berkeley* by torpedo, which she did at 1338. The Captain of the *Berkeley* specially mentions the gallantry of Colonel Hillsinger of U.S.A.A.C., who had a foot blown off by the bomb but made his way to the S.G.B., where, though in great pain, he continued to act as aircraft lookout while lying on the deck.

33. REMARKS ON THE EVACUATION

While accounts of the evacuation of Green beach are clear, the same cannot be said of the evacuation of Red and White beaches. Only a few reports from Commanding Officers of landing craft who took part in the withdrawal from the main beaches are available, and in most cases no times are given. Under the circumstances it was no doubt difficult to keep any accurate records, but the lack of them makes it difficult to follow the sequence of events. It seems evident that several craft which might have gone into the beaches were ordered away by destroyers, and Commander McClintock¹ states that a number of craft were withdrawn before the end. It is true that, except for the 100 to 150 men seen by the *Brocklesby* at 1215, reports tend to show that no troops, in a position to be evacuated, were left ashore on Red and White beaches. The *Calpe* saw no

¹ M., App. 16, p. 72.

one when she was close to the beach shortly before 1300. L.C.A. 186, the last craft to leave the beaches, saw only two men on Red beach, and none on White beach. It is nowhere stated at what time this craft finally left the beaches, but presumably it was well after 1200. When dealing with reports that no men were left on the beaches, however, it must be borne in mind that the troops were sheltering under the sea wall at some distance from the water's edge and it might well have been impossible to discern them through the smoke from off shore. The men would not have been ordered down to the fire-swept beaches until it was known from the naval beach parties that landing craft were about to touch down.

The original report¹ states that well over 1000 men were evacuated from Red and White beaches, but this is almost certainly wrong. The Canadian History estimates the number taken off at about 368 and this is probably the maximum figure. So far as can be substantiated from the reports of the boat officers, only 18 or 19 craft, about half the number available,² endeavoured to touch down on the main beaches. Of these 10 or 11 were destroyed and from 6 to 8 brought off troops; one craft never beached, but returned safely with a number of men who were swimming off the beach. According to the reports of Commander Lambert, the principal beachmaster, and of the beachmaster at White Beach,³ both of whom were taken prisoner, only one L.C.A. got safely away from each beach. It is evident however that the beach officers were unaware of the evacuation carried out by the boats of the *Princess Astrid* and they may have counted as destroyed one or two craft which in fact returned safely. The L.C.A. were designed to carry 35 men. One craft is known to have taken off 80 and three took off 70, but craft carrying a number of wounded on stretchers must have taken considerably fewer. In addition perhaps 50 men were rescued from the sea. Under these circumstances it is impossible to be certain about the exact number evacuated, but it was probably well under 400.⁴

¹ In B.R.1887, p. 28, para. 243.

² The total number of L.C.A. engaged in the operation was 60. A few had been destroyed during the landing and 14 were employed at Green beach (see Section 29). About 40 were available to evacuate Red and White beaches.

³ H. and A. 1235/45; M.3146/45.

⁴ The total number of Canadian troops who returned to England was 2078, of whom about 850 never landed at all. After careful investigation, the Canadian Army Historian finds it impossible to determine with complete certainty the number of men evacuated from the beaches. Though fairly reliable statistics are available for the men of each unit who returned to England, there is in most cases no basis for determining how many of these men had actually landed. The figures finally arrived at are as follows:—

<i>Green Beach (Pourville)</i>		
Camerons of Canada	258	} 601
South Saskatchewan Regt.	343	
<i>Red and White Beaches</i>		
14th Army Tank Regt.	3	} 368
Royal Hamilton Light Infantry	192	
Essex Scottish	41	
Fusiliers Mont Royal	65	
Royal Canadian Engineers	17	
Miscellaneous (R. Canadian Signals, Royal Marines, Rangers, French Commandos)	50	
<i>Blue Beach (Puits)</i>		
Royal Regiment of Canada	6	6
<i>Flank Beaches</i>		
No. 4 Commando	227	} 247
No. 3 Commando	20	
Grand total:		1,222

The Naval Force Commander commented that it was remarkable that "it proved possible to plan, promulgate, and carry out an entirely different scheme for withdrawal than that which had been contemplated in the original operation orders".¹ This involved (a) cancelling the existing operation orders, which contained a detailed plan for the withdrawal, (b) ordering the simplest possible alternative, and (c) achieving this without the use of plain language radio signals, since by this time it was apparent that these were being intercepted by the Germans. In these circumstances, all L.C.A. were sent into the same beaches as those on which they had originally landed to take off as many troops as possible as best they could and ferry them to L.C.T., awaiting them about a mile from the shore. There is no doubt that the landing craft carried out their most difficult task with the greatest gallantry and determination, and there is also little doubt that, though destroyers and other craft gave what support they could, this support was not effective. On the other hand, the smoke screen was extremely efficient; and in fact, it is possible to think that, without it, no evacuation could have been carried out.

34. THE RETURN TO ENGLAND

Meanwhile the main body of landing craft and coastal craft had formed up in accordance with orders and was now slowly heading north. Destroyers took up their positions and the *Fernie* was ordered to take guide. While this was happening, the *Calpe* was attacked by enemy fighters and her bridge was shot up, causing several casualties including Air Commodore Cole, the representative afloat of the R.A.F. Commander. The *Calpe* proceeded to the eastward to pick up a British pilot who was reported in the sea. She thus left the protection given by the concentrated A.A. fire of all the ships, and as a result sustained two dive bombing attacks and suffered casualties and damage from near-misses. Subsequently the *Calpe* rejoined the convoy, which proceeded through the western swept channel on its way home.

The passage home was marked by a number of enemy air attacks, which all proved ineffective against the efficient umbrella provided by the R.A.F. About 20 miles from Newhaven the convoy was joined by the *Mackay* (Capt.D. 16) and *Blencathra*, which escorted the landing and coastal craft in to Newhaven, while the destroyers and the *Locust*, with over 500 wounded on board, went on to Portsmouth, where they arrived shortly after midnight.

¹ L., Vol. I., p. 23.

CHAPTER V

The Air Battle

35. AIR FORCES

In the preceding pages, little reference has been made to the part played by the R.A.F., mainly because, in the nature of things, our aircraft, though very active, were not often seen from the ground. It should be clearly understood, however, that the air battle was not a separate phase but went on continuously from the first landings until dark, reaching its greatest intensity during the main withdrawal from the beaches.

The air battle¹ was directed by the Air Force Force-Commander, Air Vice-Marshal T. Leigh-Mallory, from H.Q. of 11 Group of Fighter Command at Uxbridge,² and the immediate operations of fighters were directed by the fighter controller in the *Calpe*. The Air Forces detailed to take part in the operation were 56 squadrons of day fighters (50 to provide cover and six for close support), two squadrons of Hurricane bombers, two squadrons of day bombers, four squadrons of Army Co-operation forces, and three squadrons of "Smoke forces," in all 67 squadrons. In addition, Coastal Command provided search patrols during the passage of the expedition throughout the dark hours. Bostons carried out bombing attacks on the east headland battery at 0510, after which a smoke screen was laid over both headlands. The two batteries behind the town were also bombed by Bostons, but owing to the haze and the bad light these attacks on the batteries were considered, in the words of C.C.O., "quite ineffective."³ "Intruder" aircraft engaged batteries, the attack by cannon-firing fighters on "Hess" battery being particularly helpful, as has already been mentioned (Sections 20 and 21). Cannon-fighters supported the landing of the troops on Red and White beaches at Dieppe, and further smoke screens was laid as requested by the Naval and Military Force Commanders. Subsequent bombing attacks were made on the east headland when it was seen that the Blue beach landing at Puits was held up. Unfortunately the bombs, like the destroyers' shells, had little effect on the enemy's defences. Nor can it be said that the bombing was very intensive, for the total of bombs dropped amounted only to some 220 bombs of 500 lb and about 90 of 250 lb, a total of 60 tons (see Appendix E). When it was seen that the situation on White beach was deteriorating, attacks were made at about 0930 on the west headland by "Hurribombers" and cannon-fighters.

¹ For fuller details, see B.R.1887, p. 144 *et seq.*

² With him throughout the operation were the Chief of Combined Operations and the G.O.C., 1st Canadian Corps. They had before them, on the naval, military and air plots which were constantly kept up to date as signals came in over the very complete W/T and land line system of communications, a complete picture of the action. Except for a number of discussions on various points with the Royal Air Force Commander, the Chief of Combined Operations and the G.O.C., 1st Canadian Corps refrained from interfering with the course of the operation, which the Force Commanders clearly had in hand.

³ B.R., p. 32.

36. ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION

At the commencement of the operation there was practically no enemy air opposition, the Luftwaffe having evidently been taken by surprise, but as time passed enemy sorties of 20 to 30 fighters appeared, and subsequently the strength of the sorties increased to between 50 and 100 aircraft. Fighter bombers also arrived and some abortive attacks were carried out on our ships, but it was not until about 1000 that heavy bombers appeared escorted by fighters. The heavies were energetically attacked by our fighters and sustained severe losses. The bombers made no attempt to attack our troops ashore and confined their attentions to the ships, but, except for the sinking of the *Berkeley*, had practically no success.

At 1030 an attack was made by 24 Fortresses, escorted by Spitfires, on the fighter airfield at Abbeville-Drucat, which rendered it unserviceable for two hours and probably severely hampered the enemy fighters at the crucial moment of the withdrawal. During the withdrawal the Germans made bombing attacks on the two headlands, and a thick smoke curtain was laid from the air. From 1200, heavy battles between formations of fighters went on over the ships and beaches, the enemy losing heavily. During the voyage home, fighter cover was maintained over the convoy and all attempts of enemy aircraft to attack the ships were foiled.¹ In the air we lost eight bombers and smoke-layers, 10 Army Co-operation and reconnaissance aircraft, and 88 fighters,² while our casualties in killed and missing were 113, with 40 wounded. It is estimated that the enemy made 125 sorties with bombers and 600 with fighters. Our total sorties were stated to have been about 3,000.

At the time it was thought that the enemy's air losses were considerably greater than ours and that over a quarter of the German Air Force in Western Europe had been put out of action.³ German records show, however, that in fact we only destroyed 23 fighters and 25 bombers, while 8 fighters and 16 bombers were damaged.⁴

These bare figures, however, do not tell the whole story. According to reliable German documents, there were in the Luftflotte 3 area (France, Belgium and Holland) 299 fighters and 175 bombers, but of these only 206 fighters and 107 bombers were fully serviceable at the time. Thus about 15 per cent of the serviceable fighters and over 38 per cent of the serviceable bombers were either destroyed or substantially damaged. Since the Spring of 1941, when the bulk of the German Air Force was moved to the eastern front, the small force remaining in the west had operated under severe pressure. The bomber units in particular were showing signs of extreme fatigue, resulting in a serious decline in efficiency of both aircraft and crews. Coming just after substantial losses suffered in the raids on Birmingham at the end of July, the casualties at Dieppe were a heavy blow, particularly as nearly all of the crews were lost, including two Squadron Commanders.

These losses should be viewed, too, in the light of the contemporary position of the German Air Force as a whole. Both in the Mediterranean and on the eastern front it was extremely hard pressed and the bomber force especially was stretched to the limit of its capabilities. In these circumstances it can fairly be claimed that Dieppe was an important contribution to the run-down of the forces in the west, which in turn led to a severe restriction of offensive operations against the United Kingdom and British shipping.

¹ B.R., p. 164. "The cover and support afforded by No. 11 Group, R.A.F., were magnificent." M., para. 4.

² The Germans claim to have brought down 112 of our aircraft. German Report.

³ B.R., pp. 33, 164.

⁴ Information from Air Ministry Historical Branch.

CHAPTER VI

Conclusion

37. COMMENT AND REFLECTION

The Dieppe Raid occupies a place of its own in the operations of the war. It was the only raid in which the landing of tanks was attempted or in which more than a couple of hours was allowed for military operations. Though it can hardly be claimed that the immediate results were commensurate with the casualties incurred, it is certain that it had important ulterior results that render it a notable landmark in the history of the war. For example, it convinced the Germans that an invasion could be defeated on the beaches; hence reliance on Hitler's "western wall" and the tactics which led to the military disaster that overtook them after the Normandy landings.

In its general aspect it shed an illuminating ray on the urgent need for meeting the long-standing requirements of Combined Operations.¹ In particular the question of close fire support received immediate and thorough investigation and steps were taken to build a number of special types of support craft. A further sequel was the introduction of the landing craft gun and landing craft rocket to support assaults. Other naval lessons, forming an important aggregate, were the necessity for ample smoke protection, for a higher standard of aircraft recognition, for careful timing of the assaults, for ample briefing with due regard to security considerations, and for an accurate and comprehensive system of control and communications. In this connection it was noted that R/T messages in plain language were speedily intercepted and exploited by the enemy.² Another important lesson, which was finally accepted by the Admiralty, was the necessity for "the formation of permanent naval assault forces" possessing a "coherence comparable to that of any other first-line formations".³ Up to the date of the raid, scattered units had been collected together as required for a particular operation and the important elements of a permanent command and continuity of training had been wanting. Measures were taken to remedy this deficiency and in due course Force "J" came into being. This led to the issue of Force "J" fighting instructions, which standardised the technique of assault forces and permitted an immense shortening of future operation orders.⁴

But the principal lesson of the Dieppe Raid was that a direct attack on a defended port had little chance of success and that landing forces must be put ashore on beaches at some distance from the port. This policy was followed in all Mediterranean assaults and also in the Normandy Landing. The necessity for prolonged maintenance over beaches caused the possibility of the construction of a temporary harbour to be investigated, with the result that the "Mulberry" was evolved, in time for the latter great operation.

¹ For Summary of "Lessons Learnt" see App. F.

² See pp. 25 (note), 39.

³ The necessity for a permanent selected force was actually put on record by Captain Hughes Hallett and agreed to by the Chief of Combined Operations two days before the forces sailed for Operation "Jubilee".

⁴ The instructions were accepted by Admiral Kirk, U.S.N., and used for the Pacific landings; they were also adapted and used in the Mediterranean. Subsequently reissued as "General Instructions for the Conduct of Naval Assault Forces", they were used in the great closing amphibious operations of the war.

APPENDIX A

Naval Forces

I. LIST OF H.M. SHIPS

Naval Force Commander: Captain J. Hughes Hallett, R.N. (in *H.M.S. Calpe*).

Chief of Staff: (Acting) Captain J. D. Luce, D.S.O., R.N.

Ship

Commanding Officer

DESTROYERS

<i>H.M.S. Calpe</i> (Headquarters Ship)	..	..	Lt.-Cdr. J. H. Wallace, R.N.
<i>H.M.S. Fernie</i> (2nd Headquarters ship)	..	..	Lt. W. B. Willett, R.N.
<i>H.M.S. Brocklesby</i>	..	..	Lt.-Cdr. E. N. Pumphrey, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.N.
<i>H.M.S. Garth</i>	..	..	Lt.-Cdr. J. P. Scatchard, R.N.
<i>H.M.S. Albrighton</i>	..	..	Lt.-Cdr. R. J. Hanson, R.N.
<i>H.M.S. Berkeley</i>	..	..	Lt. J. J. S. Yorke, R.N.
<i>H.M.S. Bleasdale</i>	..	..	Lt. P. B. North-Lewis, R.N.
<i>O.R.P. Slazak</i> (Polish)	..	..	Cdr. R. Tyminiski

SLOOP AND GUNBOAT

<i>H.M.S. Alresford</i>	..	..	Cdr. R. E. C. Dunbar, R.N.
<i>H.M.S. Locust</i>	..	..	Lt.-Cdr. W. J. Stride, M.B.E., R.N.

MINESWEEPER FLOTILLAS

9th Minesweeper Flotilla	..	..	Cdr. H. T. Rust, D.S.O., R.N.
13th Minesweeper Flotilla	..	..	Cdr. L. J. S. Ede, D.S.O., R.N.

LANDING SHIP, INFANTRY (LARGE)

<i>H.M.S. Glengyle</i>	..	..	Captain D. S. McGrath, R.N.
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LANDING SHIPS, INFANTRY (MEDIUM)

<i>H.M.S. Queen Emma</i>	..	..	Captain G. L. D. Gibbs, D.S.O., R.N.
<i>H.M.S. Princess Beatrix</i>	..	..	Cdr. T. B. Brunton, R.N.

LANDING SHIPS, INFANTRY (SMALL)

<i>H.M.S. Prince Charles</i>	..	..	Cdr. S. H. Dennis, D.S.C., R.N.
<i>H.M.S. Prince Albert</i>	..	..	Lt.-Cdr. H. B. Peate, R.N.R.
<i>H.M.S. Prince Leopold</i>	..	..	Lt.-Cdr. W. S. Byles, R.D., R.N.R.
<i>H.M.S. Princess Astrid</i>	..	..	Lt.-Cdr. C. E. Hall, R.N.R.

LANDING SHIPS, INFANTRY (HANDHOISTING)

<i>H.M.S. Invicta</i>	..	..	Cdr. A. I. Robertson, R.D., R.N.R.
<i>H.M.S. Duke of Wellington</i>	..	..	Lt.-Cdr. J. F. H. Coombes, R.D., R.N.R.

SENIOR OFFICERS, LANDINGS

"Yellow" Beach	..	..	Cdr. D. B. Wyburd, R.N.
"Orange" Beach	..	..	Lt.-Cdr. H. H. Mulleneux, R.N.
"Green" Beach	..	..	Lt.-Cdr. R. M. Prior, D.S.C., R.N.
"Blue" Beach	..	..	Lt.-Cdr. H. W. Goulding, D.S.O., R.N.R.
"White" Beach	..	..	Lt.-Cdr. C. W. McMullen, R.N.
"Red" and "White" Beaches and Principal Beachmaster	..	..	Cdr. G. T. Lambert, R.N.
Officer Commanding Cutting-out Party	..	..	Cdr. R. E. D. Ryder, V.C., R.N.
"White" Beach Beachmaster	..	..	Lt. P. Ross, R.N.V.R. ¹
"Red" Beach Beachmaster	..	..	Lt. D. T. Bibby, R.N.V.R. ²

¹ M.3146/45.

² H. and A.809/45.

LANDING CRAFT

Commanding Officer

<i>First Flotilla. Group 5. ("Yellow" Beach):</i>		<i>L.C.P. No.</i>
Lt. D. R. Stevens, R.N.V.R. (Flotilla Officer)		1
Sub-Lt. H. A. Hancock, R.N.V.R...		80
Sub-Lt. B. K. McCosh, R.N.V.R. ..		81
Sub-Lt. A. M. Button, R.N.V.R.		85
Sub-Lt. R. E. D. Fenning, R.N.V.R.		86
Sub-Lt. N. W. Dunn, R.N.V.R. ..		87
Lt. G. W. Holt, R.N.V.R. ..		95
Sub-Lt. A. L. Oates, R.N.V.R. ..		118
Sub-Lt. J. Rutherford, R.N.V.R.		128
Sub-Lt. M. V. Nicholl, R.N.V.R.		145
Sub-Lt. K. Child, R.N.V.R. ..		157
<i>Second Flotilla. Group 6. ("Green" Beach):</i>		
Lt. G. Byerley, R.N.V.R. (Flotilla Officer)		19
Sub-Lt. Franklin, R.N.V.R. ..		88
Sub-Lt. M. Easton, R.N.V.R. ..		94
Sub-Lt. D. H. Botly, R.C.N.V.R. ..		119
Sub-Lt. R. M. Smith, R.C.N.V.R...		124
Sub-Lt. D. L. Marchant, R.N.V.R.		125
Sub-Lt. J. E. O'Rourke, R.C.N.V.R.		129
Sub-Lt. D. Masson, R.N.V.R. ..		147
Sub-Lt. J. D. Nisbet, R.N.V.R. ..		156
<i>Fourth Flotilla. Group 7. (Floating Reserve):</i>		
Lt.-Cdr. W. L. N. Wallace, R.N.V.R. (Flotilla Officer)		186
Lt. J. Hawkes, R.N.V.R. ..		195
Lt. F. Lock, R.N.V.R. ..		187
Lt. R. A. Durham, R.N.V.R. ..		212
Sub-Lt. S. G. P. Walker, R.N.V.R.		175
Sub-Lt. W. E. Ibell, R.N.V.R. ..		170
Sub-Lt. D. B. Corcoran, R.N.V.R.		188
Sub-Lt. C. T. Kitching, R.N.V.R.		192
Sub-Lt. R. C. A. Barnes, R.N.V.R.		174
Sub-Lt. C. H. Lindfoot, R.N.V.R.		173
Sub-Lt. G. W. Lindfoot, R.N.V.R.		199
Sub-Lt. G. M. Doaman, R.N.V.R.		172
Sub-Lt. N. Sparks, R.N.V.R. ..		53
Sub-Lt. J. H. Vellacott, R.N.V.R.		28
<i>Fifth Flotilla. Group 7. (Floating Reserve):</i>		
Lt.-Cdr. N. C. Roulston, R.N.V.R. (Flotilla Officer)		163
Lt. R. F. H. Morgan, R.N.V.R. ..		614
Lt. A. Wilson, R.N.V.R. ..		165
Lt. E. R. C. Hunt, R.N.V.R. ..		166
Lt. C. Newman, R.N.V.R. ..		167
Lt. C. Tymms, R.N.V.R. ..		209
Lt. K. D. Cox, R.N.V.R. ..		210
Sub-Lt. J. Vaughan, R.N.V.R. ..		208
Sub-Lt. T. Williams, R.N.V.R. ..		155
Lt. R. F. McRae, R.C.N.V.R. ..		45
Sub-Lt. G. E. Evans, R.N.V.R. ..		31
Sub-Lt. D. B. Rogers, R.C.N.V.R...		163
<i>Sixth Flotilla. Group 6. ("Green" Beach):</i>		
Lt. J. Murray, R.N.V.R. (Flotilla Officer)		127
Lt. P. Moss, R.N.V.R. ..		130
Lt. D. R. Tride, R.N.V.R. ..		131
Sub-Lt. L. C. Breeze, R.N.V.R. ..		132
Sub-Lt. J. Whiting, R.N.V.R. ..		134
Lt. C. W. R. Cross, R.N.V.R. ..		135
Sub-Lt. A. D. Waters, R.N.V.R. ..		136
Sub-Lt. T. L. Rankin, R.N.V.R. ..		153
Sub-Lt. J. Murts, R.N.V.R. ..		158

LANDING CRAFT (*cont.*)*Commanding Officer*

<i>Seventh Flotilla. Group 6. ("Green" Beach):</i>		<i>L.C.P. No.</i>
Lt.-Cdr. H. Garrard, R.N.V.R. (Flotilla Officer)		101
Sub-Lt. H. A. Carter, R.N.V.R.		83
Sub-Lt. B. T. Heath, R.N.V.R.		84
Lt. J. Mattinson, R.N.V.R.		99
Lt. C. Lawrie, R.N.V.R.		102
Lt. J. Cassidy, R.N.V.R.		104
Lt. E. N. Russel, R.N.V.R.		110
Sub-Lt. R. G. Holmes, R.N.V.R.		113
Lt. M. L. Bateson, R.N.V.R.		159
Lt. G. O'Keefe Wilson, R.N.V.R.		160

<i>Twenty-Fourth Flotilla. Group 5. ("Yellow" Beach):</i>		
Lt.-Cdr. C. L. Corke, R.N.V.R. (Flotilla Officer)		42
Sub-Lt. A. D. H. Kelly, R.N.V.R.		3
Sub-Lt. B. Purden, R.N.V.R.		4
Sub-Lt. Plummer, R.N.V.R.		13
Lt. H. T. Buckee, R.N.V.R.		15
Sub-Lt. R. Hough, R.N.V.R.		23
Sub-Lt. G. E. Green, R.N.V.R.		34
Sub-Lt. P. J. Record, R.N.V.R.		40
Sub-Lt. D. H. Spring, R.N.V.R.		41
Lt. G. Brown, R.N.V.R.		43
Sub-Lt. B. Faragher, R.N.V.R.		44
Sub-Lt. M. S. Pilkington, R.N.V.R.		115
Midshipman A. B. Potter, R.N.V.R.		78

(Navigational)

2nd L.C.T. Flotilla

Lt.-Cdr. H. P. Brownell, R.A.N.V.R. (Flotilla Officer and of 1st L.C.F. Flotilla)		<i>L.C.T. No.</i>
Lt. C. Brookes Hill, R.N.V.R.		121
Lt. G. H. Reynolds, R.N.V.R.		145
Lt. L. A. Gwinner, R.N.V.R.		124
Lt. T. A. Robertson, R.N.V.R.		125
Lt. A. Cheney, R.N.V.R.		126
Skpr. B. D. McPherson, R.N.R.		127
Sub-Lt. W. H. Cooke, R.N.V.R.		169
Skpr. T. A. Cooke, D.S.C., R.N.R.		163
Skpr. C. L. Barber, R.N.R.		165
Sub-Lt. S. Alanson, R.N.V.R.		166

1st L.C.F. Flotilla

		<i>L.C.F.(L) No.</i>
Lt. E. L. Graham, R.N.V.R.		2
Lt. N. R. Woodeson, R.N.V.R.		4
Lt. H. C. Trickiey, R.N.V.R.		6
Lt. T. M. Foggtt, R.A.N.V.R.		1
Lt. E. Arundale, R.N.V.R.		3
Lt. C. Grantham, R.N.V.R.		5

4th L.C.T. Flotilla

Lt.-Cdr. C. Masterman, R.A.N.V.R. (Flotilla Officer)		<i>L.C.T. No.</i>
Lt. F. F. Appleton, R.A.N.V.R.		305
Lt. P. Dew, R.N.V.R.		304
Lt. P. Bull, R.N.V.R.		303
Sub-Lt. S. Carr-Smith, R.N.V.R.		302
Lt. D. J. B. Morris, R.A.N.V.R.		306
Lt. L. Bailey, R.N.V.R.		308
Lt. R. M. Thacker, R.N.V.R.		376
Lt. K. B. Porteous, R.N.V.R.		361
Lt. F. F. Welcome, R.N.V.R.		309
Sub-Lt. R. Dewhurst, R.N.V.R.		310
Skpr. E. J. Brown, R.N.R.		360
Skpr. C. D. Powdrall, R.N.R.		307
Lt. R. E. Green, R.N.V.R.		318
Skpr. A. C. Tavandale, R.N.R.		325

ESCORTING CRAFT

<i>Commanding Officer</i>	<i>M.G.B. No.</i>
Sub-Lt. L. H. Ennis, R.N.V.R.	50
Sub-Lt. G. Clarke, R.N.V.R.	51
Lt. W. B. G. Leith, R.N.V.R.	52
Sub-Lt. C. C. P. Broadhurst, R.N.V.R.	57
Lt. A. R. H. Nye, R.N.V.R.	312
Lt. J. L. Lloyd, R.N.V.R.	315
Lt-Cdr. T. M. Cartwright, R.N.V.R.	316
Lt. J. H. Coste, R.N.V.R.	317
Lt. N. W. Hughes, R.N.V.R.	320
Lt. B. L. Bourne, R.N.V.R.	321
Lt. G. C. Fanner, R.N.V.R.	323
Lt. R. D. Russell-Roberts, R.N.V.R.	326
<i>S.G.B. No.</i>	
Lt. G. H. Hummel, R.N.R.	5
Lt. H. C. T. Bradford, D.S.C., R.N.V.R.	6
Lt. I. R. Griffiths, R.N.	8
Lt. P. M. Scott, R.N.V.R.	9
<i>M.L. No.</i>	
Sub-Lt. G. F. Bayne, R.N.C.V.R.	114
Lt. E. K. Jones, R.N.V.R.	120
Lt-Cdr. R. N. Wood, R.N.V.R.	123
Lt. C. J. Jerram, R.N.V.R.	171
Lt. G. N. Johnstone, R.N.V.R.	187
Lt. B. H. Lloyd, R.N.V.R.	189
Lt. R. W. Ball, R.N.V.R.	190
Lt. H. Leslie, R.N.V.R.	191
Lt. J. F. Humphreys, R.N.V.R.	193
Lt-Cdr. W. Whitfield, R.N.R.	194
Lt. J. S. E. Page, R.N.V.R.	208
Lt. I. D. Lyle, R.N.V.R.	214
Lt. H. M. Nees, R.N.V.R.	230
Lt. D. H. Titcombe, R.N.V.R.	246
Lt. J. B. C. Lumsden, R.N.V.R.	291
Lt-Cdr. G. Shaw-Brundell, R.N.V.R.	292
Lt-Cdr. F. Hellings, R.N.V.R.	309
Lt. G. A. Wright, R.N.V.R.	343
Lt. L. E. Barker, R.N.V.R.	344
Lt. A. D. Fear, R.N.V.R.	346
<i>Chasseurs</i>	
Lt. W. H. P. Loftie, R.N.	14
Lt. de Vaisseau, Y. J. Boja, F.N.F.C.	43
Officier des Equipages J. Parc, F.N.F.C.	42
Lt. E. G. Egerton, R.N.	13
Lt. J. E. Syms, R.N.	41
Enseigne de Vaisseau Chanlieau, F.N.F.C.	10
Officier des Equipages M. Ibarlucia, F.N.F.C.	5
Landing Craft from the L.S.I. Flotillas consisted of: 60 L.C.A. (Assault);	
8 L.C.S. (Support); 7 L.C.M. (Mechanised).	

II. ORGANIZATION

Lists are taken from B.R.1887 and Report of N.F.C.; these do not give the names of flotilla officers in every case. The number of assault craft attached to each ship is taken from Plan 3. The total number of L.C.M. on Plan 3 (Diagram VI of B.R.) does not correspond with the text in B.R.

DESTROYERS

<i>Calpe</i>	..	..	H.Q. ship, 1st Destroyer Division, Captain J. Hughes Hallett, R.N., Naval Force Commander
<i>Fernie</i>	..	..	"Stand-by" H.Q. ship
<i>Garth</i>	..	..	S.O., 2nd Destroyer Division
<i>Albrighton</i>			
<i>Berkeley</i>			
<i>Bleasdale</i>			
<i>Slazak</i>	..	..	S.O., 3rd Destroyer Division
<i>Brocklesby</i>			

GROUP 1 ("Orange" beach)

<i>Prince Albert</i>	..	..	6 L.C.A., 1 L.C.S. Flotilla Officer, Lt. P. McKinnon, R.N.V.R.
M.G.B. 312			
S.G.B. 9			
S.O. Landings	..		Lt.-Cdr. H. H. Mulleneux, R.N.

GROUP 2 ("Green" beach)

<i>Princess Beatrix</i>		}	10 L.C.A., 2 L.C.S., 2 L.C.M. Flotilla Officer, Lt. J. H. F. Thomson, R.N.V.R.
<i>Invicta</i>	..		
M.G.B. 317			
S.G.B. 6			
S.O. Landings	..		Lt.-Cdr. R. M. Prior, R.N.

GROUP 3 ("Blue" beach)

<i>Queen Emma</i>	..	}	12 L.C.A., 2 L.C.S., 1 L.C.M. Flotilla Officer, Lt. N. E. B. Ramsay, R.N.V.R.
<i>Princess Astrid</i>	..		
M.G.B. 316			Flotilla Officer, Lt. J. Howitt, R.N.V.R.
S.G.B. 8			
S.O. Landings	..		Lt.-Cdr. H. W. Goulding, R.N.R.

GROUP 4 ("Red" and "White" beaches)

<i>Glengyle</i>	..	..	10 L.C.A., 1 L.C.S., 2 L.C.M. Flotilla Officer, Lt. P. Cork, R.N.V.R.
<i>Prince Charles</i>	..	..	8 L.C.A., 1 L.C.S. Flotilla Officer, Lt. Phillips, R.N.V.R.
<i>Prince Leopold</i>	..	..	8 L.C.A., 1 L.C.S. Flotilla Officer, Lt. R. Chancellor, R.N.V.R.
M.G.B. 326			
M.L. 291			
<i>Locust</i>			
S.O. Landings, "Red" and "White" beaches			Cdr. G. T. Lambert, R.N.
S.O. Landings, "White" beach	..	..	Lt.-Cdr. A. W. McMullen, R.N.
<i>Duke of Wellington</i>	..	..	6 L.C.A. Flotilla Officer, Lt. S. Breach, R.N.V.R.
("Blue" beach)			

GROUP 5 ("Yellow" beach)

1st L.C.P. Flotilla		
24th L.C.P. Flotilla		
S.G.B. 5		
M.L. 346		
L.C.F. (L) 1		
S.O. Landings	..	Cdr. B. D. Wyburd, R.N.

GROUP 6 ("Green" beach)

2nd L.C.P. Flotilla

6th L.C.P. Flotilla

7th L.C.P. Flotilla

M.L. 190

M.L. 194

S.O. Group and Boat Pool Officer, Cdr. H. V. McClintock, R.N.

GROUP 7 (*Floating Reserve*)

4th L.C.P. Flotilla

5th L.C.P. Flotilla

M.L. 214

M.L. 230

S.O. Group Lt.-Cdr. J. H. Dathan, R.N.

GROUP 8

L.C.T. 145, 127, 159, 126, 121, 163

L.C.F.(L) 2, 6 .. (Numbers of L.C.F.(L) not certain)

M.L. 343

S.O. Group Lt.-Cdr. Earl Beatty, R.N.

GROUP 9

L.C.T. 124, 125, 165, 166

M.L. 191

S.O. Group Lt. H. Leslie, R.N.V.R.

GROUP 10

L.C.T. 305, 304, 303, 302, 313, 314

M.L. 193

S.O. Group Lt.-Cdr. G. H. Stevens, R.N.

GROUP 11

L.C.T. 306, 308, 376, 361

M.L. 189, 187

L.C.F.(L) 3, 5

S.O. Group Lt. N. B. Lloyd, R.N.V.R.

GROUP 12

L.C.T. 309, 307, 310, 360

M.L. 344

L.C.F.(L) 4 (Number not certain)

S.O. Group Lt. L. E. Barker, R.N.V.R.

GROUP 13

Chasseurs 14, 43, 42, 13, 41, 10, 5

Alresford

S.O. Group Lt. M. Buist, R.N.

NOT ATTACHED TO GROUPS

M.G.B. 315, 321, 320, 323, 50, 51

M.L. 246, 123, 114, 120, 292, 309, 171, 208

CARRIED IN LANDING SHIPS

60 L.C.A.

7 L.C.M.

8 L.C.S.

Note.—The total number of landing craft lowered and sent in from the landing ships are in B.R., but the number from each ship and the flotilla identity numbers are not given.

APPENDIX B

Military and Air Forces

2nd Canadian Division: Major-General J. H. Roberts, M.C.

<i>Regiment</i>	<i>Commanding Officer</i>
4th Canadian Infantry Brigade ..	Brigadier W. W. Southam, E.D.
6th Canadian Infantry Brigade ..	Brigadier Sherwood Lett, M.C., E.D.
Royal Hamilton Light Infantry ..	Lt.-Col. R. R. Labatt
Essex Scottish	Lt.-Col. F. K. Jespersen
Queen's Own Cameronians ..	Lt.-Col. A. C. Gostling
Royal Regiment of Canada ..	Lt.-Col. D. E. Catto
South Saskatchewan Regiment ..	Lt.-Col. C. C. I. Merritt
Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal ..	Lt.-Col. D. Menard
Calgary Regiment (14th Canadian Tank Battalion).	Lt.-Col. J. G. Andrews
2nd Canadian Light Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.G.	Lt.-Col. K. A. Hunter

Commandos

No. 3 Commando	Lt.-Col. J. F. Durnford-Slater, D.S.O.
No. 4 Commando	Lt.-Col. The Lord Lovat, M.C.
Royal Marine Commando ..	Lt.-Col. J. P. P. Phillips, R.M.

ROYAL AIR FORCE

Air Vice-Marshal T. Leigh-Mallory, C.B., D.S.O., R.A.F.

Fighter Squadrons	611, 131, 129, 111, 43, 3, 32, 174, 124, 616, 64, 122, 81, 154, 165, 65, 242, 56, 51, 266, 610, 253, 232, 602, 130, 66, 118, 501, 87, 245, 175, 19, 41, 222, R.A.F. 402, 412, 416, 401, 411, 403, R.C.A.F. 485, R.N.Z.A.F. 350, Belgian 340, French 306, 317, 302, 303, 308, Polish 71, 121, 133, <i>Eagle</i> 331, 332, Norwegian 310, 312, Czechoslovakian 307, 308, 309, U.S.A.A.C.
Bomber Squadrons	88, 107, R.A.F.
Army Co-operation Squadrons ..	26, 239, 414, R.A.F. 400, R.C.A.F.
Smoke Forces	13, 614, 226

APPENDIX C

Casualties

Note. The figures which follow differ from those given in B.R. 1887, pp. 35, 36, which were compiled shortly after the raid. The figures adopted in the following statement have been obtained from the following sources:—*Royal Navy and Royal Marines* from the Naval Force Commander's Report and the Admiralty, N.C.W. (casualties); *Commandos* from Amphibious Warfare H.Q.; *R.A.F.* from Air Ministry, Historical Branch. These were all checked in June 1958. *Canadian losses* from official History of Canadian Army, Vol. I, p. 389.

I. ALLIED LOSSES

NAVAL (exclusive of Royal Marine Commando but including Royal Marines serving in L.C.F.)

(a) Personnel	Officers	O.R.	Total
Killed and died of wounds ¹	25	123	148
Prisoners of war	16	96	112
Wounded, ³ returned to U.K.	18	245	263
	59	464	523

(b) Material

1 destroyer (H.M.S. *Berkeley*), 5 L.C.T., 8 L.C.P.(L), 1 L.C.M., 1 L.C.S.(M), 1 L.C.F., 17 L.C.A.

MILITARY

(a) Personnel ²	Officers	O.R.	Total
Killed and died of wounds ¹	66	914	980
Prisoners of war	126	1,884	2,010
Wounded, ³ returned to U.K.	45	590	635
	237	3,388	3,625

(b) Material

29 tanks,⁴ 10 cars and carriers, 3 motor cycles, mortars, small arms, ammunition etc.

¹ Including permanently missing, and those who died in captivity (mostly from wounds received in the raid).

² Including 2nd Canadian Division, Commandos, Rangers and Royal Marine Commando.

³ A considerable number of prisoners of war were wounded. Of these there is no record except for the Canadians, of whom there were 1,306 unwounded, 568 wounded.

⁴ On p.26 of B.R. tank losses are given as 28, but the accounts of the landing show that out of 30 tanks carried by the 10 L.C.T. all but one left the craft; 28 were landed and one was drowned. The Germans claimed to have captured 29 tanks (German report, para. 50).

AIR

(a) *Personnel*

	<i>Officers</i>	<i>O.R.</i>	<i>Total</i>
Killed and died of wounds	20	33	53
Prisoners of war	9	13	22
Wounded, returned to U.K.	7	20	27
	36	66	102

(b) *Material*

88 fighters, 10 army co-operation and reconnaissance, 8 bombers and smoke-laying aircraft, 3 high-speed launches.

In addition to the foregoing the Combined Operations Headquarters Staff suffered 10 casualties, of which 2 were fatal.

The Germans claimed a total of 2,217 prisoners (German report, para. 70) and said they had buried about 600 of our dead.

The proportion of casualties to the troops engaged of the 2nd Canadian Division, Nos. 3, 4, 6 and 10 Commandos, the R.M. Commando and the U.S. Rangers was as follows:—

Engaged: 6,088 }
Casualties: 3,625 } 59.5 per cent: of these 980 (16 per cent) were fatal.

The following table shows the proportion of casualties to the number engaged by Services. Column 3 shows casualties from all causes (killed, wounded, missing, prisoners of war) on the conclusion of the raid, i.e. the loss to the war effort at that time until they had been made good: Column 4 gives *fatal* casualties (killed, died of wounds, died in captivity, permanently missing, presumed killed) as finally determined on the conclusion of the war.

(1) SERVICE	(2) NUMBER ENGAGED	(3) CASUALTIES FROM ALL CAUSES <i>per cent</i>		(4) FATAL CASUALTIES <i>per cent</i>	
Naval	7,750	523	6.7	148	1.9
Royal Marine Commando	370	76	20	29	7.8
Commandos	705	169	24	37	5.2
Canadian Forces	4,963	3,367	67.8	907	18.2
U.S. Rangers	50	13	26	7	13
R.A.F.	1,179	102	8.6	49	4.1
C.O.H.Q. Staff	22	10	45	2	9
GRAND TOTAL	15,039	4,260	28.3	1,179	7.8

II. ENEMY LOSSES

- (a) **PERSONNEL.** Two sets of figures of losses are given in the German report (paras. 38 and 70) which are not reconcilable, but the probable losses were:—

Navy: Killed and missing, 78. Wounded, 35.

Army: Killed, 115. Missing, 14. Wounded, 187.

Air Force: Killed and missing, 104. Wounded, 58.

This makes a total of 591 enemy casualties for the three services—not far from the estimate of 500 in B.R., p.35. Our prisoners consisted of 25 naval ratings from the armed trawler UJ. 1404, eight soldiers, and four air force personnel (B.R., p.35).

(b) **MATERIAL**

Naval: 2 armed trawlers sunk

1 small tanker sunk

2 armed trawlers probably damaged

Air Force: 48 aircraft destroyed

24 damaged

Military. Military damage is difficult to assess. A number of fortified houses, the Casino and tobacco factory, all facing Red and White beaches, were set on fire by shell fire or bombs and gutted. A certain amount of damage was done to other fortifications. Four 5.9-in. guns of "Hess" battery were destroyed, and other guns are thought to have received direct hits.

APPENDIX D

Types of Landing Craft

- L.C.T. Landing craft, tank. Craft of about 250 tons, with length of 160 ft. and upward.
Armament, two 2-pdr. pom-poms. No armour. Crew, 2 officers and 10 ratings. Carries three tanks.
- L.C.F. (L) Landing craft, flak, (large). Craft of about 400 tons. Length about 160 ft. Converted L.C.T.
The armament of L.C.F. (L) 1 was two twin 4-in. H.A./L.A. and three Oerlikons. L.C.F. (L) 2 to 6 were armed with eight 2-pdr. pom-poms and 4 Oerlikons.¹
- L.C.S. (L) Landing craft, support (large). Craft about 46 ft. long. Armament, one 2-pdr., two .5-in. M.G., two Lewis guns. One 4-in. smoke mortar. These craft are armoured against .5-in. fire. Crew, 1 officer, 11 ratings.
- L.C.M. (1) Landing craft (mechanised) (*i.e.*, for carrying mechanised transport). Craft about 40 ft. long. No armament. Partially armoured. Used for carrying Bren carriers or jeeps; will take one medium tank. Crew, six ratings, one officer to three craft.
- L.C.A. Landing craft (assault). Craft about 38 ft. long. Armament one Bren gun. Partially armoured against small-arms fire. Carries 35 men; crew, 4 ratings. One officer to three craft.
- L.C.P. (L) Landing craft (personnel). Craft about 36 ft. long. Armament, one M.G. No armour. Carries 25 men. Crew, 1 officer and 3 ratings.

¹ The crews of L.C.F. (L) varied somewhat in the different craft, but were about 2 naval officers and 15 ratings and 2 marine officers and 50 other ranks. In addition some craft carried a medical officer. (Information from D.C.O.P.)

APPENDIX E Analysis of Bombing Attacks

(See Plan 1)
(From B.R.1887)

Target	Squadron	No. of Aircraft	Bombs Dropped	Result
"Rommel" Battery	No. 2 Group	14	55 × 500 48 × 40	Not observed, but believed "target area and to east."
	174	10	12 × 250 6 × 250	Bursts in target area. Houses south of "Rommel."
	175	18	16 × 250	Six bursts in target area.
		10	20 × 250	Direct hits on emplacements.
"Bismarck" Battery	No. 2 Group	12	48 × 500	Target straddled and entire area covered with smoke. Objective reached.
	Army Co-op. Smoke-laying	14	156 smoke bombs	
	174	12	18 × 500 6 × 250	No target seen on landfall. Targets selected were 2 miles east of Dieppe (houses and woods).
"Hitler" Battery	No. 2 Group	13	39 × 500 92 × 40	South and east of target overshot.
	174	12	18 × 500 4 × 250	Many bursts in target area.
	605	1	10 × 40	Results not observed.
"Goering" Battery	No. 2 Group	1	3 × 500 8 × 40	South and east of target. Unobserved.
	418	3	30 × 40	Target located and bombed.
"Hindenburg" Battery	No. 2 Group	12	36 × 500 92 × 40	Most bombs in target area.
Road Dieppe—Rouen	No. 2 Group	6	—	Bombed railway at Ouville.
"Red", "White" Beaches	Army Co-op. Smoke-laying	4	36 smoke bombs	Effective screen.
		2	—	—
		2	—	Successful. Mole west headland.
		4	—	Successful screen. East and west headland.
		3	—	Did not attack target.
		3	—	Task successfully completed.
"Green" Beach	Army Co-op. Smoke-laying	6	60 smoke bombs	Smoke screen good.
		6	72 smoke bombs	Task completed
West Headland	175	—	24 × 250	Bursts on houses and church used as flak post.

APPENDIX F

Summary of Lessons Learnt¹

1. Naval

(a) The need for overwhelming fire support, including close support during the initial stages of the attack.

(b) The necessity for the formation of permanent naval assault forces with coherence comparable to that of any other first line fighting formations. Army formations intended for amphibious assaults must without question be trained in close co-operation with such naval assault forces.

(c) The necessity for fire support in any operation where it has not been possible to rely on the element of surprise. This fire support must be provided by heavy and medium Naval bombardment, by air action, by special vessels or craft working close inshore, and by using the fire power of the assaulting troops while still sea-borne. Special close-support craft, which should be gunboats or some form of mobile fort, do not exist and must be designed and constructed.

Support by the Royal Air Force is effective within the limits imposed by time and space.

(d) Tanks should not be landed until the anti-tank defences have been destroyed or cleared²; L.C.T. carrying tanks must not linger on the beaches beyond the time required to disembark their loads.

(e) A far higher standard of aircraft recognition is essential both in the Royal Navy and the Army. This should be achieved by means of lectures, photographs and silhouettes. If possible, personnel of the Royal Observer Corps should be carried in ships.

(f) Beach signal parties should not land complete with the first wave, but only when the beach has been secured.

(g) The importance and necessity of using smoke cannot be over-emphasized and larger quantities of smoke must be carried in any operation of the size of the assault on Dieppe.

2. General

(a) The necessity for planning a combined operation at a Combined Headquarters where the Force Commanders and their staff can work and live together.

(b) The necessity to plan a raid so as to be independent of weather conditions in the greatest possible degree. A plan based on the assumption that the weather conditions will be uniform is very likely to fail; therefore a plan which can be carried out even when they are indifferent or bad is essential.

¹ From B.R.1887. These lessons are considered in detail in B.R.1887, and also in a pamphlet, B.R.1887 (1), *The Raid on Dieppe: Lessons Learnt*.

² This lesson did not apply to tanks subsequently developed for special assault purposes, e.g. D.D. ("swimming" tanks), A.V.R.E. (tanks equipped for moving beach obstacles, manned by Royal Engineers). See N.S.H., Battle Summary No. 39, *Operation "Neptune"*.

(c) The necessity for flexibility in the military plan and its execution. To achieve this, the assault must be on the widest possible front limited only by the possibilities of control and the amount of naval and air support available.

(d) The allocation to the assault of the minimum force required for success and the retention of the maximum force as a reserve to exploit success where it is achieved.

(e) The necessity for as accurate and comprehensive a system of control and communications as it is possible to establish.

(f) The dissemination of knowledge to officers and other ranks, each of whom should know the intention of his superior, the outline of the operation and the details of the task of his own unit and those on the flanks.

(g) The value of special training particularly in amphibious night operations. Such training must include rehearsals and the testing of inter-communication arrangements.

(h) Assaults must be carefully timed. Whether to assault in darkness, at dawn or dusk, or in daylight, must depend on the nature of the raid, and on certain conditions, such as tide and distance, which will vary in every case.

(j) Great and continuous attention must be paid to security problems, and greater use made of subordinate officers who should be put partly in the picture, so that they can control the men under them. Only important extracts from Operation Orders should be taken ashore. These should be kept in manuscript form and have their official headings removed.

(k) Briefing of the troops should take place as late as possible. If airborne troops are used, arrangements must be made to increase the number of models available so as to cut down the time needed for briefing.

Airborne troops provide means of achieving surprise and should be used as often as possible subject to the limitation of the weather. It should be regarded, however, as exceptional for a plan to depend for success entirely on their use.

(l) Unless means for the provision of overwhelming close support are available, assaults should be planned to develop round the flanks of a strongly defended locality rather than frontally against it.

(m) Some form of light or self-propelled artillery must be provided once an assault has got across the landing place and is making progress ahead.

APPENDIX G

Extracts from German Reports on the Dieppe Raid

This report is derived from the translation of an Italian copy which came into Allied hands. Some matters of no Naval interest have been omitted. Times, which were German, have been altered one hour to correspond with British time, and paragraphs have been numbered to facilitate reference. Comments are in italics.

Of particular interest is the fact of the incorrect appreciation that a small British Channel convoy was a large troop convoy (Paragraphs 11 and 39). As shown in Para. 39, the Germans derived a considerable amount of information from numerous documents which they captured, including the operation orders of the 2nd Canadian Division and the Orders of the Naval Force Commander. Paras. 40 to 46 and 54 to 57 have been omitted, as the matter in them consists merely of an abstract of our operation orders.

EXTRACTS FROM REPORT OF GERMAN C.-in-C., WEST, COMMANDING D GROUP OF ARMIES

I. ANTICIPATORY EVENTS

1. From middle of June, the results of photographic and visual reconnaissance of Air Squadron 3 and information from Agents collected by Headquarters revealed the concentration of numerous small landing craft on the South Coast of England.

An air photographic reconnaissance carried out, in spite of weather conditions, just at the end of July, confirmed the concentration of Naval forces which were later increased in comparison with the large numbers already observed in June.

It was *not* possible, up to 15th August, to obtain other details regarding a British landing operation except the information furnished by Agents which could not be checked. All the same, from middle of June onwards Headquarters considered the situation was such that an operation by the enemy on a large scale would certainly take place at some time at some part of the coast. For this reason the submarine bases and defence sectors were reinforced to full establishment both with personnel and supplies (also the shore-fronts), and the defence organisation was continually exercised to make certain that all the local reserve sections, air and army, should be ready to come quickly into action.

Special importance was given by H.Q. to the fact that its motorised reserves of the Army Group should be stationed near enough to the coast to be able to come into action in mass on the first day of a landing.

On 15th August occurred a sudden change in British wireless traffic which made it more difficult for our Interception service. Numerous flights over the Channel coast pointed to increased reconnaissance action and the crews of the machines brought down were mostly American. No other change in the enemy

situation could be discovered, however, up to 0350 hours on 19th August, even by the daily recon of the 3rd Air Squadron.

1a. Weather conditions, tides and force of the wind were carefully observed each day and communicated to the troops.

On 18th August, the weather forecast for the Channel area for the coming night was as follows:—

Light winds chiefly from the South, increasing later to a minimum of two to four. Few clouds, visibility about 4 to 10 kilometres, morning mist in the coast with decreasing visibility. Later on an increased haze may be expected from the West with a ceiling of low cloud:—

Moon sets 2320 hours, 18th August.

Night period From 2115 of 18th to 0510 of 19th August.

Visibility Increasing from 0510 hours.

High water at Dieppe .. 0403 hours on 19th August.

These conditions make an enemy landing appear possible in the Eastern sector of the Channel during the night of 18th-19th.

Based on this, Naval Headquarters West gave orders to the 4th Group of M.T.B.s (4 units) stationed at Boulogne to be ready to move at a half hour's notice from midnight onwards.

(*Note.*—No orders were given for the employment of this force on the 19th, as the enemy attack took place at dawn, and it was considered useless to use it against destroyers).

No other Naval forces were available in the Channel Area as the 5th Flotilla M.T.B.s were minelaying in Lyme Bay during the night 18/19th.

On 18th August, at 2000 hours, one of our convoys left Boulogne for Dieppe, steaming 6 knots. It consisted of five small coasting motor schooners, escorted by three submarines.¹

On 19th August, between 0330 and 0400 hours, this convoy was off the coast opposite Dieppe.

II. FIRST CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY

(Naval engagement off the Dieppe sector, 302nd Infantry Division)

19.8.42

2. At 0445 hours the following signal from Naval H.Q. West was received:

“At 0350 hours attack on our convoy by surface forces, 4 kilometres off Dieppe. Particulars not yet known. It is the opinion of the Naval Command that it has been one of the usual attacks on convoys.”

At 0500 hours, 15th Army Command signalled to Army H.Q.:—

“According to information from 81st Army Corps, one of our convoys has been attacked by fast British ships at 0400 hours, at about 20 kilometres off the port of Dieppe. Troops have intensified their look-out. Navy and Air authorities have been advised.”

(*Note.*—It became known later that this convoy was caught up in the first wave of British landing craft and had partially upset the enemy's plan of times and operations, and at least had had a delaying effect.)

The noise of the engagement between our units and the enemy gave the alarm to the coastal sector.²

¹ This cannot be correct. Escort vessels are evidently meant (see main text, Section 14, note).

² See Section 17.

III. THE ENEMY'S ATTEMPT TO LAND NEAR AND AROUND DIEPPE (302nd INFANTRY DIVISION)

INITIAL SITUATION OF AIR ARM

3. *Reconnaissance.* Air reconnaissance had been organised (with special intensity in certain sectors) from May, 1942, by agreement between Army H.Q. and Air Squadron 3. Taking part in this were:—

9th Air Corps, 123rd Recco Group and Atlantic Air Command.

Zone of Reconnaissance: From the North Sea as well as the Channel as far as the Atlantic.

Sectors in which reconnaissance was carried out with special intensity:—

Mouth of the Thames, English South Coast ports, British Channel, Bay of Biscay.

Evening Reconnaissance: Area between the Scheldt and the mouth of the Thames, English South Coast and the zone round Britain as far as the mouth of the Gironde.

Night Reconnaissance: Zone of the Channel of Cape Griz Nez, Gulf of the Seine, and the area of sea round Normandy.

To augment the reconnaissance all the fighting planes available had been employed up to the limit of their range.

Fighter Groups. Two Fighter Commands with six groups of fighters, two fighter-bomber squadrons and complementary formations were continuously employed by air-defence work.

Fighting Detachments. 9th Air Corps (six fighting groups and some complementary groups).

Atlantic Air Command (three fighting groups, one complementary group).

(*Note.*—The 3rd Air Squadron, especially the fighting portion, was, on 19th August, about 35 to 40 per cent. of its normal strength.)

Readiness for immediate action, and similarly for regrouping of all squadrons of complementary groups fit for flight, was assured by 3rd Air Squadron.

All measures for the defence of aerodromes, etc., had already been taken.

Air Situation. Up to the beginning of the fighting on 19th August, the enemy's air activity by day and night did not show any characteristics pointing to an imminent attempt to land.

Wireless Situation. There was also little variation from normal detected by the watch on wireless traffic and drill in England.

INITIAL NAVAL SITUATION

4. Three harbour lookout ships were stationed off Dieppe. Up to the moment of receiving news of the Naval fighting off Dieppe, our D/F service had not signalled the presence of any enemy Naval forces. Single objectives detected after 0300 hours by the Tréport apparatus in the area between 10 miles north and north-west of Dieppe, were intercepted only for brief periods, and were considered in view of the noise of the motors causing their detection to be *aerial* objectives.

THE LANDING

0530 *hours*

5. 15th Army Command (AOK 15) signals to H.Q.:—

“Information received from 81st Army Corps that at 0505 hours bombs were dropped on Dieppe and enemy attempted landing in the areas Berneval-Dieppe-Pourville and Quiberville.”

At the same time the General staff at Army H.Q. has been advised of the situation, as well as the Liaison Officers of the Navy and Air Force (the Duty Officer at Army H.Q. has passed the information received from AOK 15 to Navy West and to 3rd Air Squadron).

FIRST APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION BY ARMY H.Q.

6. It cannot yet be decided whether the operation is of a local nature and of what it consists. As however, the attempted landing has taken place at various points (for the first time) on a front of 20 to 25 kilometres and in daylight, the invasion may have larger proportions. And there is also the possibility of an attack in other sectors. The situation is not yet by any means clear.

0600 *hours*. Army H.Q. gives orders that, as a preventative measure, the 10th Armoured Division, the S.S. Division “Adolf Hitler” and the 7th Air Division shall be warned as follows:—

“Information about enemy attempted landing still not clear. The alarm will probably be given.”

0625 *hours*. Army H.Q., gives an order to the 10th Armoured Division: “Alarm No. 2.”

0628 *hours*. Army H.Q. orders the S.S. Division A.H.:—“Alarm No. 2.”

0632 *hours*. The Commanding Officer, Navy West, signals that according to information received from the Seine-Somme Command, the enemy was attempting to land at 0525 hours near Berneval. Naval battery is in action against enemy ships. At the same time, AOK 15 signals:—

“Chief of Staff of 81st Army Corps states that the enemy has landed near Berneval. Counter-attack begun with about three companies, details not yet known, bombardment of Dieppe continues. An attempt to land near Pourville has been repulsed. The situation round Quiberville is not yet clear.”

0640 *hours*. Officer Commanding Navy West signals that according to what he has heard from Admiral Francia’s¹ Command, communication with the Officer commanding Dieppe Port is interrupted. Dieppe Naval Semaphore Station signals:

“The enemy continues to land at Dieppe. Destroyers making smoke along the coast. Up till now 12 tanks have been landed, of which one is on fire.”

SECOND APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION BY ARMY H.Q.

7. The operation is of large proportions and evidently aims at the occupation of Dieppe as a bridge-head.

0700 *hours*. The Chief of Headquarters Staff calls the Chief of General Staff, Artillery General Jodl, and informs him of the enemy’s position, and of the

¹ (sic) This no doubt means Admiral, France, i.e., German Naval C.-in-C., France.

measures adopted by us (counter-attack by the local reserves, alarm passed to the reserves of the Army Group, 10th Armoured Division and S.S. "Adolf Hitler" Division) and asks the Officer Commanding Submarines that the submarines may be employed against the flank of the enemy formation.

0700 hours. First operational signal, first priority, secret, to Army H.Q.:—

"At 0525 hours enemy attempted to land at and around Dieppe. Fighting proceeding. Detailed signal will follow."

0715 hours. Chief of Staff, Army H.Q. speaks with the General of the 81st Army Corps, who judges the enemy operation to be a local action up to now.

0725 hours. The officers commanding the Armies in Netherlands and the Air Forces are informed of the situation at Dieppe. *The utmost vigilance is necessary.* At the same time the Military Commander in France is informed, who passes it to the Military Commander in Belgium and in Northern France.

0730 hours. Commanding Officer, Navy West, sends the following signal received from Naval C.-in-C., France (received at 0720 hours) to Army H.Q.:—

"Dieppe Naval Semaphore Station signals: A.A. firing against troops landing near the Casino (the Casino on the beach at Dieppe had been partially blown up for security reasons) and against attacking fighter planes. A troop transport has been sunk in front of the Casino. German fighters over Dieppe. A second transport on fire. The British are trying to land from assault vessels."

0745 hours. Commanding Officer, Navy West, signals:—

"Our convoy has been dispersed to the North of Dieppe during the enemy landings. An enemy unit destroyed by ramming. Several hits on M.T.B.s and a destroyer; brought down, two planes. A small part of the convoy off St. Valéry-en-Caux. The divisions stationed in the respective defence sectors of the Channel have been advised by the Naval Group."

0750 hours. Army H.Q. to 3rd Air Squadron after conversation with the 81st Army Corps:—

"Commanding Officer 81st Army Corps requests air support against everything under way afloat, and asks for no intervention in land fighting. This intervention will be required later."

0815 hours. Naval Commander, Seine-Somme, signals through the N.O.I.C. channel coast:—

"British continue to land round Dieppe; 17 to 20 tanks are on the beach firing at the town. Destroyers making smoke. One troop transport sunk to the east of Dieppe. Guns on board enemy destroyers also attacking." (Time missing in signal).

Immediately afterwards the same Command completes the signal:—

"0635 hours the British landed detachments. Destroyers made smoke screens. About 20 tanks on the beach. Four destroyers patrolling in front of the port. English destroyers watching the landing from 3 miles out."

0823 hours.

8. 3rd Air Squadron signals (through the Air Liaison Officer) that the 9th Air Group has been engaged since 0800 in continuous air attacks against enemy Naval targets.

Contradictory information about the appearance of enemy cruisers off St. Valéry-en-Caux (afterwards found incorrect).

THIRD APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION BY ARMY H.Q.

0840 hours

9. The enemy situation is becoming clearer. Enemy attempts to land continue, but the local reserves of 302nd Infantry Division are already counter-attacking. While the heights on the two sides of Dieppe are entirely in our hands, it is not yet possible to say anything about the situation inside the town. It seems that more to the West, near Pourville, the landing may still be going on. In any case there are still movements of vessels to and from the beach going on in that sector. Around Quiberville the situation is not clear and it has not yet been established whether Quiberville itself has been attacked or not. Near St. Aubin an attempt to land by the enemy is still possible.

Based on this estimate of the situation, in which an idea of the size of the enemy's landing force has been recognised, amounting to two regiments at least and perhaps a whole division, and as it is not yet possible to foresee the ultimate development of the operation, Army H.Q. decides to employ the 10th Armoured Division.

0844 hours. Orders from Army H.Q. to 10th Armoured Division (information of AOK 15 and 81st Army Corps):—

“The 10th Armoured Division is placed under the orders of General Kuntzen (Commanding 81st Army Corps) for the immediate clearing-up of the situation round Dieppe. The advanced portion of the Division will move up at 1000 hrs. and the main body at 1100.”

(This order was received over the telephone by AOK 15 at 0847 hours; by 10th Armoured Division at 0851 hours; and by 81st Army Corps at 0845 hours.)

0900 hours

10. Second signal to Army Headquarters:—

“Enemy attempts to land continue. Our Army forces have commenced to counter-attack with local reserves. Situation at Dieppe not yet clear. Heights at the sides of Dieppe entirely in our hands. Landings continue near Pourville. Position at Quiberville not clear. It seems that at St. Aubin a further attempt to land is being prepared.”

0903 hours. Chief of Staff of 81st Army Corps signals as follows about the position at Dieppe:—

“Situation at Berneval seems clearer. Battery¹ is again firing with four guns. Enemy is in flight, apparently to the foot of the cliffs (low tide) in north-east direction. The intervention of the fighting planes is requested here. Position at Puits to the north-east of Dieppe is also clearer. The 302nd Division signals that the enemy has lost 500 men between dead and prisoners. The heights on both sides of Dieppe are in our hands, as well as the heights to the east of Pourville. The enemy is on the height to the west. Battery 813² near St. Marguerite had fallen into enemy hands, but has been retaken. It is again firing with two guns.”

0947 hours

11. Commanding Officer, Navy West, refuses the employment of submarines for reconnaissance in the Channel requested by Army H.Q., as submarines lend themselves very little for reconnaissance and their employment to the east of Cherbourg is not possible owing to the risk of mines and enemy superiority. Their employment at the western exit of the Channel and the Bay of Biscay is not considered necessary at present.

¹ This was “Goebbels Battery.”

² This was “Hess Battery.”

1010 hours. Third Air Squadron signals (through Air Liaison Officer) the following results of Recco (Reconnaissance plane returned to base at 0910 hours):—

- “(a) At Dieppe two large groups of fires in the roadstead, five to six destroyers making artificial smoke, 50 to 80 landing craft identified.
- (b) Forty kilometres to the north-west of Dieppe six large transports¹, presumably carrying tanks and fully loaded.
- (c) Sixty kilometres north-west of Dieppe, three merchant ships¹ of medium tonnage and 1 M.T.B.
- (d) In the zone of Selsey Bill (England) 26 large transports² of 6,000 tons each, crowded with troops escorted by three destroyers.
- (e) To the south-east of Eastbourne ships of small tonnage steering east, apparently a security force.
- (f) Nothing observed in other areas.
- (g) The number of British fighter planes over Dieppe is very large; bitter fighting with the smaller number of our fighters.”

Clauses (b), (c) and (d) gave rise to thought. The immediate question from H.Q. as to what course the 26 large transports were steering could not be answered (at least not immediately).² From these signals H.Q. had to judge the position from a new point of view.

FOURTH APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION BY ARMY H.Q.

12. The ships mentioned in clauses (b) and (c) belong to “the reserves afloat” of British landing plans. If this is linked up operationally with the fleet of transports further behind mentioned under (d), the enemy operation may represent the beginning of the attempt to form “the second front.”

It is, therefore, possible that the enemy is carrying out the attack on Dieppe to draw off the attention of the defending forces and to bring to Dieppe the motorised reserves of Army H.Q. so that a major operation can be carried out in another locality—H.Q. thinks possibly Brittany.

The essential thing, therefore, is that the enemy around Dieppe shall be routed and destroyed in the shortest possible time with all the means available. The position is now cleared to the point that it is certain that the reserves employed there will be more than sufficient for this object.

If the enemy is unable to establish a bridge-head at Dieppe, neither his “reserves afloat” nor the fleet carrying his “operative reserves” can be used.

He may then hold the 26¹ transports ready for another step in a main operation—probably against Normandy.

From these considerations, after a brief interval, H.Q. decides to give the alarm to the whole sector of AOK 7 (Normandy and Brittany).

1020 hours. Advice received of an enemy wireless signal just intercepted:—

“At Dieppe four tanks destroyed, position serious.”

1030 hours

13. Order from Army H.Q. to AOK 7:—

(For information to: 81st Army Corps, Army Motorised Reserves including 7th Air Division, Herman Goering Brigade, and the Reserves of the Army Group constituted by the 337 Division.)

¹ These were the nine L.S.I. returning home.

² This was a small convoy of small ships (C.W.116) westbound from Southend to St. Helens. There were no large transports in it. There are several references to it in the German Report.

"Air reconnaissance has sighted, in the latitude of Isle of Wight, 26 transports crowded with troops.¹ Orders for the 7th Army and for the Reserves of Army Groups—7th Division, 6th Armoured Division, 337 Infantry Division, Herman Goering Brigade—Alarm II." von Rundstedt, General Field-Marshal. (The S.S. Division "Das Reich" was not put into the state of Alarm II but was immediately informed of the measures taken by Army H.Q., as were also Navy Command West and the 3rd Air Squadron.)

1050 hours. 3rd Air Squadron reports (through Air Liaison Officer) from the 123rd Recco Group:

"From conversations with an air commander, a convoy (26 ships of 6,000 tons each) is loaded with troops; at 0830 hours, it was proceeding north-westerly from Selsey Bill, direction Portsmouth. Later information will be given about 1200 hours by reconnaissance planes."

(This action gives rise to new considerations by Army Headquarters.)

Probably the enemy Command had already understood that the Dieppe action had failed. It did not seem advisable therefore to take the valuable tonnage into the area threatened by the fighting air forces of the Germans. All the same the fact that the enemy convoy was proceeding to the strongly protected port of Portsmouth might not mean that the enemy had abandoned his intentions.

1100 hours

14. Ic/LW of Army Headquarters signals from 3(F) Squadron 122.—0830 to 0835:—

"Sighted in the Fécamp-Dieppe area at 3-6 kilometres from the coast seven large warships, heavy and light cruisers, 10-15 escort ships, 1 light cruiser, another Naval unit, steering towards the English coast."

This return movement may also be connected with that mentioned above. All goes to show that the enemy, recognising the failure of the Dieppe operation, breaks off the action. This may mean the destruction of his troops already landed.

Army headquarters has doubts about the size and types of warships reported above (large destroyers, it has been proved by experience, may easily be mistaken for cruisers).

1120 hours. Army headquarters decides to communicate with the General Commanding Communications in the West (and had sent a liaison officer to the officer to the Operations Division of Army Headquarters) that in view of the favourable development of the situation there need not even be taken into consideration the necessity of suspending the civil railway traffic and the cancelling of permits.

All precautions are to be taken, however, that the railways may be taken over by the Germans at any moment.

15. The Maritime Commander of the Channel Coast signals through Navy Command, West (received at 1120 hours):—

"There are no more ships off Dieppe. The destroyers have left. Landing craft are in flames on the beach. Several tanks are still moving here and there on the beach and come under the gunfire of the army positions. It appears that the beach is blocked."

¹ See footnote to para. 11(d).

At the same time Army Headquarters is informed of the following British wireless messages:—

At 0645 hours: "All well."

At 0944 hours: "Many tanks destroyed. The situation is serious. The enemy has great possibilities."

At 0958: "An unknown British commanding officer requests smoke screen for re-embarking."

1135 hours

16. Signal from 3rd Air Squadron to Army Headquarters:—

"Up to 1130 hours, 288 fighter planes were employed, among these 18 fighter-bombers. Successes: 24 planes brought down certain, 4 probables. One destroyer damaged, 3 of our planes lost. Fifty-four battle planes employed so far; no information yet about results obtained."

1149 hours. 81st Army Corps signals its opinion about the situation at the moment:—

"The position to the east of Dieppe is cleared. There is no more danger around Penly and Berneval. At Dieppe about a dozen tanks have been destroyed. Repelling action along the beaches proceeds well. West of Dieppe the enemy still resists near Pourville; a counter-attack with two battalions is proceeding well. They have penetrated into the western part of Pourville. Apparently no more reinforcements from the sea are arriving. General impression: 'giving up!'".

1210 hours

17. Signal from 1c Army Headquarters with wireless interception shows that the enemy is retiring, but it seems that counter-orders have been given for a second operation at the same time. This confirms the opinion of 81st Army Corps and of headquarters with regard to the 26 transports sighted¹, the enemy still had the intention of landing other troops if the Dieppe action had succeeded and thus to begin operations against the important key point Le Havre, or at any rate a second action against Normandy and Brittany. This brings us to the

FIFTH APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION BY ARMY H.Q.

The enemy gives up. He is completely beaten to the east of Dieppe and is being repelled to the west of Dieppe at Pourville and in the woods and on the cliffs to the west of it, and it is now only a question of time. Everything possible is now being destroyed, and with this object every weapon is being employed.

Army Headquarters then gives the following orders:—

- 1215 hours. "To (1) AOK 15 (first priority).
 (2) 81st Army Corps.
 (3) Navy Command West.
 (4) 3rd Air Squadron.

The enemy landed at Dieppe is giving in. It is necessary that as much as possible of the enemy forces shall be destroyed. With this object strong detachments of the 10th Armoured Division, tanks and artillery should immediately go forward. Every weapon available must now contribute to the total destruction of the enemy. All fronts on which the enemy has landed must now be cleaned up in the shortest possible time."

(Signed) von RUNDSTEDT,
 Field-Marshal, C.-in-C., West.

¹ See footnote to para. 11(d).

18. The Military Chief of Staff then called up the General Chief of Staff Jodl and instructs him in the opinion of Army Headquarters on the general situation. Immediately afterwards Ic Army Headquarters gives instructions regarding the procedure of the Propaganda Arm and also for the collection of prisoners of war in a camp already prepared by the military commander, France. All prisoners will be handled by AOK 15. Interpreters and interrogating officers provided for special cases are already available for AOK 15.

1230 hours. Army H.Q.'s appreciation of the position is confirmed by a signal from 3rd Air Squadron (123rd Recco Group) that the enemy Naval traffic between Eastbourne and Dieppe in a southerly direction has now ceased.

1233 hours. 81st Army Corps signals:—

"The enemy force landed to the east of Dieppe has been destroyed. At Dieppe itself the situation has been cleared up. Small centres of resistance still remain. Estimate of prisoners taken is about 1,000. The heights to the west of Dieppe as far as Pourville have remained all the time in our hands. Battalion I/571 has commenced an attack on Pourville into which it has partially penetrated. To the west of Pourville in the cliff and wooded area, there is still an enemy bridge-head about 1 kilometre deep and 6 kilometres wide. Reserves of 302nd Division have been made available to support Battalion I/571 attacking the Pourville-Varengeville sector from Ofranville. A battalion at St. Marguerite has been sent forward to prevent the enemy in the bridge-head getting away from it.

At sea the enemy is making a dense smoke screen, apparently to facilitate the return of the troops who were landed.

All forces are employed in attacking and destroying the enemy.

General Kuntzen was personally at Dieppe and is now at the south of Pourville. He intends to make use of the 10th Armoured Division."

1400, 1415 hours

19. The following signals reached Army H.Q.:—

- (a) From AOK 15. "The number of tanks destroyed at Dieppe appears to be 18."
- (b) From 3rd Air Squadron. "Enemy asking by wireless for air (fighter) support as, on account of strong defences, he cannot drop his bombs on the coastal fortifications, and requires Mustangs for the protection of his ships which are being attacked from the air. Thirty-four planes brought down against nine of ours. Direct hit with 500-kilo bomb on 1,500-ton ship, and well-placed release among enemy vessels."

1425 hours. Army H.Q. orders AOK 15 to report within an hour:—

- (a) An estimate of the force employed by the enemy;
- (b) The successes obtained by the defence forces so far, especially the booty, material destroyed, number of prisoners, etc., with a summary of the operations.

1445 hours. 81st Army Corps reports:—

"Dieppe and Pourville in our hands. Some of the forces landed still in Varengeville wood. During the last hour three destroyers, two torpedo boats and various landing craft have been sunk by our gunfire. Operation may be considered finished; prisoners calculated at about 1100. 10th Armoured Division arrived. Advance force should now be at Dieppe. 302nd Infantry Division had made its own arrangements in collaboration with the Artillery and Air Forces."

20. With this the enemy's operation against Dieppe has been broken up in little more than nine hours. The extent of the enemy's defeat was already evident at 1100, but from 1600 onwards detailed reports arriving made it appear always greater. He must have had very serious losses not only ashore but also at sea, it being possible only to *estimate* the latter.

Our losses appear moderate, and very much lower in comparison than the enemy's.

1610 *hours*. Signal received at H.Q. through AOK 15 confirming the above opinion and which is at once elaborated for report to Army Headquarters West.

From this and other signals it is considered that at least two regiments and additional forces of the British Army carried out the attack besides the "Commandos." Tanks were landed only at Dieppe, where they were all destroyed. The number of landing-vessels put into the sea from transports is estimated at 300 to 400; these came shorewards in waves of 40 to 60 at a time. In the first hours of the morning appeared numerous forces of enemy fighting planes, about 16 squadrons, some accompanied by fighter-bombers, for the protection of ships in the convoy. These forces were continually being renewed. At 1000 hours an attack took place by a numerous formation of fighters (about 15 squadrons) together with 12 bi-motor battle-planes in the Abbeville zone, bombs being released from a height of 4,000 metres.

The British protecting fighters, continually renewed, remained in the skies over Dieppe until towards 1400 hours, and were reinforced by other planes about 1300 hours. Afterwards there was a gradual reduction of British air activity.

1640 *hours*

21. Orders from Army H.Q. that the Senior Tank Officer was to go to Dieppe immediately to examine the enemy tanks destroyed there.

At about the same moment the Military Chief of Staff signals to General Jodl:—

"No armed British remaining on terra firma,"

and informs him of the successful end of the action.

1650 *hours*. The Admiral Commanding in France signals that the net defence of the port of Dieppe is intact, although there has naturally been some damage to it by gunfire and air bombardment.

1700 *hours*. 81st Army Corps signals:—

"At Dieppe and on both sides of the town, all is again in order. Twenty-eight enemy tanks have been destroyed round Dieppe. The number of prisoners has increased to 60 officers and 1,500 men. The principal weight of the struggle has been borne by the 571st Infantry Regiment which has also made the greatest number of prisoners."

At the same time the Air Liaison Officer at H.Q. receives a signal from the 3rd Air Squadron:—

"57 enemy fighter planes brought down so far."

1715 *hours*

22. Third signal to Headquarters West (for information Army H.Q./Operations Section):—

"Army reports that no armed enemy remain on terra firma. 302nd Division have sunk in the concluding period three enemy destroyers, and two torpedo boats which had ventured too close in, as well as various landing-vessels.

One thousand five hundred prisoners taken, amongst whom 60 Canadian officers, 28 tanks destroyed, including some American. Details will follow. Enemy has suffered heavy bloody losses. Prisoners being interrogated. They include Canadians, British, American and Free French.

The operation appears as follows: A landing group of 300 to 400 units protected by 13 to 15 cruisers and destroyers and various groups of fighter-planes. Behind these a reserve of 6 transports and 3 merchant ships. An operative reserve of 26 transports between terra firma and England. As far as can be ascertained so far, about 3 regiments and 30 tanks were landed.

Our losses not yet known but they are limited.

Battery 813¹ near Pourville has held on to its fort in hand-to-hand fighting, but blew up its guns; the battery has had heavy and bloody losses. The port of Dieppe has not yet been damaged, the net-defence of the harbour is intact; off the entrance a fighter-bomber has sunk a "Hunt" class destroyer. Material, etc., at Berneval is intact. The personnel defended the fortress in collaboration with Army Coastal Battery 2/770 in violent hand-to-hand fighting."

(Signed) RUNDSTEDT

With this the shore fighting was terminated.

1845 hours

23. The following from Military Headquarters was communicated to AOK 15, 81st Army Corps, 302nd Infantry Division, as well as to Naval Command West, 3rd Air Squadron and Admiral Commanding, France:—

"British, American and Canadian troops on 19th August, attempted a landing on a large scale in the sector of 81st Army Corps at Dieppe. This has been beaten off by the brave 302nd Division in collaboration with the Air Arm, local reserves, artillery reserves, part of the 10th Armoured Division and Coastal artillery stationed in the sector.

The enemy has suffered heavy and bloody losses. He has lost many landing craft, some cruisers, destroyers, torpedo boats and many aircraft.

1,500 prisoners have been taken.

I extend to all Commanding Officers and troops who have taken part in the action my praise and my thanks. Today I have been able to report "The troops have fought well."

My thanks are also extended to the air squadrons who with their continuous action have helped the Division and incessantly attacked the enemy at sea, and I thank also all those of the Navy who before the landing fought an action afloat and those who were employed ashore."

(Signed) C.-in-C., West,
von RUNDSTEDT, Field-Marshal

IV. FOLLOWING-UP BY THE AIR ARM

24. Attack by the Air Arm on the enemy fleeing by sea continues off Dieppe and nearly up to the centre of the Channel the sea had been cleared of enemy ships by about 1615 hours; this fact was immediately signalled. The 3rd Air Squadron then again joined up with the air forces employed at Dieppe, making themselves available to the respective commands.

¹ This was "Hess" Battery.

9th Air Corps and the Atlantic Air Command received orders to attack Portsmouth with a moderate-sized force, disregarding the weather conditions. Fifty planes were employed and the attack which was to be of a destructive nature was continued into the night of 19 August. Numerous bombs were concentrated on the town of Portsmouth and on the quays and harbour. The following results were obtained against Naval objectives, torpedo motor boats, and vessels returning from Dieppe:—

Sunk—two transports totalling 5,000 to 6,000 tons.

In addition, four bombs of medium calibre dropped in the middle of 10 landing craft returning to base in close formation.

The defensive fire was very heavy, so that it was impossible to ascertain whether other targets were hit; but in any case this is very probable.

V. SIXTH (AND LAST) APPRECIATION OF THE POSITION BY ARMY H.Q.

1915 hours

25. The enemy has been defeated and wiped out at Dieppe. No immediate renewal of his attempts to land is therefore likely, but there is always the possibility of small intrusive attacks and reconnaissances as well as of air attacks.

Further, the general situation is not yet sufficiently cleared up to the point of being able to cancel "the Alert" to the 7th Army (Normandy-Brittany). It is always possible that a second operation on a large scale may be attempted, as all attention is concentrated on Dieppe. It is not yet known whether the fleet of transports¹ has again unloaded at Portsmouth.

VI. LAST ENEMY SIGNALS

2140 hours

26. AOK 15 signals that Interception Station Etretat has intercepted the following British wireless messages:—

- (1) "Help, we are sinking."
- (2) (From the Portsmouth-Southampton area). "Return immediately to places of departure."

VII. ARMY H.Q.'s REMARKS ON THE ENEMY LANDING AT DIEPPE

What were the objects of the enemy?

(1) The landing operation at Dieppe organised on a large scale and which after some months' preparation has been carried out with almost *too much* precision and detailed arrangement, on account of the forces employed—one Canadian Division reinforced by "Commandos" and special troops—cannot be described as merely a Raid.

For an action of that kind, too many men and too much material were employed. For a raid, one would not sacrifice at least 29 or 30 tanks.

(2) It is considered that the enemy with such a large force thought that he could win in a short time the bridge-head of Dieppe after having eliminated the defending artillery, and then be able to use the harbour installations for disembarking the reserve and operative forces which were afloat.

¹ See footnote to para. 11(d).

With the reserves afloat there were 28 tanks, certainly of the same type as those landed. Now the employment of altogether 58 similar tanks cannot be connected with a brief sabotage operation. Although operational orders have also fallen into our hands, it is not possible to deduce whether it was a question of an operation of local character, or—in case of success—if it would form the initial stage of "Invasion." The British directive for the landing operations elaborated also the evacuation and re-embarkation, but it is not a proof of the enemy intentions if in the orders both these latter were treated with great clearness and in detail.

(3) Thus Commandos 3 and 4 had orders that, having carried out their mission and re-embarked, they were to await instructions whether to return to England or to remain with the reserve forces (only in case the enterprise failed and retirement was ordered were they to return immediately to England).

(4) Further, there were indications in the orders that the troops were not to destroy the gasometer in Dieppe, at any rate until the pioneers had come into action, and this left open the possibility of other orders being given at an opportune moment.

If Dieppe had fallen it may be considered certain that such new orders would have been given.

(5) The behaviour and employment of the British Air Force was strange. It is incomprehensible why, at the beginning of the landing, the bridge-head of Dieppe and other points of disembarkation were not subjected to continuous air bombardment, to prevent or at least to delay the action of the local reserves.

One explanation may be that the British wished to keep the employment of large air forces as a *second phase*, that is, for the beginning of the "Invasion," after having gained Dieppe. As the enemy knew exactly where the 10th Armoured Division was stationed and that it would certainly come into action, it may be that this contributed to his decision to hold back his fighting Air Force.

He will not do that a second time!

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

20th August, 1942

27. Chief of Staff, Army H.Q., visits the 302nd Infantry Division at Dieppe to gather personal impressions of the battle, and to examine on the spot the different phases of the action carried on by Battery 813.¹

As the enemy's position is such as to make it improbable that another landing will be attempted (*see* VI. "Last Enemy Signals") the order is given to terminate Alarm II for all interested Commands as well as for the 10th Armoured Division of 81st Army Corps.

In the course of the day the first information is received about our losses which, even if they are not to be considered exact until hospital returns, etc., are confirmed, show that those of the Army have been moderate.

With regard to Naval Command, West, information is received that one of the three harbour patrol vessels which were off Dieppe when the action began and retired into harbour was sunk there without its crew, probably by a hit received during the battle.

28. Third Air Squadron reports, through Ic. Army H.Q., that the number of enemy planes brought down has increased to 112.

¹ "Hess" Battery.

Teleprinter signal from 3rd Air Squadron confirms previous signal:—

Completely sunk . . . 5 merchant ships, totalling 13,000 tons
 1 destroyer
 1 coastguard vessel
 1 motor torpedo-boat (probable)

Damaged . . . 4 cruisers
 4 destroyers
 5 merchant ships, totalling 15,500 tons
 3 motor torpedo-boats
 1 rescue vessel
 1 landing craft
 1 tug

Probably damaged . . . 4 merchant ships, totalling 12,000 tons
 1 motor torpedo-boat

About 1700 hours the Chief of Staff, Army H.Q., returns to H.Q. and reports his impressions. The following is sent to General Jodl by teleprinter—most urgent (first priority):

29. “(1) Personal impression of action:—

Heavy and bloody British losses.

Although many have already been interred, there are still British dead everywhere, especially in front of our heavy gun positions. In front of one machine-gun post which flanked the narrow strip of beach between the sea and the cliffs, there are piles of dead (more than 100 only in this spot); much booty in equipment and infantry weapons, light and heavy. The British fought well

Prisoners make a good impression, young, fresh, intelligent. The aspect of one part of the beach to the west of Dieppe recalls that of Dunkirk. Three large burnt-out transports, high and dry at low tide, with many landing vessels and about 20 tanks which were all knocked out during the landing operations. At other places, still more landing vessels, tanks and funnels and masts sticking out of the water. At Dieppe, damage has been serious at some points, moderate at others. The behaviour of the civil population during the battle has been correct. No cases of sabotage or interference with military measures. Shops re-opened as early as midday on the day of the attack. In the sectors where the most violent combats developed, the civil population is still terrorised.

Our rapid intervention and the powerful aspect of the Armoured Division made a great impression on the populace.

Further details will follow.

Military Chief of Staff, Army H.Q.”

(Signed) ZEITZLER,
 Major-General

30. “(2) Personal Impressions of Battery 813 (“Hess”):—

Battery 813 is situated on a height, about 1 kilometre from the coast, which at this point is very precipitous. All round there are arrangements for defending against close attack, which, however, were only lightly manned, as not enough men were available. The battery was employed against Naval objectives. Fighter planes attacked it, swooping down and igniting the cartridges of nearly all the guns with small incendiary bombs. The personnel had to extinguish these fires. At the same time the enemy attacked from both sides with about 150 men. The battery crew fought gallantly; the attack lasted nearly two hours,

until at last the battery had to surrender. The guns still intact continued firing to the end at 200 metres range. The battery, whose fighting personnel was 112 men, had the following losses:—30 dead, 21 wounded who were got away, amongst them the Commander of the battery seriously wounded, and up to now apparently 10 missing, the greater part of whom were presumably brought to safety by the troops. It seems that two men of the battery were taken prisoner, but it is doubtful whether they were taken on board the enemy's ships. A telephone operator defended his blockhouse until the arrival of reinforcements, and is now in hospital, seriously wounded. The guns have been damaged by explosive charges.

(3) Enemy losses: 2,095 prisoners, among them 617 wounded; 500 to 600 dead; an unspecified number wiped out.

Military Chief of Staff, Army H.Q."

(Signed) ZEITZLER,
Major-General

21st August, 1942

31. The following teleprinter message from the Führer to the Supreme Command has been received at Army H.Q.:—

"To C.-in-C., West, Field-Marshal General von Rundstedt. Thanks to the accurate preparations conscientiously carried out by officers and men, a great British attempt to land has been repulsed.

I request you, Field-Marshal General, to express my approval and my thanks to all units of the three Armed Forces who have taken part in the action. I know I can safely rely in the future also on the Command and on the troops of the armed forces in the West."

(Signed) ADOLF HITLER

23rd August, 1942

32. FUNDAMENTAL REMARKS OF ARMY H.Q., No. 8

(First reports on the enemy's large-scale attempt to land at Dieppe. Further reports will follow when collected and confirmed.)

(1) TIME FOR LANDING OPERATION

The landing took place as day was breaking, just when it might be considered unsuitable for such an operation.

Lessons deduced.—H.Q. has repeatedly pointed out in its orders and fundamental remarks (see Fundamental Remarks No. 1, paragraph 3), that "The Commanding Officer responsible must always calculate that everything, even the most unlikely, is possible."

The enemy may even come at noon in full daylight and also at low tide. He possesses means for landing, and also material much more modern than anything hitherto considered.

(2) SMOKE SCREENS

At the time of landing the enemy made great use of artificial smoke. Ships and landing craft were rapidly hidden in it. The smoke was produced either by ships or by aircraft. At some points the approach to the shore and the actual landing was possible only thanks to the smoke; as the latter was coming towards the shore, the firing of the defence's guns was made less effective.

Lessons deduced.—(a) Exercises of every kind carried out at night and with smoke should accelerate training.

(b) Army H.Q. has been asked to put chemists on research work to find means of making smoke.

(3) COUNTER-ATTACKS

33. The rapid counter-attacks of our reserves were very successful and decisive. It is necessary, however, for reserves to have with them some guns.

Lessons deduced.—Re-examine again everywhere whether the reserves are in a state of readiness to be employed immediately. They must also, in the case of large units, have some artillery. It is wrong to employ *all* the divisional artillery in the front line.

(4) COASTAL BATTERIES

There are still many coastal batteries in absolutely wrong positions and which could not oppose a close infantry attack well led. The reason lies in the fact that these were established in 1940-41 when conditions were quite different to the present (then more of an offensive nature firing against distant naval targets. Now it is coastal defence against landing operations and supporting the principal fighting forces).

Lessons deduced.—The winter programme for the work of fortification must eliminate this trouble. We shall have to find and will find a solution so that these batteries will be able to protect themselves.

(5) CONSUMPTION OF AMMUNITION

34. One group of troops not used to fighting wasted a great deal of ammunition. H.Q. had indicated this fact already in its Order No. 20. Of course a young soldier sometimes loses his nerve. One battery for example fired 1,300 rounds in the fighting up to midday. There was also a want of ammunition for the machine guns. One machine gun company had fired away all its ammunition during the forenoon.

Lessons deduced.—Continue to educate the troops in "ammunition tactics," to prevent excessive barrage fire. Take care, however, that there is sufficient ammunition, since a landing operation presents many suitable targets.

(6) CONSERVATION OF AMMUNITION

British fighter planes ignited the cartridges of one battery with tracer bullets, obliging the personnel to employ themselves in extinguishing the fire, after which the enemy attacked the battery with infantry.

Lessons deduced.—Re-examine all the arrangements of ammunition, especially of cartridges, to see that they are in safe places.

(7) THE LANDING OF TANKS

35. There were landed from 4, or at a maximum from 5 motor boats, 29 tanks in a sector of 1,000 metres. Twenty-four of these were put out of action by our artillery and remained stranded among the pebbles on the high levels of the beach. Only five arrived on the roadway beside the sea.

The pebbles on the beach proved a very good obstacle against the tanks, which easily got stuck in them. This has been a valuable help in preventing them getting to the road. The tanks were not able to get into the town quickly but had to wander to and fro along the beach, becoming easy targets for the guns of the defence.

Lessons deduced.—(a) Make still better use of the deep pools and pebbles which are natural obstacles against tanks. In districts of the town near the shore obstruct all the streets at right-angles to the beach with numerous large walls. In streets which must be left open hold mobile obstructions in readiness.

(b) H.Q. will carry out trials to see how tanks may be placed on the high levels of the beach.

36. *Lessons deduced.*—Nearly all the tanks have been hit by our projectiles

of every calibre including those of 75 mm. but only two have been perforated by medium calibre projectiles. Serious effects on the bullets, which apparently are of non-ductile material, and which therefore break easily. Do not fire at too great range. 37-mm. projectiles had little effect.

Note.—Para. 8 omitted as being without interest.

(9) CLIFFS

The enemy climbed the cliffs by the help of various means, even places considered impracticable. The valleys having been mined, he approached from the sides of them.

Lessons deduced.—No point is “inviolable,” every possibility must be reckoned with.

(10) MAPS

The enemy was in possession of good charts which showed nearly all our arrangement of defences and minefields up to June, 1942.

Lessons deduced.—It is necessary to make still more use of camouflage, which is one of the most effective weapons of our forces. Intensify still more our measures against espionage. In this regard further orders will be issued.

(Signed) von RUNDSTEDT,
General Field-Marshal

37. British Operational Orders for the Dieppe landing comprising 121 pages (operation “Jubilee”) were photostated after rapid and partial translation, and distributed to all the military authorities, divisions, and to the other Services under the title “Fundamental Remarks of Army H.Q., No. 9 (British Operational Orders for Dieppe Landing).” I have had these translated and photostat copies made. According to the German conception these are not orders but a collection of notes of procedure with an exercise on the chart.

In any case it contains many points of great value to us; first about the enemy himself; secondly, details of his methods of landing and fighting.

All Commands must therefore take the greatest care to benefit by these experiences for our coastal defences and for the training and education of our troops. It would be a mistake to think that the enemy will organise his next operation in the same manner. He will learn lessons from the errors and lack of success this time, and will act differently next time. All the same, some details of his orders are instructive for us.

Army H.Q.,
(Signed) von RUNDSTEDT,
General Field-Marshal

LOSSES

38. Our total losses in the three Services including those of the Navy, personnel ashore and Air reconnaissance troops amount to:—

Army	..	115 dead
		187 wounded
		14 missing (of these, according to British broadcasts, four at most in enemy hands)
Navy	..	78 dead and missing (the missing are from the E-boat sunk) ¹
		35 wounded
Air Force	..	104 dead and missing (the latter brought down)
		58 wounded

(Signed) ZEITZLER,
Major-General, Chief of Staff

¹ Presumably the armed trawler UJ.1404 is meant. There were no E-boats present.

GERMAN ARMY HEADQUARTERS REPORT ON THE ENEMY SITUATION

39. Summary of Report on Enemy Situation during the operations at Dieppe, 19th August 1942

A. Compiled from the following sources:—

- (a) Numerous documents captured including operational orders, nearly intact, of the Second Canadian Division, and the orders of the Naval Commanding Officer.
- (b) Interrogations of prisoners.
- (c) Results of wireless interceptions of all three Services.

B. SCHEME OF OPERATIONS

Forces taking part:

- | | | |
|------|----|--|
| Army | .. | 2nd Canadian Division with 1 Armoured Group, 3rd and 4th British Commando. |
| Navy | .. | 8 destroyers
16 gunboats
1 river gunboat
26 light units (motor boats and chasers)
8 transports carrying 65 landing vessels, rescue vessels and material
100 large motor boats for landing
2 minesweeping flotillas
1 Commando of Royal Marines (about 100 men)
A convoy of 26 transport ships seen off Portsmouth by our Recco planes; these were laden with troops and were probably held ready as a reserve in case the landing operation had succeeded. |

Air Force.—Appears to be two fighter groups with a total of about 30 squadrons for action in various waves. Some squadrons of twin-engined bombers.

Note.—Paras. 40 to 46 have been omitted as they consist of an abstract of British orders.

Effective execution of the Operation

47. The concentration of troops and the embarkation took place according to the plan arranged. At 0348 hours the invading forces met at about 4 miles to the north of Dieppe a small German convoy which was dispersed by units of the British escort. In consequence of this there was a delay of about a quarter of an hour and the alarm was given to the German coastal defence. Doubts arose among the landing troops as to the preservation of secrecy (some prisoners spoke of a betrayal).

At the sides of Dieppe only the landing of the 1st waves succeeded everywhere. Owing to the weak support of gunfire and to the heavy fire of the German defences many landing craft were sunk and the bodies of troops on the beaches suffered heavy losses. In only one point the preparation of a corridor for tanks was made and the main body remained blocking the higher levels of the beach. Thirty tanks could not be landed and remained afloat.

The landing of the Commandos on the wings was more successful. No. 4 Commando was able to signal at 0745 hours that it had already fulfilled its

task (putting out of action battery 813) and to be re-embarked. No. 3 Commando arrived with its party in the middle of the attack, but was immediately repulsed and forced to re-embark, during which it suffered heavy losses.

The retreat and the re-embarkation resulted in a complete chaos. Not even one tank could be re-shipped. Numerous landing craft were sunk by the powerful attacks of the German Air Force, by the gunfire of the coastal batteries, and by parties of German troops. More than 2,000 men surrendered with heavy losses.

48. In case new enemy attempts are made to land, the coastal defence must presumably reckon with the following changes in the fighting arrangements that he will make:—

- (a) Intensification of measures to preserve secrecy.
- (b) In the first landing waves the mass of men and material landed will not be considered so important as choosing an unexpected locality and the fighting value of the troops who will first touch land. This is proved by the fact that the action of No. 4 Commando of 200 men succeeded, while the action at Dieppe in which 10 times as many men supported by tanks, was a complete failure.
- (c) When the surprise factor fails owing to meeting enemy units the principal precaution for the success of the operation is wanting; therefore it is better to return to the base of departure. Daylight landings are very difficult unless there is an enormous superiority of air force and gunfire support with Naval batteries. Landings by night offer greater probability of success.
- (d) It is only advisable to land tanks on difficult ground when the pioneers disembarked by night, together with the 1st Assault troops, have created the possibility of movement for the tanks themselves.
- (e) To support a re-embarkation which is to be carried out under enemy pressure, very powerful fighter and bomber airforces must be available.

49. British Losses

- (1) *Prisoners*: 2,195 including 1 Brigade General, 15 Staff Officers, 112 other officers.
- (2) *Deaths*: About 600 buried ashore.
Losses at sea not known but very considerable according to statements by prisoners.
- (3) *Air*: 127
- (4) *Ships sunk*: 5 transports, 3 destroyers, 6 escort units and numerous landing craft.
Damaged: An unspecified number of all classes.

50. Booty

- (a) *Vehicles*: 29 Churchill tanks, including
 - 4 of Mark I
 - 7 of Mark II
 - 18 of Mark III
 - 6 armoured cars with machine guns (Dingo)
 - 1 petrol carrier
- (b) *Weapons*: 1,300 rifles
 - 170 machine guns
 - 60 machine pistols
 - 70 light mortars
 - 16 heavy mortars
 - 700 bayonets

- (c) *Ammunition:* 1,210 rounds for tank guns
 2,180 rounds for light mortars
 356 rounds for heavy mortars
 1,230 rounds for anti-tank rifles
 400 rifle bombs
 150,000 rounds for machine guns
 75,000 rounds for rifles
 4,220 rounds for machine pistols
 2,000 hand grenades
 250 kilogrammes of explosives of various kinds
 50 metres of explosive tubing
- (d) *Equipment:* 1 assault ladder in six parts
 6 lifebelts

GERMAN REPORT ON OPERATION BY 81st ARMY CORPS DURING BRITISH ATTACK ON DIEPPE, 19th AUGUST 1942

Initial Situation

51. The defensive arrangements in the Division's sector extended for a length of 70 kilometres, including high cliffs with numerous ravines at right angles to the sea. For this reason the defence was not continuous but concentrated at points of special importance, *i.e.*, near ports where a landing was possible and probable. It was laid out for the defence of each single valley with the smallest possible force. With such an arrangement of defence it was not possible to prevent the well-equipped British Commandos obtaining temporary successes at certain points along the coast as at Berneval and Varengeville. To have any possibility of repelling an attack from the sea or from the shore there would have to be much more strength than is now possible at the most important points in the vicinity of the ports; and it is further necessary to have numerous reserves in hand both to help the blockhouses and immediately to counter-attack the enemy forces landed in the intermediate zone.

It is specially important to hold back some strong reserves, because it may be considered certain that the enemy, in a large-scale operation, will employ airborne troops and parachutists to eliminate the coastal defence while he is attacking from sea and land.

52. In the Dieppe Sector there were employed:—

- 1 Infantry regiment (Infan. Reg. 571) with 2 battalions of infantry
- 1 Pioneer battalion with 2 companies of pioneers
- 8 anti-landing guns and three 47-mm. guns served by infantry
- The 3rd Group, 302nd Artillery Regiment with 2 batteries of light field-howitzers and 2 range-finding batteries.
- The coastal battery of heavy field-howitzers of Post 265.

For Flak:—

- 1 heavy battery (of 75 mm)
- 1 platoon (50 mm)
- 1 platoon (37 mm)
- 2 platoons (20 mm)
- About 200 men of various Naval detachments
- 60 men of the police
- 1 experimental company of 60 men

53. *Army Reserves* were:—

Infantry Regiment 676 at Doudeville.

1st Battalion of Infantry Regiment 676 around Héricourt

3rd Battalion of Infantry Regiment 676 around Yvetot

3rd Battalion of Infantry Regiment 570 around Baqueville

81st Armoured Company at Yvetot

The last named was stationed so as to be able to come into action immediately both in the sector of the 302nd Infantry Division and the 332nd Infantry Division.

This grouping of the reserves was proved efficient on the 19th August, 1942.

The 332nd Artillery Regiment was used for coastal defence at Fécamp and from there was transferred to the zone of the Army Reserves.

Note.—*Paras. 54 to 57 have been omitted as being an abstract of British orders.*

58. It is not known whether other forces would land if the attack succeeded. It is possible that the convoy of 26 ships¹ which had left Portsmouth at midday and then reversed its course was intended to form the second wave in case the operation was successful. This supposition is supported by the fact that many prisoners spoke of help which should have arrived after 1600 hours and of alternatives.

The enemy was provided with the very best maps, which were of great help to him in carrying out the operation. By means of perfect photographic reliefs, the German positions had been reproduced to the very smallest detail. There were even shown the anti-tank walls barring passage to the sea-promenade. All possible points of access to the coast were clearly shown. But from the maps it did not appear that the local French-English espionage had worked well. The regimental tactical Headquarters were not known. The Divisional H.Q.s were believed to be at Arques-la-Bataille, where they had been many months earlier. The 110th Infantry Division was supposed to be in the line instead of the 302nd Division.

Progress of the Operations

59. The British Forces proceeding towards the French coast met, at 0400 hours, a German convoy about 20 kilometres off Dieppe. A violent action took place between the two formations, which, though short, gave the alarm to all the coastal defences. While enquiries were still being made as to whether they were our own or enemy ships off Dieppe, heavy air-attack with the dropping of bombs and firing on Dieppe itself and the sides of the town was taking place. While this air attack was going on, evidently with the object of neutralizing the coast defences, groups of landing-craft in waves of 40 to 50 emerged from the clouds of artificial smoke made by the aircraft, and under cover of the British Naval gunfire, proceeded towards the shore. Natural fog, as well as the artificial smoke and the dim light of dawn, prevented our artillery from scattering the landing craft already very close in, so that the fire of the guns and heavy weapons had to be concentrated on them when they were practically on the beach. On the beach itself there was so much fog and smoke as to make observation very difficult.

60. To the east of Dieppe the enemy had landed at the opening of the valley near Berneval, presumably in the strength of a Commando of 250 men, with orders to take and to destroy the battery in position there. They had succeeded in scaling the sides of the cliffs with the help of ladders, ropes and other gear,

¹ See footnote to para. 11(d) of this Appendix.

and attacked the battery. The latter was situated in a blockhouse, and consisted of a machine-gun squad under the command of an officer of the Berneval sector. The battery was able to repel, partly with direct gunfire at close range and partly with machine-gun fire, the fierce enemy attacks. A position situated near the battery with a personnel of 100 men was also attacked, but all the attacks were repelled, mostly by counter-attacks.

61. 302nd Infantry Division had, on hearing of the attack on Berneval, ordered a counter-attack to be made by the 302nd Anti-tank Group under Major von Blucher, together with the Cyclist Squadron stationed at St. Nicholas and the 3rd Pioneer Company stationed at Arques-la-Bataille. Major von Blucher also assumed the command of the 3rd Company of the 572nd Infantry Regiment which came out from St. Martin. The Berneval battery repelled the enemy attack. Major von Blucher succeeded in wiping out the enemy forces at Berneval and captured 2 officers and 80 men.

62. A similar action to that described above was taking place to the west of Dieppe against the battery near Varengeville by a special Commando of 300 men. Protected by smoke, this Commando landed on the coast on both sides of Varengeville, whilst another Group attempted to land opposite the Quiberville blockhouse where a platoon of the 3rd Company of the 571st Infantry Regiment was stationed. The attempt was frustrated by the concentrated fire of the Company.¹ On the other hand some Commandos were able to get ashore at various points in the area around Varengeville, where small wooded cliffs run down to the sea and where it was possible to clamber up.

This enemy force, about 300 men, attacked the battery from two sides with hand grenades, machine guns, and revolvers and mortars, while air bombardment neutralised the defence of the battery with continuous diving raids. Tracer bullets ignited the cartridges which were stored in the battery. The battery defended itself bravely right up to the end as is proved by the 28 dead and 29 wounded, including the Commanding Officer who directed the fire and did his best to hold out. When at last the battery passed into British hands practically all the guns had been rendered unserviceable by the ignition of the ammunition.

It was probably 0800 hours when the British Commandos re-embarked, taking with them 4 prisoners, and there were many dead and wounded of their own.

Evidently both the actions at Berneval and Varengeville were carried out with the object of wiping out the two heavy coastal batteries in order to facilitate later landings and subsequent re-embarkations at Dieppe.

The two coastal batteries were outside the main sector of Dieppe and through lack of personnel were not able to be defended sufficiently by infantry. The critical position of 813 was known, and its inclusion in the Dieppe defences proper should have been made earlier.

The Principal Attack against Dieppe

63. This took place on a wide front with three principal centres, at Puits, Dieppe itself and Pourville.

The attack at Puits was broken up by the concentrated fire of the heavy artillery with serious losses to the enemy. No British troops were able to force a passage through the defences. The enemy was literally wiped out by flanking

¹ No landing was attempted at this spot.

fire in front of the barriers, on the high walls running along the beach and on the beach itself. Besides numerous prisoners taken, there were 150 dead at this point alone.

The battalion which was landed immediately to the west of Dieppe Harbour, up to the Rue Duquesne, was dispersed and destroyed together with the tanks which had been landed. The gunboat *Locust*, which had come up to the entrance of the harbour at 0600, found herself under the fire of the anti-landing guns and was hit several times; she tried to back out under a smoke screen and was probably sunk, as during an interval of good visibility the stern of a large sinking ship with 200 or 300 men on board was clearly seen.

The two battalions which with tanks had landed on the two sides of the Casino suffered the same fate. They were dispersed during the landing operation on the beach and on the promenade, and with the exception of some patrols did not succeed in entering the town. All the tanks landed there were destroyed.

64. The 6th Battalion, however, succeeded in entering the western part of Pourville with the aid of darkness and smoke screens and overcame the weak garrison (1 platoon of infantry and men of the Todt Organisation). The battalion then tried to reach the objectives assigned to them. Two companies setting out from Pourville westwards overcame all the positions along the coastal road in the valley of the Scie and got as far as the anti-tank positions, where they put the gun out of use. Practically all the personnel serving the gun were killed. A part of the British were able to get over the Scie and arrive at the northern side of the Quatre Vents farm. Here they were destroyed.

The two companies did not succeed in breaking through the line of the principal defences of Dieppe. This line began only at the anti-tank positions, whilst Pourville had an advanced post only weakly defended.

The other two companies presumably reached their first objective, occupying the south side of Pourville and the machine gun positions on the heights towards the west forming with it a bridgehead.

65. The 7th Battalion, which had orders to land behind the 6th Battalion and to advance along the west bank of the Scie as far as the airport of St. Aubin, arrived in the zone of Hautot by going through the woods on the heights to the west of the river; they then came under the flanking fire from Quatre Vents Farm and met the Cyclist Platoon pushed forward by the 571st Infantry Regiment and other patrols from the same regiment. The intentions of this Canadian Battalion are not clear; they had met only slight resistance as there were only few German troops in the locality but they found it impossible to carry out orders to advance in the direction of the airport of St. Aubin. Probably they were held up by an order from the British Command as the frontal attack against Dieppe and Puits had not succeeded.

From the British orders it appears that the troops landed ought to have reached their fixed objectives before 1130 hours and that the retirement and re-embarkation ought to have started at that time. This operation had to be finished by 1430 hours. Numerous other vessels approached the beach at Dieppe up to midday. On account of the smoke it was not possible to see whether these vessels landed other troops or if they were taking on board those who had previously landed.

Measures adopted by Army Command

66. When shortly after 0500 hours the width of the attacking front was known and it was seen that there were no attacks at Le Tréport, at the mouth of the Somme, and in the sector of the 332 Infantry Division, the latter had, as

already mentioned, sent from Arques-la-Bataille to Berneval the Cyclist Squadron and 3rd Pioneer Company under the orders of Major von Blucher to help the Berneval Battery.

At 0610 hours the 571st Infantry Regiment stationed at Dieppe ordered its first battalion at Ouville to be prepared to attack in the Pourville direction.

The G.O.C. 81st Corps, who at 0540 hours gave the Alarm II to all divisions and reserves, put the 3rd Battalion of the 570th Infantry Regiment at the disposal of the 302nd Infantry Division and ordered it forward to Offranville, while the remainder of the reserves were given orders to advance to Bacqueville (14 kilometres southwards of Dieppe). The 1st Battalion of the 571st Infantry Regiment was ready at 0900 hours in the Hautot area for the attack against Pourville. At 1030 hours the battalion began the attack against Pourville, cleared the enemy from the heights to the west and took about 200 prisoners.

The position at Dieppe itself was cleared up by 1100 with the employment of five companies of the 571st Infantry Regiment, with some of the 302nd Pioneer Company. The counter-attack by this force caused the surrender of the British troops landed, who were completely demoralised. About 100 prisoners were taken.

What was the Cause of the Failure of the British Operation?

67. It was an absolutely mistaken estimate of the extent of the German defence which decided the enemy to take the bull by the horns and to land the main forces of his troops and tanks frontally at Dieppe, even though as appears from his charts he had a clear knowledge of the organisation of the coastal defences, the cement fortifications, the anti-tank walls, the machine gun positions, and the anti-landing guns. It is also hard to understand why no tank support was given to the patrols landed at Pourville. Probably the attack by tanks coming from Pourville against the heights west of Dieppe and the Quatre Vents Farm would have been successful even if getting through the anti-tank walls and over the Scie would have been a formidable obstacle.

Against all expectations, neither airborne troops nor parachutists were employed by the British. If Puits had been attacked from the east by airborne troops and at the same time from the sea, the position of the defence in the area would have been very critical, especially at first.

The enemy certainly thought that his air attack would have a demoralising effect on the coastal defences and hoped, therefore, to be able to overcome the German lines fairly easily with his battalions. Probably the precision and the efficiency of the British air attacks was considerably influenced by the smoke cover over Dieppe.

68. The enemy landed both light and heavy mortars, but in all his orders only one light battery and one light A.S. Squadron is mentioned, which was to be landed near Puits. As the landing, therefore, failed these guns were not employed. Probably some light assault artillery would have been of greater service initially than tanks.

69. Since the large naval vessels were not able to see the result of their gunfire on account of the artificial smoke, there was a want of any artillery support for the enemy forces.

The British under-estimate of our defences is as surprising, in view of their air reconnaissance, as is the brief lapse of time in which they believed they could carry out the whole operation.

Their operational orders extending over 100 pages gave the fullest details of the task of each unit and detachment. Their detail gave rise in itself to the germ of failure in case unforeseen difficulties presented themselves.

70. The British attack against Dieppe completely failed with very great losses to the enemy, thanks to the valiant defence of all our Armed Forces. The enemy left 95 officers and 2,122 men prisoners in our hands. Up to the 24th August, his dead are estimated at 475. More corpses are continually being washed up by the sea. A large percentage of losses which cannot be estimated was caused afloat by our gunfire, our air bombing, and the sinking of landing vessels, lighters and destroyers. The enemy losses must amount to 60 or 70 per cent of the landing force.

German Losses

302nd Infantry Division:—

5 officers, 14 non-commissioned officers, 68 men dead
1 non-commissioned officer, 9 men missing
5 officers, 27 non-commissioned officers, 124 men wounded

Total Losses: (Army, Navy, Air Force, Todt Organisation):—

6 officers, 144 non-commissioned officers and men dead
15 non-commissioned officers and men missing
5 officers, 270 non-commissioned officers and men wounded

Booty

28 tanks	60 machine pistols
7 motor lorries	42 anti-tank rifles
1 petrol waggon	70 light mortars
1,300 rifles	60 heavy mortars
170 machine guns	

In addition, a quantity of ammunition, hand grenades, explosives and equipment.

GERMAN REPORT OF 15th ARMY ON BRITISH ATTACK ON DIEPPE ON 19th AUGUST 1942

HEADQUARTERS, 27th AUGUST, 1942

Enemy Landings

71. The fact that the British were able to land a considerable number of men is explained by their use of so many landing craft (about 300 to 400) which were protected while proceeding to the beaches by both air force and naval gunnery and especially by the artificial smoke and natural cloud prevailing. The latter caused our own gunfire to be obscured at the critical moment of the landing operations, that is when the landing craft were still afloat within range of the guns of the defences. The attack has again proved that the prompt recognition of an attempt to land and the immediate opening of fire by the defences are of enormous and decisive importance in breaking up and destroying the naval objectives while these are still at some distance from the coast.

Also in future the employment of smoke by the enemy must be taken into consideration.

The Success of the Defences

72. From the large number of prisoners taken it may be thought that the fighting qualities of the British and Canadian troops are not too high; this is not the case. The enemy troops, nearly all Canadian soldiers, who took part in the battle fought well and bravely. The principal reasons for the large number of prisoners and the heavy losses are:—

- (1) The lack of artillery support. The naval guns were obscured by the smoke. As soon as his tanks had been eliminated the enemy had no more heavy weapons at his disposal.
- (2) The British had under-estimated the forces of the defence and at all the landing points, but especially at Puits and at Dieppe, were in a desperate position from the very start.
- (3) The effect of the German defensive weapons was greater than the offensive weapons employed by the enemy.
- (4) The craft which had been relied on for the re-embarkation were nearly all hit and sunk.

Reserves in the Sector

73. The opinion of the 81st Command is confirmed with regard to the employment of reserves in the sector. These reserves which can rapidly be got hold of should come into action without any hesitation, even if the position is not clear, so as to suffocate at birth any initial successes of the enemy.

Mobile Artillery

The request that part of the Army's reserves of guns should be quickly placed on motor lorries is justified.

Reserves of Army Corps

The proposal to reduce these reserves and to assign them to the divisions is not favoured.

The Corps reserves arrived too late on the 19th August, not because they were too far from the coast but because their movement orders were given only at 0630 hours. The Corps reserves were at the disposal of the 81st Corps from the beginning so that the hands of their Commanding Officer were not tied in any way with regard to their employment.

Anti-tank Defence

74. It appears necessary to strengthen the passive anti-tank defences covering a greater area. It is also absolutely necessary to strengthen the active anti-tank defence.

These first trials against British tanks have shown that the Anglo-American tanks are certainly vulnerable.

According to telephone communications from the 10th Armoured Division the tanks were perforated at short range by our anti-tank rifles and by anti-tank 37 mm guns with armour-piercing shells, Model 40, and also blown up with ordinary 37 mm shells for anti-tank guns (it appears that on 19th August these had been fired at too long range as well as badly aimed). It is a question of giving the personnel serving the anti-tank guns more confidence in their weapons and of training the gunlayers with regard to efficient ranges. With this object it seems that the training of the personnel in war conditions should be intensified.

Anti-landing Guns

A larger organisation for anti-landing batteries had been repeatedly requested.

In view of the absolute necessity for reinforcements the urgency of the increase is again pointed out.

Military Coastal Artillery

The indispensable inclusion of Army guns in the sector of the harbour works is again emphasised to those Commands where it has not hitherto been possible for want of personnel.

Collaboration with the Air Arm

75. To accelerate collaboration with the Air Arm an Air Liaison Officer should be sent to the Corps H.Q. with a wireless unit.

Liaison of the Corps with only one officer of the Air Arm does not seem workable; the one Command which, in the Army's point of view, could be taken into consideration is the Air Force. This, however, is not possible, the distance being too great.

Minefields

The arrangement of many false minefields (those at sea being charted) is a valuable factor.

Otherwise there are no improvements to propose.

It is possible that experience from other sectors can be obtained.

The creation of more telephone call boxes would be advisable, but perhaps this is a question of wire being available.

Wireless

76. The provision of wireless apparatus is not sufficient. It is absolutely necessary to have a third wireless apparatus in the batteries.

Civilian Traffic

The orders to stop all civilian traffic in the battle area must be given by the division itself on receiving the Alarm II signal.

Booty

Ascertaining the real situation with regard to booty has been impeded and delayed by various Commands intervening (even the Army High Command is included in this); it seems necessary that this intervention should be limited to the Commands concerned.

Consumption of Ammunition

77. The consumption of ammunition has been much too high. The importance of munition tactics should be continually inculcated to the troops.

The ammunition which is available ought not to be *destroyed*¹ too quickly.

The stowage of the ammunition should be re-examined (especially that of cartridges with regard to safety from incendiary projectiles). The stowage should be in small quantities at safe distances, under cement, if possible.

H.Q. has given the necessary orders.

¹ Presumably "expended" is meant.

Medical Services

78. The medical authorities in the sector of the 81st Command are being examined.

Fuel Supplies

The problem of fuel supplies for gasogene vehicles will be taken up by H.Q.

German Weapons

79. There have been no difficulties or special breakdowns in our arms and apparatus.

The introduction of some sort of electric lighting for blockhouses is urgently necessary.

British Weapons

There do not appear to be any new or unusual British weapons.

Their abandoned equipment with explosives of every type is worth pointing out.

Behaviour of the Troops

80. The behaviour of our troops has been good. An example was given by the non-commissioned officers who have done their duty everywhere. The fighting has shown the special importance of having good non-commissioned officers with detachments stationed in small nests of resistance and in block-houses.

The collaboration between detachments of the Army, of the Air Force, and of the Navy became more marked in the course of the fighting.

(Signed) HAASE,
Commander-in-Chief

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
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RESTRICTED

DIEPPE. 19th AUGUST 1942, SHOWING PRINCIPAL BATTERIES, LANDING PLACES AND TROOPS ENGAGED

PLAN I



RADAR STATION ———— 

GUN BATTERY (NUMBER) ———— 


DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS ———— 

KEY

OFFICERS' MESS, POURVILLE ———— 

AIRFIELD ———— 

GASWORKS ———— 



DIEPPE, 19th AUGUST 1942. DISPOSITION OF NAVAL FORCE DURING THE PASSAGE


Landing Craft are coloured in accordance with the colour of the beach to which they proceeded.

NAVAL SHIPS AND LANDING CRAFT

DESTROYERS	9
MINESWEEPERS (NOT SHOWN)	15
GUNBOAT	1
CHASSEURS	7
LANDING SHIPS	9
S.G.B.'s.,	4
M.G.B.'s.,	12
M.L.'s.,	16
	<u>73</u>

LANDING CRAFT TANK	24
LANDING CRAFT FLAK	6
LANDING CRAFT SUPPORT	8
LANDING CRAFT MECHANISED	7
LANDING CRAFT ASSAULT	60
LANDING CRAFT PERSONNEL	74
	<u>179</u>
TOTAL	<u>252</u>

Bleasdale
Albrighton
Berkeley
Garth




KEY

- DESTROYERS
- LANDING SHIPS INFANTRY
- GUNBOAT
- CHASSEURS
- LANDING CRAFT TANK
- S.G.B.'s., M.G.B.'s., M.L.'s.,
- L.C.F.,
- L.C.S.,
- L.C.M.,
- L.C.A.,
- L.C.P.,

NOTE

The L.C.A. and L.C.S. in groups 1, 2, 3 and 4 were shipborne.
The L.C.P. in groups 5, 6 and 7 made the passage under their own power.


Slazak (Polish)
Brocklesby




NOTE.—If Radar plots of German Convoy are correct destroyers were south-east of their course and Group 5 to south-west of course through JJ. Positions are only approximate as information is not sufficient to lay down precise positions. It is certain from the German report that vessels engaged were the escorts of the German convoy.


PLOT OF ENEMY CONVOY, 18-19th AUGUST 1942

PLAN 5









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